Institutional influence on the manifestation of entrepreneurial orientation: A case of social investment funders by Onishi, Tamaki
  
INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE ON THE MANIFESTATION OF 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION: 
A CASE OF SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUNDERS 
 
 
 
 
 
Tamaki Onishi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 
Indiana University 
 
September 2013 
 
 ii 
Accepted by the Faculty of Indiana University, in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
August 1, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Wolfgang Bielefeld, Ph.D., Chair 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Dwight F. Burlingame, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Jeffrey G. Covin, Ph.D. 
      
 
 
 
 
   
Janet P. Near, Ph.D. 
      
 
 
  
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 
Tamaki Onishi 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 iv 
DEDICATION 
 
For my very best boy, Blessing. Your spirit will continue to guide me throughout my life. 
 
  
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Since I came by myself from Japan to the United States—a nation with a rich 
tradition of philanthropy, my life has been filled with many challenges, yet with 
numerous episodes of people’s generosity as well.  The biggest lesson I learned during 
my work for fundraising at Carnegie Hall and WNET New York is to thank those people 
for their unconditional support and to never take it for granted.  As such, I will here 
express my deepest gratitude to those who helped bring this dissertation to completion.  
My acknowledgement should go first to my dissertation chair, Dr. Wolfgang 
Bielefeld, for many reasons.  He expressed a strong interest in my research idea while it 
was still very premature, and always advocated for it.  This resulted in faculty funding 
from the Center on Philanthropy and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.  I am 
also extremely grateful for his efforts training me by sharing not only his academic 
successes but also his own challenges as a student when I was let down.  This was crucial 
for me, since a student tends to think that a well-known scholar had no such challenges.  
Dr. Dwight Burlingame was the person, besides Dr. Lilya Wagner, who brought 
me to the Center on Philanthropy (now Lilly Family School of Philanthropy) and opened 
the door to the community of philanthropic scholars and practitioners.  He taught me 
what philanthropy really means: Not only is he a scholar of philanthropic studies, but he 
has also been living American philanthropy.  His dedication to supporting me throughout 
my time at the School was unparalleled; yet he never asked for any returns.  
I am most honored that Dr. Jeffrey Covin agreed to serve on my committee.  As a 
prominent entrepreneurship scholar especially for his groundbreaking research on EO, he 
 vi 
taught me not only about EO, but also how a successful scholar has established his 
career—never being satisfied with the current state and determinedly seeking to achieve 
the highest level.  He often shared his ongoing, as well as prior, studies with me, which 
was the most intellectually stimulating experience that I ever treasured.   
Dr. Janet Near is my minor advisor and became my role model.  I first met her as 
a student of her doctoral seminar at Kelley School of Business, and I was truly blessed by 
having her in my committee.  I learned the greatest deal about all aspects of research 
from her.  She always treats her student with enormous respect and patience, and 
responded immediately with detailed information to my numerous, and often 
complicating, questions.  Now as I will no longer need to ask her about my dissertation, I 
will miss her tremendously.  
There are many people whom I owe so much outside my committee.  I would like 
to start thanking Dr. Eugene Tempel and the Honorable P.A. Mack.  It was my greatest 
honor to be selected as a Mack and Tempel fellow for consecutive years.  I am 
indefinitely grateful to Dr. Warren Ilchiman, Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, and 
the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, for their support enabling my research.  Dr. 
Patrick Rooney and Dr. Una Osili helped Dr. Bielefeld and me obtain necessary funding.  
Dr. Leslie Lenkowsky helped me develop my research questions with his crucial insights 
into foundations during our “weekly Skype meetings.”  Dr. Richard Steinberg was always 
available when I had been hampered by methodology questions, and more seriously when 
I, as a harsh critic of myself, was becoming my own worst enemy.  Dr. Lilya Wagner, Dr. 
Gregory Witkowski, and Dr. Fran Huehls lent me moral support always.  Dr. William 
Crowther and Dr. Ruth DeHoog at University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro 
 vii 
have fostered me since I became their vising—now full-time—faculty member.  Dr. Scott 
Richter, a statistics professor at UNC at Greensboro, introduced sophisticated statistical 
techniques, such as multiple imputation analysis, to me.  Many thanks to my fellow 
students, especially Richard (Ruey-Der), Bill, Taka, Suzann, Tyrone, Sung-Ju, and Sarah, 
and our wonderful colleagues Susy and Emily, for helping me progress.  
Obtaining systematic data was the determinant of a successful completion of my 
dissertation research.  In this regard, my deep gratitude goes to people at Indiana 
University Center for Survey Research, in particular Dr. John Kennedy and Lilian Yahng. 
Aryn Schounce was a graduate student at School of Public and Environmental Affairs, 
who came to help my survey follow-up efforts.  It was her outstanding help that enabled a 
high response rate.  And, no words can begin to express my heartfelt thanks to SIF 
professionals and thought-leaders who took an extra time in answering my interviews and 
surveys.  Without your help, this dissertation would not be completed. 
As institutional theory suggests, my mission originating this dissertation research 
has been shaped by the institution in which I am most profoundly embedded—my family.  
My mother Yoshiko has equipped me with critical principles in life: every individual has 
a right to pursue his/her dream although it may be against social norms; always thank 
others for what they have done for me and society; and treat anybody fairly regardless of 
social and economic statuses.  I recalled that she always offered a help to underprivileged 
children in our neighborhood—as I often sat with them to do my homework!  My sister 
Michiru, whom I adore more than she can imagine, persuaded my father who was 
initially reluctant to let me study abroad when I was accepted by Columbia University.  
Without her backing, I would not be able to continue my career in the United States.  
 viii 
Likewise, I would not have survived without my beloved and brave girl Philly, who has 
consoled me exceedingly during our most devastating days after passing of her “brother” 
Blessing, and our new boy Benevolence, whose arrival has lit up our life again.  
There are several beings that no longer exist on earth, but that enlightened me 
how deeply philanthropy is rooted in human values.  Victims of the 9/11 attacks—the 
tragedy in which I happened to be involved when our president at WNET urged all staff 
members to volunteer—empowered me to discover my own entrepreneurial capacity 
when I organized a volunteer group assisting their families; as being trained to be a 
classical pianist, I had never done this sort of thing till then.  This experience also made 
me realize that data of victims were not about numbers, but about a life unique to each 
special being.  My grandmother Masae, who raised my father single-handedly as a war 
widow and small business owner, has left a testament to how an individual could be 
entrepreneurial despite very limited resources.  My father Yoshihiro was an Olympian 
later becoming a corporate executive, who also actively supported young athletes.  
During and after his funeral, I learned from many his employees that he avoided massive 
layoffs during Japan’s depression by cutting his own salary and benefits: His life 
demonstrated to me that business and philanthropy could harmonize in a remarkable 
manner.  Finally, my very best boy Blessing, who passed away unexpectedly right before 
our moving to Greensboro: You came to my life in its prime, and always supported me 
later during my darkest times.  As I kept telling you, I would not be alive without you.  I 
am not really sure how I am still here, honestly.  But, one thing I am very certain about is 
that you have kept, and will continue to keep, me grounded and focused in pursuit of my 
life mission.  For this very reason, this dissertation is dedicated to you.   
 ix 
ABSTRACT 
Tamaki Onishi 
INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE ON THE MANIFESTATION OF 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION: 
A CASE OF SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUNDERS 
 
 Linking the new institutionalism to entrepreneurial orientation (EO), my 
dissertation investigates institutional forces and entrepreneurial forces—two 
contradicting types of forces—as main effects and moderating effects upon practices and 
performance of organizations embedded in the institutional duality.  The case chosen 
observes unique hybrid funders that this study collectively calls social investment funders 
(SIF), which integrate philanthropy and venture capital investment to create and 
implement a venture philanthropy model for a pursuit of their mission.  A theoretical 
framework is developed to propose regulative and normative pressures from two 
dominant institutions governing SIFs.  Original data collected from 146 organizations are 
scrutinized by moderated multiple regressions for two empirical studies: Study 1 for 
effects on SIFs’ venture philanthropy practices, and Study 2 for effects on SIFs’ social 
and financial performance.  Multiple imputations, diagnostic analyses, and several post 
hoc analyses are also conducted for robustness of data and results from multiple 
regression analyses.   
 Results from these analyses find that EO and venture capital institutional forces 
both enhance SIFs’ venture philanthropy practices.  A hypothesis postulated for a 
negative relationship between the nonprofit status and venture philanthropy practices is 
also supported.  Results from moderated regression analyses, along with a subgroup and 
EO subdimension analyses, confirm a moderating effect between EO and the nonprofit 
 x 
status, i.e., a regulative institutional pressure.  A positive relationship is found in EO- 
financial performance, but not in EO-social performance.  While support is lent to 
hypotheses posited for a social/financial performance relationship with donors’/investors’ 
demand for social outcomes, and with the management team’s training in business, the 
overall results remain mixed for Study 2.  Nonetheless, this dissertation appears to be the 
first study to theorize and test EO as a micro-level condition enabling organizations to 
strategically shape and resist institutional pressures, and it reinforces that organizations’ 
behavior is not merely a product of their passive conformity to environmental forces, but 
of the agency, also.  As such, this study aims to contribute to scholarly efforts by the 
“agency camp” of the new institutionalism and EO, answering a call from the leading 
scholars of both EO (Miller) and the new institutionalism (Oliver).  
 
 
 
Wolfgang Bielefeld, Ph.D., Chair 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 1 presents an overview of this dissertation by explaining research 
backgrounds, objectives, questions and contributions.  Pertinent prior literature is 
reviewed to identify theoretical gaps in institutional theory and entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO).  The present chapter concludes with summarizing the structure of this 
dissertation.  
  
Overview 
The last decade has witnessed substantial developments in research on social 
entrepreneurship.  A recent study found that its sample of 152 articles on social 
entrepreneurship showed an increase in publication rate of 750 percent over the 18-year 
time span (Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 2009).  Despite many conceptual and 
methodological issues, including a lack of agreement on major aspects such as a clear 
definition as well as difficulty measuring performance, this emerging field bears 
significant opportunities for theory development (Austin, 2006; Bielefeld, 2009; Mair & 
Martí, 2006; Mort, Weerawardena, & Carnegie, 2003; Nicholls, 2010; Peredo & McLean, 
2006; Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman, 2009).  The complexity of 
organizational legal status and structure (nonprofit, for-profit, or a hybrid of both) and the 
duality of goals and orientation (social and financial) challenge our conventional 
understanding about theories that have been tested and established.  Indeed, the number 
of theory-grounded studies about social entrepreneurship is rapidly increasing.  As shown 
in Table 1.1, those studies apply a wide range of theoretical perspectives to analyses, 
ranging from economics and market failure (Cohen & Winn, 2007; Dean & McMullen,  
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2007) and organizational identity (Grimes, 2010; Miller & Wesley, 2010) to bricolage1 
(Di Domenico, Haugh, & Tracey, 2010), institutional logics and theory (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Moody, 2008; Townsend & Hart, 2008), and the resource-based view 
(Meyskens, Robb-Post, Stamp, Carsrud, & Reynolds, 2010). 
My dissertation aims to follow these theory-grounded efforts advancing social 
entrepreneurship research by combining two theoretical perspectives, namely, the new 
institutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008a) and entrepreneurial orientation 
(EO) (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Miller & Friesen, 1978; Miller, 1983).  My approach 
originates from theoretical gaps identified by Oliver (1991), which I will discuss in more 
detail in the following section.  In sum, the gaps lie at the heart of the “structure versus 
agency debate”—the most central quarrel dividing institutionalists (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 
1997).  That is, institutional theorists have been involved in heated discussions over 
whether organizational behavior is primarily the product of macro social forces or of 
organizational agency.  Although the agency arguments offers a meaningful premise of 
advancing institutional theory, the term “institutional” is still more likely to be associated 
with “structure” (Scott, 2008a), and as a result, the bulk of the research efforts in the 
institutional theory tradition is concentrated on tests of structure rather than agency 
(Heugens & Lander, 2009).  
To fill the important gaps identified to advance institutional theory, my 
dissertation takes the “agency” position in the new institutionalism by linking 
institutional theory to EO.  A traditional “structure” position in the new institutionalism 
                                                
1 It should be noted that a concept of “bricolage,” which originates from Lévi-Strauss's (1966) work 
describing it as “making do with whatever is at hand,” has been applied as “entrepreneurial bricolage” to 
entrepreneurship literature.  Baker and Nelson (2005) have developed a formal definition of entrepreneurial 
bricolage proposed a process model of bricolage and firm growth. 
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emphasizes how organizational behaviors and structures are shaped by institutional forces 
that reinforce stability and conformity.  In contrast, the literature on entrepreneurship 
tends to call attention to how organizational behaviors and institutions themselves are 
shaped by creative entrepreneurial forces that bring about change.  The juxtaposition of 
these contradictory forces has stirred a tension, yet it has also opened a new promising 
research avenue for “institutional entrepreneurship” (DiMaggio, 1988).  Scott (1987) first 
proposed that institutional arguments alone are insufficient to fully explain organizational 
behaviors and are perhaps better positioned as complementary.  The importance of the 
approach I am taking has been fervently stressed (Garud, Hardy & Maguire, 2007), as it 
will advance institutional theory.  Linking EO with institutional theory does not serve 
only the interests of institutional theorists.  In a recent Special Issue of Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice about EO, Miller (2011) suggested that EO scholars explore using 
institutional theory for their EO research because combining these theoretical domains 
will serve well to contribute to useful EO theory development.  Miller’s comment reflects 
the fact that institutional theory may have not received worthy attention from EO scholars 
to date, with a few exceptions (e.g. Tang, Tang, Marino, Zhang, & Li, 2008), which 
usually examine EO against government policies and infrastructures in the international 
context (e.g., China).    
In my dissertation, institutional forces and entrepreneurial forces are investigated 
as main effects and interaction effects upon (1) organizations’ practices, and (2) their 
performance.  In so doing, I examine how institutional forces and entrepreneurial forces 
affect organizational practices and performance both individually and jointly by using 
moderated multiple regression analyses.  Some post hoc analyses and multiple imputation 
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analyses are conducted for the robustness of the results and data.  To pursue my inquiry, 
the empirical context selected for this study is unique hybrid funders (Young, 2007) for 
social entrepreneurs, which are often called “venture philanthropy foundations” 
(Fleishman, 2009) or “social venture capital funds” (Clark & Gaillard, 2003; Miller & 
Wesley, 2010).  This study collectively calls them social investment funders (SIFs) that 
adopt and adapt a for-profit venture capital model (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984) for 
philanthropic purposes, which resulted in creating an unconventional model called a 
venture philanthropy funding model (Brainerd, 1999; Frumkin, 2008; Letts, Ryan, & 
Grossman, 1997).  As discussed in more detail below, the idea of venture philanthropy 
has arguably gotten the greatest attention in the field of nonprofit and philanthropic 
studies over the past decade (Frumkin, 2008); nonetheless, very limited scholarly efforts 
have been made to investigate this topic (Moody, 2008) primarily due to a lack of 
systematic data for analysis (Van Slyke & Newman, 2006). 
Given these backgrounds, my objectives in this study are two-fold.  First, I hope 
to fill theoretical gaps identified in the new institutionalism literature and the EO 
literature, and to expand theoretical implications of these two domains.  These theoretical 
gaps will be detailed below in the literature review section.  My second, and perhaps the 
most fundamental, objective answers a call from my fellow nonprofit and philanthropic 
scholars (Dees, 1998; Van Slyke & Newman, 2006).  My objective is to help advance 
more scholarly theory-grounded efforts to understand unique phenomena of social 
entrepreneurship and venture philanthropy.  To conduct this empirical study, I collected 
systematic data and analyzed them through hypothesis testing by moderated multiple 
regression.  This methodological approach distinguishes my study from the majority of 
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the theory-grounded studies listed in Table 1.1, which generally take an exploratory and 
qualitative approach.  A use of qualitative methods should be justified, considering that 
the field of social entrepreneurship is still in its infancy and thus offers a prime 
opportunity for theory development through employing rich qualitative methods (Dart, 
2004; Kistruck & Beamish, 2010; Peredo & Chrisman, 2006).  Nevertheless, the time 
seems ripe for embarking on a next stage.  The recent study by Short and his co-authors 
(2009) succinctly summarizes the present state and future directions of our collective 
efforts to advance the social entrepreneurship field:  
 
Based on our review of conceptual social entrepreneurship articles, we 
believe that scholarly progress in social entrepreneurship research will not 
accelerate until theoretical relationships become more explicit, reflecting 
Cummings' (2007) statement that legitimacy can be gained when research 
questions are principally theory driven, and data gathering and analytical 
methods are chiefly quantitative (Short et al., 2009, p. 166). 
 
This statement underscores that quantitative analysis with theory testing is critical 
to further advance social entrepreneurship.  My dissertation aims also to meet this call by 
a triangular method involving hypothesis testing by quantitative analyses.  Now, let us 
move to the literature review to identify gaps addressed in this empirical study.  
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Table 1.1. Selected Theory-Grounded Studies about Social Entrepreneurship  
Author (Year) Theoretical 
perspectives 
Sample Methodology Findings 
Battilana & 
Dorado (2010) 
Institutional logics 2 pioneering 
commercial 
microfinance 
organizations 
Case study • A lack of institutional logic plurality forces hybrid 
organizations to develop a common organizational 
identity that enables organization members to strike a 
balance between logics so as to maintain their hybridity.  
Cohen & Winn 
(2007) 
Market failure N/A  Theory paper • Sustainable entrepreneurship arises from market 
imperfections that have contributed to environmental 
degradation: (1) firms are not perfectly efficient; (2) 
externalities exist; (3) pricing mechanisms work 
imperfectly; and (4) information is not perfectly 
distributed. 
Dean & McMullen 
(2007) 
Market failure  N/A Theory paper • Environmentally relevant market failures provide 
opportunities for achieving profitability while 
simultaneously reducing environmentally degrading 
economic behaviors. 
 Di Domenico, 
Haugh & Tracey 
(2010) 
Bricolage 8 social enterprises in 
U.K. 
Case study • Social enterprises acquire resources in resource-scarce 
environments through social bricolage, which is based 
on the constructs of social value creation, stakeholder 
participation, and persuasion.  
Grimes (2010) Organizational 
identity and sense 
making  
6 organizations with 
different geographies 
and service mixes  
Case study • Social organizations employ performance measurement 
as a tool for making sense of social entrepreneurship as 
an organizational identity, and their relationship with 
funders varies in terms of how they use performance 
measurements as a sense-making tool to establish their 
organizational identities.  
 
  
  
7 
Table 1.1. (cont.) 
Author (Year) Theoretical 
perspectives 
Sample Methodology Findings 
Meyskens, Robb-
Post, Stamp, 
Carsrud & 
Reynolds (2010) 
Resource-based 
view 
70 social 
entrepreneurs in 
economic 
development and 
education 
Content analysis 
and correlation 
analysis 
• Not only commercial but also social entrepreneurs rely 
on interlinked resources to create value, as shown by 
the positive and significant relationship between 
innovativeness, financial capital, and partnerships, and 
that between knowledge transferability and 
innovativeness.  
Miller & Wesley 
(2010) 
Organizational 
identity 
44 social venture 
capitalists 
Hierarchical linear 
regression 
• The dual identity of social ventures in the social and 
entrepreneurship sectors prompts their funders, social 
venture capitalists, to assess their investment decision 
based on criteria drawn from both sectors.    
Moody (2008) Institutional theory 
and field 
construction  
13 organizational 
leaders in venture 
philanthropy  
Exploratory  • The construction and diffusion of the venture 
philanthropy field depended on opinion leaders who 
strategically defined, legitimated, and advocated the 
new model. Implementation difficulties and the for-
profit/nonprofit culture clash also affected the evolution 
of the field. 
Moss, Short, 
Payne & Lumpkin 
(2011) 
Organizational 
identity  
118 winners of 
awards by 
FastCompany and 
the Skoll Foundation 
Content analysis  • Sample social ventures exhibit dual identities: a 
utilitarian organizational identity (i.e., entrepreneurial, 
product oriented) and a normative organizational 
identity (i.e., social, people oriented)—and show a 
greater normative identity relative to mainstream for-
profit ventures.  
Townsend & Hart 
(2008) 
Institutional theory N/A Theory paper • Founder perceptions of an ambiguous institutional 
environment are leading to the variance in choice of 
organizational form for social entrepreneurial ventures. 
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Gaps in Literature 
 
Agency Perspectives in the New Institutionalism: Organizations’ Strategic 
Responses to Environmental Pressures 
Institutional theory adopts an open system perspective: Organizations are strongly 
influenced by the environment surrounding them.  Whereas the “old” institutional theory 
focuses on the role of habit, issues of influence, competing values, power and informal 
structures (Parsons, 1960; Selznick, 1949, 1957), the “new” institutional theory2 
highlights the cognitive aspect of institutions, legitimacy, and embeddedness of 
organizational fields as the central issues (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Zucker, 1988).  As such, the new institutionalism dictates that legitimacy and 
social acceptability are critical for organizations to survive and thrive in their social 
environment (Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000).  Legitimacy3 here is regarded as a 
“generated perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).  To gain legitimacy, organizations must comply 
with demands from their institutions, which are “composed of regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide 
stability and meaning to social life” (Scott, 2008a, p. 48).   
                                                
2 Scholars (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a; Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Scott, 2008) often 
distinguish the “new institutionalism” from the “old” institutionalism, while there is a criticism of this 
distinction (e.g., Selznick, 1996).  In the old institutionalism, issues of influence, coalitions, and competing 
values are central, along with power and informal structure.  This focus contrasts with the new 
institutionalism with its emphasis on legitimacy, the embeddedness of organizational fields, and the 
centrality of classification, routines, scripts, and schema (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977).  The current study bases its discussions on the new institutional perspective unless otherwise noted.   
3 It should be noted that different theories define “legitimacy” differently.  For instance, resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) views legitimacy as another kind of resource for 
organizations.  The present study follows the definitions by new institutional theory.   
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As a result, conformity to the external constraints presses organizations toward 
“institutional isomorphism”(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)—processes that lead 
organizations in a specific organizational field to become homogeneous to one another 
over time in search of legitimacy.  Institutional isomorphism occurs through any of three 
pressures: (1) coercive isomorphism (in which organizations are pressured to adopt rules 
from other organizations they are dependent upon); (2) mimetic isomorphism (in which 
one organization mimics another successful organization in the face of uncertainty); and 
(3) normative isomorphism (in which increased professionalization presses organizations 
to adopt same, appropriate methods) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983).  According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), such inter-organizational 
homogeneity is the logical end state for all organizations occupying increasingly 
professionalized and “structured” (Giddens, 1984) fields where an increase in the amount 
of interactions among organizations leads to the development of particular structures 
reflecting their shared self-definition. 
Hence, the effects of the institutional environment on structural conformity and 
isomorphism have long been the “master hypothesis” of the structuralist camp in the new 
institutionalism (Heugens & Lander, 2009).  Notwithstanding its current status as one of 
the leading perspectives in organizational analysis (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999), the new 
institutionalism has also been a frequent target of criticism due to its assumption about 
organizational passivity and its failure to adequately address an organization’s possible 
strategic behavior and response to influence the process of institutionalization (Covaleski 
& Dirsmith, 1988; Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; DiMaggio, 1988; Hirsch, 1997; 
Powell, 1985).     
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In 1988, DiMaggio offered an important implication about the “agency” view of 
the new institutionalism: “new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient 
resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly” 
(DiMaggio, 1988, p. 14).  However, Oliver's study (1991) first laid out a systematic set of 
the counterhypotheses arguing that an organization can indeed be an active player in 
organization-environment relations and also be capable of employing a broad range of 
strategic behaviors responding to the institutional environment that affects it.  There are 
five types of strategic behaviors that organizations may enact in response to institutional 
pressures toward conformity.  These strategic behaviors vary from passivity to increasing 
active resistance: (1) acquiescence (mimicking models and obeying rules); (2) 
compromise (balancing multiple expectations and negotiating with stakeholders); (3) 
avoidance (buffering and loosening institutional attachments and changing goals); (4) 
defiance (ignoring or contesting rules, requirements and norms); and (5) manipulation 
(shaping values and controlling institutional processes).   
According to Oliver (1991), how organizations respond to institutional pressures 
depends on their willingness, capacity and resources, i.e., the micro-based organizational 
factors, along with other institutional antecedents.  As such, Oliver (1991) hypothesized 
organizational responses to institutional pressures toward conformity, based on five 
conditions: (1) cause (why institutional pressures are being exerted); (2) constituents 
(who is exerting these institutional pressures); (3) content (what these pressures are); (4) 
control (how or by what means these institutional pressures are exerted); and (5) context 
(where they occur).   
  11 
Today, this “structure (conformity) versus agency (strategic responses) debate” is 
discussed as the most central quarrel dividing institutionalists (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 
1997).  The primary question is about whether organizational behavior is the product of 
macro social forces or of organizational agency.  In Oliver's view (1991), organizations 
experience differing degrees of discretion in responding to institutional pressures.  
Increased institutionalization can in fact become a source of deviant, autonomous, and 
entrepreneurial behaviors in their own rights (“institutional entrepreneurship,” DiMaggio, 
1988).  That is, it is argued that institutional pressures actually promote organizations to 
assume entrepreneurial behaviors, which then shape institutional processes.   
Being invoked by Oliver’s argument, other scholars began theoretically exploring 
the agency perspective in the new institutionalism (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; 
Hoffman, 1999; Washington & Ventresca, 2004).  These foundation studies resulted in 
the increasing number of empirical studies exploring this line of research (Holm, 1995; 
Rao, Davis, & Ward, 2000).  Today, we have some empirical insights about what 
conditions may trigger organizations’ resistance against environmental constraints.  For 
example, institutionalization is a product of “interaction rituals” that work to distribute 
power differentially within fields and consequently engender strategies of resistance on 
the part of those not privileged by existing conditions (Lawrence, 2004).  Zilber's (2002) 
ethnographic study reveals that the roles of organization members work as carriers of 
institutions and their agency in infusing actions with meanings through interpretation.  
Ongoing field-level institutionalization is also likely to give rise to endogenous pressures 
for change.  The underlying mechanism confirms that increasingly strict isomorphic 
pressures progressively reduce the adaptive flexibility of institutions, and this condition 
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in turn makes them more vulnerable to exogenous resistances and shocks (Schneiberg, 
2005).  To date, many studies (Child, Lu, & Tsai, 2007; Greenwood, Suddaby, & 
Hinings, 2002; Holm, 1995) have been focusing on field-level conditions enabling 
organizations’ response to influence institutional constraints.   
Notwithstanding a significant contribution that these studies have made to 
advance the new institutionalism (Heugens & Lander, 2009), the main focus of most 
prior studies remains on organizations’ deviant and entrepreneurial behaviors at the 
“field” level.  In other words, resistance and deviance are examined as collective actions 
by a group of organizations, rather than idiosyncratic actions by an individual 
organization.  What is lacking here is an attention to the “organizational-level” 
conditions, i.e., the attributes of organizations, answering a question about why some 
organizations take a strategic response to institutional pressures while other organizations 
do not, even within the same institutional field.  Research on strategic responses of 
organizations at the macro level does not adequately rise to a fundamental claim about 
organizations’ agentic, entrepreneurial, and strategic actions against institutional 
pressures, which Oliver (1991) advocated in her seminar work.  It is still not well 
understood whether the level of entrepreneurship in individuals or organizations can be a 
determinant of organizational strategic responses to institutional pressures.  My empirical 
study is poised to fill this gap in the new institutionalism.  
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The Paradox of Embedded Agency: Linking the New Institutionalism to 
Entrepreneurship Research 
Master hypotheses of institutional theory and entrepreneurship4 contrast with each 
other.  As reviewed above, the literature of the new institutionalism has traditionally 
focused on stability of the field and passive conformity of organizations to environments, 
although it increasingly acknowledges the importance of change5 (Dacin et al., 2002; 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1993).  Legitimacy is more important than effectiveness from the 
institutional theory perspective.  In contrast, the literature on entrepreneurship highlights 
change through the processes of discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities 
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) and effectiveness and efficiency are venerated (Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997).  Despite the contrast between these two theories, the juxtaposing of 
institutional and entrepreneurial literature can offer considerable promise for 
understanding how and why certain entrepreneurial organizing actions come into 
existence in the face of institutional constraints (Garud et al., 2007).  An inquiry that 
reintroduces agency, interests, and power into institutional analyses of organizations has 
today led to a dramatic growth of a new research agenda6, “institutional 
entrepreneurship” (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Child et al., 2007; Dorado, 
2005; Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 
                                                
4 It should be noted here that my use of the term entrepreneurship is very general. EO scholars, such as 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) distinguish a firm's EO or entrepreneurial processes, from entrepreneurship, 
which is often defined as new entry. Lumpkin and Dess (1996) said “new entry explains what 
entrepreneurship consists of, and entrepreneurial orientation describes how new entry is undertaken” ( p. 
136). 
5 It should also be noted that work by the “old” institutional theory (Selznick, 1949, 1957) accounted for 
actors’ agency, while the new institutional theory tends to overlook the role of actors in institutional 
change.  
6 Although DiMaggio (1988) has been credited with the foundational work for the notion of institutional 
entrepreneurship, Leca, Battilana, & Boxenbaum (2008a) cite Eisenstadt (1980) as the first to use the 
notion of institutional entrepreneurship to characterize actors who serve as catalysts for structural change 
and take the lead in being the impetus for, and giving direction to, change.  
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2006; Khan, Munir, & Willmott, 2007; Lawrence & Phillips, 2004; Leca, Battilana, & 
Boxenbaum, 2008; Leca & Naccache, 2006; Lounsbury, 2007; Maguire, Hardy, & 
Lawrence, 2004; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011; Wijen & Ansari, 2007; Zilber, 2007).  
In sum, institutional entrepreneurs serve as “agents of legitimacy supporting the creation 
of institutions that they deem to be appropriate and aligned with their interests. These 
agents have the resources and hence the power to shape the character of institutions and 
institutional change” (Dacin et al., 2002, p. 47).   
My effort to link institutional theory to entrepreneurship echoes the heated 
debates among institutional entrepreneurship scholars over “the paradox of embedded 
agency” (Battilana & D’aunno, 2009; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b; Friedland & Alford, 
1991; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Holm, 1995; Leca & Naccache, 2006; Mair & Martí, 
2006; Mutch, 2007; Seo & Creed, 2002; Sewell, 1992; Uzzi, 2001).  The debates have 
brought a challenge to the very principle of the new institutionalism because it 
traditionally views institutions as the source of stability (Scott, 2008a).  The notion of 
institutional entrepreneurship runs against this traditional view shared among institutional 
scholars.  The primary question is: if actors are embedded in an institutional field and are 
substantially shaped by regulative, normative and cognitive pressures that structure their 
cognitions, how can they envision change and enact new practices in the contexts in 
which they are embedded? (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006)  Resolving this paradox is a 
key challenge to the formulation of theoretical foundations for the study of institutional 
entrepreneurship. 
 To answer this, many organizational studies have been published.  Yet, most 
literature on institutional entrepreneurship investigates the field-level conditions that 
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prompt institutional entrepreneurship.  Research that accounts for institutional 
entrepreneurship at the micro and individual level remains very limited (Battilana et al., 
2009).  Still, the limited literature about institutional entrepreneurship at a micro level 
informs us about individual-level conditions enabling institutional entrepreneurship.  
Such conditions include actors’ sensemaking strategies (Dorado, 2005), partial autonomy 
from the institution (Seo & Creed, 2002), an entrepreneur’s ability to abstract from the 
concerns of others and to take an autonomous reflexive stance (Mutch, 2007), and 
empathy and social skills to provide other actors with reasons to cooperate (Fligstein, 
1997, 2001).  Despite their contribution, there is still very limited understanding about 
how entrepreneurial forces urge organizations to execute a novel action to resist 
institutional forces.  
Entrepreneurship scholars, too, have begun actively applying institutional theory 
to their studies, due to the dissatisfaction with theories that tend to ignore the social and 
institutional forces and structural configurations that shape organizational actions 
(Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007).  A 
recent study by Bruton and his co-authors (2010) states that institutional theory has 
become a major theoretical lens for entrepreneurship research since Shane and Foo's 
(1999) application of institutional theory to investigate the survival of franchisors.  The 
authors also surveyed existing entrepreneurial articles that employed institutional theory 
and identified three major streams of research: (1) institutional setting, (2) legitimacy, 
and (3) institutional entrepreneurship.   
A review by Bruton and his co-authors (2010) reveals that the majority—
seemingly in a disproportionately larger number than in case in sociology and other 
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organizational studies—of entrepreneurship research has utilized institutional theory for 
comparative international research typically between emerging and transitional 
economies (e.g., China, Eastern Europe, Russia) and mature market economies (e.g., the 
United States) (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Obloj, 2008; Busenitz, Gómez, & Spencer, 2000; 
Manolova, Eunni, & Gyoshev, 2008; Zacharakis, McMullen, & Shepherd, 2007).  Scott’s 
“three pillar” frame (2008) is often introduced as a theoretical model to examine varying 
rules, norms, and beliefs that influence organizations across countries and cultures.  By 
using the three pillar frame addressing regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive forces 
from institutional fields, scholars strive to find out what institutional environment enables 
and constrains entrepreneurial activities in the environment in question (Ahlstrom & 
Bruton, 2010; Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003; Peng, 2004; Peng, Yamakawa, & Lee, 2010).  
As such, actively explored research agendas include investigating how the institutional 
factors, such as government regulations, define, promote or limit entrepreneurial 
opportunities and venture capital practices, and how they affect the rate and size of new 
venture creation (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Singh, 2002); and what are legitimacy-building 
strategies in different countries and how do they affect entrepreneurial actions there 
(Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 2008).  In their studies about institutional influences, most 
entrepreneurship scholars also tend to focus on impacts of “institutional void” (Hajer, 
2003; Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Breton-Miller, 2009)—the situation where institutional 
infrastructures are inadequate, weak or non-existent—upon entrepreneurial activities and 
how entrepreneurs manage to create ventures in the condition that lacks institutional 
infrastructure (often by forming informal ties and relational governance).  
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These studies have dramatically advanced our understanding of entrepreneurial 
activities from an international and broader perspective.  Nonetheless, their findings are 
still somehow disconnected from Oliver’s (1991) hypotheses.  That is, without going 
deeper into the micro level to examine the relationship between the level of 
entrepreneurial posture of individual organizations, rather than a group of organizations, 
and their strategic responses to institutional environments, we still do not know how 
entrepreneurial forces of organizations shape and respond to institutions in a distinct and 
strategic manner—the central quarrel raised amid the “structure versus agency debate” 
(Heugens & Lander, 2009).  The micro-level research will also help answer a subsequent, 
yet perhaps more intriguing, question for entrepreneurship scholars, about how 
institutionally embedded actors can enact strategic behaviors and resist pressures from 
the very institutions in which they are embedded (Garud et al., 2007).   
Bruton and his co-authors (2010) are actually aware of this unfilled gap in 
entrepreneurship research and acknowledge that entrepreneurship scholars have typically 
used institutions as macro-level variables.  According to them, micro-level research will 
open a new, meaningful avenue of entrepreneurship research.  Wicks' (2001) study 
reminds us that institutional theory could also be a micro-level variable impacting 
individual behavior.  While I also use Scott’s three-pillar typology as a theoretical 
construct for my study, what distinguishes it from prior studies lies in this micro-level 
inquiry about interactions between entrepreneurial and institutional forces.  Whereas the 
prior entrepreneurship literature tends to take the structuralists’ position and is typically 
interested in trajectories of entrepreneurial behaviors shaped by institutional forces at the 
macro level (e.g., a rate of venture creations), my study takes the agency position and 
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views entrepreneurship as a factor shaping the impact of institutional forces on 
organizational practices and processes at the micro level.  Toward this end, I argue that 
EO is a factor enabling organizations to resist institutional constraints, empowering them 
to employ unconventional practices and enhance performance.    
 
EO in the Institutional Environment: Moderating Effects Between EO and 
Institutional Pressures 
EO is an organization-level construct (Covin & Slevin, 1991) that refers to an 
organization’s processes, practices, and decision-making proclivity favoring 
entrepreneurial activities (Covin & Wales, 2012; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).  EO generally 
is conceptualized in two different ways: as the unidimensional construct constituted by 
innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Miller, 1983); or as 
the multidimensional construct representing five dimensions: innovativeness, 
proactiveness, risk taking, autonomy, and/or competitive aggressiveness (Lumpkin & 
Dess, 1996).   EO consists of sustained behavioral patterns reflecting any or all of those 
dimensions (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011).  
EO has become a central concept in the domain of entrepreneurship and has 
received substantial amounts of theoretical and empirical attention (Covin, Green, & 
Slevin, 2006; Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin, & Frese, 2009).  The ultimate dependent 
variable in EO research is organizational performance (Covin & Slevin, 1991).  Hence, 
the EO-performance relationship became the major focus in EO research and a 
considerable amount of knowledge regarding it has been accumulated to date.  Many 
prior studies found EO improves organizational performance (Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 
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2001; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003; Wiklund, 1999; Zahra & Covin, 1995), while scholars 
also concluded that the empirical results are somewhat mixed (Lyon, Lumpkin, & Dess, 
2000; Rauch et al., 2009).  Covin, Slevin and Schultz (1994) and Smart and Conant 
(2011) were unable to find a significant relationship between EO and performance.   
In addition to performance, EO has been linked to other variables (Covin & 
Slevin, 1991).  For instance, EO is positively related to organizations’ acquisitive and 
experimental learning (Kreiser, 2011); strategic learning capability (Anderson, Covin, & 
Slevin, 2009); strategic reactiveness (Green, Covin, & Slevin, 2008); and organizational 
capability of knowledge management and effectiveness (Lee & Sukoco, 2007). 
In part searching for a better explanation for mixed empirical results (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2003), EO scholars have empirically explored the contingent relationship 
between EO and moderators.  This effort also aligns with the comment from Covin and 
Slevin (1991) and Lumpkin and Dess (1996) that the performance implications of EO are 
context-specific and thus models should incorporate contingency or moderating effects.  
That is, the strength of the relationship between EO and performance depends on the 
characteristics of the external environment and internal organizational characteristics 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005).  This further implies that the relationship between EO and 
performance may be more complex than a simple main-effects-only relationship and may 
be better understood through a configurational approach (Dess, Lumpkin, & Covin, 1997; 
Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).   
As a result, a variety of moderators for the EO-performance relationship have 
been discussed and tested (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Zahra & Covin, 1995; Zahra & 
Garvis, 2000).  Moderators identified include internal variables, such as knowledge-based 
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resources (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003), strategies (cost leadership, marketing 
differentiation, and innovative differentiation) (Dess et al., 1997), and cultural diversity 
in management (Richard, Barnett, Dwyer, & Chadwick, 2004); and external variables, 
such as inter-organizational network and social capital (network centrality and bridging 
ties, Stam & Elfring, 2008).  As Covin and Slevin (1991) stress that inclusion of 
environmental variables in the model is critical in EO research, environmental variables 
are the most actively explored moderator for EO.  Therein, EO scholars have extensively 
investigated the environment-organization relations (Covin & Covin, 1990; Covin, 
Slevin, & Schultz, 1997; Covin & Slevin, 1989; Dess et al., 1997) to the point that “much 
of the value added from these lines of research has now been realized” (Covin & 
Lumpkin, 2011, p. 865).   
A review of the literature on both institutional theory and EO, therefore, reveals 
that these theoretical domains both have long explored the environment-organization 
relations.  Yet, the central premises of institutional theory and EO propose the contrasting 
organizational processes.  Contrary to the traditional view of the new institutionalism, 
which assumes organizational passiveness and incapacity to respond to and shape the 
environment, the central premise of EO is organizational capacity to respond to and shape 
adverse circumstances.  EO scholars assume that organizations are active players that 
“manipulate or change their environments by entering new markets, establishing new 
technologies, etc.” (Miller & Friesen, 1978, p. 12).  Indeed in Miller's (1983) study, 
constraints arising from environmental heterogeneity, dynamism, and hostility are 
significantly and positively related to pioneering, innovation, and risk taking postures of 
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entrepreneurial organizations.  Many other studies confirm this positive relationship 
between EO and performance (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Zahra & Covin, 1995).   
It should be reminded that theoretical implication proposed by Miller and Friesen 
(1978) is very much in agreement with Oliver’s agency views of organizations (1991).  
Herein, there is a logical connection of EO applied to institutional theory.  At the same 
time, the nature of organization-environment relations still considerably differs between 
EO and institutional theory.  Hence, there should still be some added value realized from 
the research juxtaposing these two theories.  That is, whereas EO scholars conceive of 
organizations as independent from environments, institutional theorists conceive of 
organizations as deeply embedded in environments, which then affect organizational 
processes and cognitive abilities to envision and enact entrepreneurial actions.  In other 
words, EO may play an even more critical role in enabling organizations to respond 
strategically to environmental constraints because organizations are embedded in these 
very institutional environments.  In fact, in his recent article in a Special Issue of 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Miller recommended linking institutional theory 
to EO to “examine how the normative, political, and cognitive institutional environment 
may influence EO” (Miller, 2011, p. 881).   
 
EO in Nonprofit and Social Entrepreneurship: Richer and More Complex 
Manifestation of EO 
Much of the research characterizing EO has focused primarily on for-profit firms.  
Yet in recent years, scholars have begun applying EO to organizations in the nonprofit 
sector and the public sector (Bhuian, Menguc, & Bell, 2005; Caruana, Ewing, & 
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Ramaseshan, 2002; Coombes, Morris, Allen, & Webb, 2011; Davis, Marino, Aaron, & 
Tolbert, 2011; Helm & Andersson, 2010; Morris & Jones, 1999; Morris & Joyce, 1998; 
Pearce, Fritz, & Davis, 2010).  This growing trend of applying EO to the nonprofit 
context lies in the premise of offering a distinctive perspective on how EO manifests 
within the organizations whose primary goal is theorized as not maximizing profit, but 
rather maximizing the public good (Hansmann, 1980; Weisbrod, 1988).  A common 
approach, therefore, is comparative research to test whether there is a noticeable 
difference between EO of nonprofits and for-profits (Cools & Vermeulen, 2008; Davis et 
al., 2011).  According to Davis and his co-authors (2011), no significant difference exists 
with regard to a level of EO between nonprofits and for-profit.    
Reflecting this growing position of EO in nonprofit and philanthropic studies,  
Morris, Webb and Franklin (2011) in their recent article have argued that although EO’s 
key dimensionality in the nonprofit context may mirror the same dimensionality in the 
for-profit context, the dimensions should still be modified accordingly due to the 
different motives, processes, and outcomes of nonprofit behavior.  Nonprofits’ mission-
driven motivation shapes their entrepreneurial processes and outcomes.  As such, sub-
dimensions of EO manifest in a more complex and multifaceted way.  That is, (1) 
innovations are mission-centric, commercial, and/or a hybrid of both social and 
commercial aspects; (2) nonprofit organizations take social, financial, and/or stakeholder-
relevant risks; and (3) they are proactive relative to similar organizations in terms of 
social and commercial innovation as well as relative to stakeholder expectations (Morris 
et al., 2011).   
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 Morris and his co-authors (2011) have developed this theoretical framework 
clarifying a richer and more complex dimensionality of EO.  Their theoretical framework 
suggests that the manifestation of EO can be dichotomous (social versus financial) in 
nonprofit and social entrepreneurship.  One way to test this implication is to develop and 
empirically test items that tap each subdimension of nonprofit EO (Morris et al., 2011).  
Therein, two recent studies examined how EO affects social and financial performance of 
arts and culture nonprofits (Coombes et al., 2011) and religious organizations (Pearce et 
al., 2010).  However, this line of research is still considerably slim.   
 
Theory-Grounded Research on Venture Philanthropy and Social Investment  
Venture philanthropy is often conceived as part of the movement toward adapting 
business concepts and practices for use in the nonprofit sector (Dart, 2004a, 2004b; Dees, 
1998; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Jegen, 1998).  This very approach has prompted 
heated debates over advantages and disadvantages of using a venture philanthropy model 
in the nonprofit and philanthropic sector (Bishop & Green, 2010; Edwards, 2009, 2011).  
Proponents and opponents, however, both agree that venture philanthropy is one of the 
most prominent (yet the most controversial) innovations in philanthropic practice and no 
other idea for advancing the field of philanthropy has gotten more attention than venture 
philanthropy over the past decade (Frumkin, 2003).  Despite a call from scholars (Van 
Slyke & Newman, 2006), venture philanthropy has been a rare subject for serious 
scholarly and theory-grounded research efforts.  Drawing on institutional theory, 
Moody's exploratory study (2008) is credited with one of the first theory-grounded 
studies on venture philanthropy.  He documented that a shift from traditional 
  24 
philanthropic culture to business-like culture led to the development of a new 
organizational field for venture philanthropy.   
Institutional theorists predict that increased communications and legitimacy-
enhancing practices should develop isomorphism in organizational structures and 
behavioral patterns (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  Contrary to this 
prediction, striking diversity still exists in the SIF institutional field.  The legal structure 
of organizations ranges from public charities, private foundations and unincorporated 
voluntary groups, to quasi-governmental funds and limited liability corporations.  Prior 
publications discuss a wide variety of organizations, including giving circles (e.g., Social 
Venture Partners), community foundations (e.g., the Peninsula Community Foundation 
recently merged into the new Silicon Valley Community Foundation), United Way, large 
and influential private foundations established by wealthy individuals (e.g., the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation), and nonprofit and for-profit “social 
venture capital” intermediary funds that work much like venture capital firms in raising 
“capital” and distributing it to a “portfolio” of organizations (e.g., Acumen Fund, the 
Omidyar Network) (Bishop & Green, 2010; Community Wealth Ventures, Inc., 2000, 
2002; Eikenberry, 2006; Emerson, Wachowicz, & Chun, 2000; Fleishman, 2009; 
Frumkin, 2008; John, 2006; Moody, 2008; Scarlata & Alemany, 2008; Standlea, 2006).  
A lack of homogeneity in the SIF field raises fundamental questions: What 
distinguishes SIFs from other organizations?  In other words, why do some organizations 
decide to engage in venture philanthropy practices, while others do not?  Nonprofit and 
philanthropic scholars have attempted to answer this question by examining internal 
characteristics of organizations (Anheier & Leat, 2006; Fleishman, 2009; Frumkin, 2008; 
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Hess, 2005; Letts et al., 1997; Prewitt, 2006a, 2006b) or external factors (Moody, 2008), 
but no definitive answers have been offered.  A close look at the SIF field suggests that a 
descriptive or single-theory approach may not be sufficient to explain the diversity in the 
field, and a contingency approach is necessary.   
This diversity also may be exemplified by the “institutional duality” (Kostova & 
Roth, 2002) in the SIF field, which was preceded by the traditional philanthropic field 
and the mainstream venture capital field (Moody, 2008).  The duality of organizational 
identities of social ventures and their funders has recently been investigated and proven, 
and the findings assure that these organizations possess dual organizational identities and 
behave differently in accordance with their dominant identity (Miller & Wesley, 2010; 
Moss et al., 2011).  Because organizational identity is socially constructed and 
appropriately conceived of as a set of identity claims, in reference to a specified set of 
institutionally standardized categories (Whetten & Mackey, 2002), it is logical to assume 
that the field of social entrepreneurship involves duality in the institutional environment 
as well as the organizational identity.  The institutional duality of the SIF field then raises 
theoretically and empirically intriguing questions regarding why the diversity still exists 
in the field, including: What are dominant institutional fields for organizations to follow 
in order to decide whether or not to engage in venture philanthropy?  
 
A Summary of Gaps Identified and Addressed by This Study 
 The extensive review of literature on the new institutionalism, entrepreneurship 
(nonprofit and philanthropy), and social entrepreneurship, has identified several 
important theoretical and methodological gaps.  Table 1.2 illustrates these gaps.  My 
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dissertation attempts to fill these gaps, and in so doing, it aims to make theoretical and 
methodological contributions to social entrepreneurship and philanthropic studies.  As 
discussed above, a critical need for theory testing and development has been stressed to 
advance the field of social entrepreneurship (Short et al., 2009).  Toward this end, my 
study addresses methodological gaps in social entrepreneurship by (1) grounding research 
in two major theories (institutional theory and EO), and (2) collecting and utilizing 
systematic data adequate for quantitative analysis testing hypotheses developed to 
examine theoretical relationships.  My approach to fill theoretical gaps in social 
entrepreneurship also serves the need to fill theoretical gaps addressed by scholars in 
institutional theory and EO.  
 
Table 1.2. Gaps Identified by Literature Review  
Research domain Gaps in the literature Main references 
New institutionalism  • Organizations’ agentic and 
strategic responses to institutional 
environments (“the agency view”) 
Oliver (1991) 
New institutionalism 
and entrepreneurship 
• Micro-level entrepreneurial 
conditions enabling organizations’ 
strategic responses to institutional 
environments 
Battilana, Leca & 
Boxenbaum (2009); 
Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li 
(2010) 
EO  • Regulative and normative impacts 
of institutional environments on 
EO (moderators) 
• More complex dimensionality and 
manifestation of EO in nonprofits 
and social entrepreneurship 
(nonprofit contexts) 
Miller (2011) 
 
 
Morris, Webb & Franklin 
(2011) 
Social 
entrepreneurship 
• Theory-driven, quantitative 
research with hypotheses testing 
and systematic data 
gathering/scrutiny  
Short, Moss & Lumpkin 
(2009) 
Nonprofit and 
philanthropic studies 
• Theory-grounded research on 
venture philanthropy  
Dees (1998); Moody 
(2008); Van Slyke & 
Newman (2006) 
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Research Questions 
The ultimate objective of my dissertation is to conduct an empirical study 
answering the central question raised from the agency-view of the new institutionalism: 
why some organizations strategically respond to and resist institutional constraints, while 
other organizations do not, even within the same institutional field?  To expand 
theoretical implications of the agency view postulated by Oliver (1991), I argue that how 
organizations respond depends on a level of EO and institutional pressures arising from 
environments in which they are embedded.  
The above question about the agency-view of the new institutionalism echoes the 
fundamental questions raised by philanthropic scholars to better understand phenomena 
of venture philanthropy: what distinguishes SIFs from other organizations? My empirical 
study develops a model to examine, build, and test models from a contingency 
perspective to answer the two guiding research questions:  
 
1. From perspectives of institutional theory and EO: Do EO and/or institutional 
pressures independently affect practices and performance of organizations 
embedded in the dual institutions? (main effects); and 
2. From perspectives of the agency view of the new institutionalism and EO 
moderators: Does EO enable organizations to resist institutional negative 
pressures and still engage in strategic practices and enhance performance despite 
institutional constraints? (moderating effects) 
 
  
  28 
Structure of The Dissertation 
This dissertation is structured as follows.  In Chapter 2, I draw on philanthropic 
institutional theory and EO literature to establish the theoretical mechanisms of 
institutional forces in the SIF context, after which I proceed to develop the hypothesized 
relationships.  This is followed by Chapter 3 in which I discuss the methodology used to 
test the relationships.  Chapter 4 presents the results of the empirical tests of the 
hypotheses, where original data collected from 146 SIFs were analyzed by moderated 
multiple regressions along with several post hoc analyses.  In Chapter 5, I discuss the 
results of each hypothesis, offer suggested areas for future research, and acknowledge the 
limitations of the study.   
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
In this chapter, I link entrepreneurial orientation (EO) to the new institutionalism 
to develop theoretical models for two empirical studies: (1) Study 1 (effects on venture 
philanthropy practices); and (2) Study 2 (effects on social and financial performance).  
 
A Typology of Institutional Pressures on Social Investment Funders 
Any attempt to evaluate information to predict organizations’ strategy and 
performance would depend significantly on the nature of the institution and institutional 
norms (Zacharakis et al., 2007).  Hence, I must first specify what this study defines and 
investigates as institutional pressures shaping the practices and performance of SIFs.   
Toward this, two questions must be answered: (1) What are dominant institutional fields, 
and (2) what are the sources of institutional pressures arising from those fields?      
 
Dominant Institutional Fields Affecting SIFs 
Institutions do not emerge in a vacuum: they always challenge, borrow from, and, 
to varying degrees, displace prior institutions (Scott, 2008a, p. 94).  These prior 
institutions shape and construct an emerging field in terms of both formal institutional 
elements such as regulatory structures, professions, and public opinions (Oliver, 1991) 
and of informal elements such as language, physical artifacts, and beliefs (North, 2005).  
With this logic, the new field of SIFs must have been shaped and constructed by prior 
institutional fields.   
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Philanthropic scholars (Frumkin, 2008; Letts, Ryan, & Grossman, 1997; Moody, 
2008) have identified the mainstream venture capital institution and the traditional 
philanthropic institution as the two prior institutional fields that have been shaping the 
SIF field.  For instance, Letts, Ryan and Grossman's (1997) seminal article about the 
venture philanthropy movement reports that “some foundations have been studying 
venture capital firms and their techniques” (p. 35) to look for ways to improve upon 
traditional grantmaking.  Moody’s (2008) exploratory study on interview and publication 
data testifies how philanthropic-minded high-tech entrepreneurs have drawn on venture 
capitalists’ principles and practices and how their adaptation of venture capitalism to 
philanthropy has shaped this emerging field for SIFs.   
Through a theoretical lens of the new institutionalism, influences from venture 
capitalism and philanthropy can also be recognized in the way the SIF field emerged in 
the first place—by a naturalistic construction and by an agency-based construction 
(DiMaggio, 1988).  The naturalistic construction (Berger & Luckmann, 2011; Schütz, 
1967) began during the 1980s and 1990s when the neoconservatives’ faith in market-
based approaches arose.  Subsequently, the primary wave of institutional creation for 
SIFs came during the “dot-com” era when high-tech entrepreneurs with accumulated 
wealth began entering into the philanthropic field (Moody, 2008).  Institutional creation 
is driven by many “actors” and “opinion leaders" (Scott, 2008).  “Diffusion” scholars of 
institutional theory (Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; Rogers, 1995) 
generally conceive of those “actors” and “opinion leaders” as those who work 
deliberately and diligently to construct the culture and promote a new field.  The actors 
who have played a central role in creating and shaping the SIF field represent both the 
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venture capital and entrepreneurial community (e.g., venture capitalists, high-tech 
entrepreneurs, and corporate elites) and the philanthropic community (e.g., foundations 
and thought leaders).  Notable examples in the venture capital community include George 
R. Roberts (one of the founding partners of KKR & Co. L.P. and the founder of REDF, 
which is the pioneer venture philanthropic fund in San Francisco), Bill Gates (the co-
founder of Microsoft and of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), and Jeffrey Skoll 
(the first president of eBay and the founder of the Skoll Foundation).  Opinion leaders of 
the philanthropic field include influential foundations, such as the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Kellogg Foundation (Standlea, 2006).   
During the course of construction of the SIF field, however, the institutional 
duality (Kostova & Roth, 2002) has caused many cultural clashes with opinion leaders 
from each dominant field (Moody, 2008).  The contrasting nature and logics between the 
mainstream venture capital field and the traditional philanthropic field created significant 
ambiguity in legitimacy.  Whereas organizations facing uncertainty seek to mimic 
successful organizations in their own new field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), 
organizations facing ambiguity caused by the multiplicity of institutional logics seek to 
mimic old or longstanding organizations of the prior fields and to rely on well-established 
logics rather than emergent logics in a new field (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; 
Kimberly, 1980).  Given these theoretical implications, dominant institutional forces 
affecting SIFs are likely to come from the traditional philanthropic field and the 
mainstream venture capital field, rather than the SIFs’ own emerging field.    
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Sources of Institutional Pressures 
Scott (2008) has argued that institutions comprise three nominal “pillars”—
regulative, normative, and cognitive—incorporating the legal (regulative), social 
(normative), and cultural (cognitive) aspects of institutions.  Regulative pillars of 
institutions commonly take the form of regulations, laws, and rules (Hwang & Powell, 
2005; North, 1990).  The state and powerful actors both encourage and constrain 
organizational action by coercion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or threat of legal sanctions 
(Hoffman, 1999).  Normative pillars of institutions generally symbolize professional 
practices, occupational standards, and appropriate ways to pursue goals (Scott, 2008a).  
Organizational action and beliefs are guided largely by social obligation, norms or 
professionalization (Honig & Karlsson, 2004; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 2003; 
Montgomery, Oliver, 1996; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Scott, 2008b).  Organizations comply 
with them out of moral and ethical obligation or in conformance to norms established by 
universities, professional training institutions, and trade associations (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  Cognitive (or cultural) aspects of institutions embody shared conceptions, 
symbols, language, and frameworks that constitute the nature of social reality (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977).  Organizations often obey them unconsciously (Zucker, 1983).  
Although all organizations within a given institutional field are subject to the 
effects of institutional processes, not all experience pressures in the same way.  
Organizational adaptation to institutional pressures varies because of differences among 
organizations in the amount of pressure they experience and in their characteristics 
(Scott, 2008a).  By reviewing prior studies on mechanisms of institutional processes, 
Scott (2008) draws attention to main organizational characteristics predicting adaptation 
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to institutional pressures.  Two main mechanisms exist: Institutions affect organizations 
in the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive areas through such areas as (1) 
organizations’ internal attributes (e.g., organizational structure, size, and management 
style) (Edelman, 1992; Sutton, Dobbin, Meyer, & Scott, 1994; Westphal & Zajac, 1995); 
and (2) their linkage (e.g., networks, board interlock, affiliations, donors and corporate 
sponsors’ demands and expectations, and reference groups) (Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 
1998; Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; Uzzi, 1996)7. 
Drawing on Scott’s regulative and normative theoretical frame, I have identified 
four sources reflecting distinct characteristics of SIFs: (1) organizational legal structure 
(regulative pressure); (2) training of the management team (normative pressure) as the 
internal attribute sources; (3) donors’ and investors’ demand for funding outcomes 
(regulative pressure); and (4) affiliation with professional associations (normative 
pressure) as the linkage sources.  A typology of these sources is displayed in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1. Typology of Organizational Characteristics Associated with Institutional 
Pressures 
 Internal attributes Linkage 
Regulative pillar Legal structure Donors’ and investors’ demand 
for funding outcomes 
Normative pillar Training of the management 
team 
Affiliation with professional 
associations 
 
 
Due to the institutional duality (Kostova & Roth, 2002) in the SIF field, 
institutional pressures are manifold and the effects are materialized in a more complex 
manner.  That is, the common legal structure of organizations is nonprofit in the 
philanthropic field (Brody, 2006; Simon, Dale, & Chisolm, 2006) and for-profit in the 
                                                
7 Scott (2008) discusses “reference groups” as the third mechanism. However, studies he cites are primarily 
about networks. I therefore include reference groups in the second category. It should also be noted that 
Scott states that this classification is not comprehensive.  
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venture capital field (Clark & Gaillard, 2003; Sahlman, 1990).  The economics model of 
giving conceptualizes donors as “interested third parties whose demand for an 
organization’s service is on behalf of a client base to which they do not themselves 
belong” (Brown & Slivinski, 2006, p. 143).  As such, although giving motivation can 
vary greatly across different donors8 (Burlingame, 1993), philanthropic scholars agree 
that donors in the traditional philanthropic field support nonprofit organizations because 
they care about how nonprofits serve the public good and achieve their missions 
(Ostrander, 2007; Payton & Moody, 2008; Vesterlund, 2006).  On the other hand, 
investors in the venture capital field invest in growth-potential ventures, demanding 
strong financial results assessed usually by expected rate of return (Muzyka, Birley, & 
Leleux, 1996; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999).   
Sources of normative pressures are also dichotomous between the philanthropic 
field and the venture capital field.  Today, both the philanthropic field and the venture 
capital field have become professionalized, constituting influential professional 
associations.  Since the passage of the 1969 Tax Reform Act forced private foundations 
to take stock of their situation, the Council on Foundations, followed by many 
grantmaking associations serving different regions or program areas, has been playing a 
central role in setting professional standards for grantmaking organizations in the 
philanthropic field (Wadsworth, 1975).  Likewise, since its inception in 1973, the National 
Venture Capital Association has enjoyed widespread industry support from venture capital 
members and has normalized professional standards with which venture capital members 
                                                
8 Philanthropic scholars point out that giving motivation involves an altruistic and egoistic nature (e.g., 
Burlingame, 1993).  Economics theories also assume that for anyone to contribute, they will get some type 
of benefit from doing so, since tax deductions do not reduce the price of giving to zero (Vesterlund, 2006). 
In this theoretical assumption, there are public benefits and private benefits associated with giving.	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agree to comply (Bruton, Fried, & Manigart, 2005).  In addition to professional associations, 
formal education produced by universities and professional training are also instrumental for 
the development of organizational norms among professional managers (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  Top management teams in venture capital funds often hold degrees such as a 
master’s in business administration (MBA) and experience in the financial and consulting 
fields (Dimov & Shepherd, 2005).  Not only the business field, but the philanthropic field 
also saw a dramatic growth in nonprofit management education in the 1990s (O’Neill, 2005).  
By 2007, 240 universities and colleges across the United States provided courses in nonprofit 
management education—graduate (including PhD), undergraduate, continuing education, and 
noncredit (Mirabella, 2007).   As a result, a total of eight sources for regulative and 
normative pressures from two institutional fields have been identified, which are then 
used along with EO as independent variables for my hypotheses testing (Table 2.2).   
 
Table 2.2. Typology of Institutional Pressures from the Two Mature Institutional 
Fields  
  Philanthropic 
institution 
Venture capital 
institution 
 
 
 
Regulative 
pillars 
Legal structure Nonprofit  For-profit  
Donors’ and 
investors’ demand 
for funding 
outcomes 
Donors’ and investors’ 
demand for social 
outcomes 
Donors’ and investors’ 
demand for financial 
outcomes 
 
 
 
Normative 
pillars 
Affiliation with 
professional 
associations 
Affiliation with the 
Council on Foundations 
and other grantmaker 
associations  
Affiliation with the 
National Venture Capital 
Association and other 
venture capital 
associations 
Training of the 
management team 
Management team’s 
training in nonprofits  
Management team’s 
training in business 
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Hypotheses For Study 1: Factors Affecting Venture Philanthropy Practices 
 Using EO and eight institutional variables introduced in the previous section, this 
section proposes hypotheses testing main effects and moderating effects on venture 
philanthropy practices for Study 1.  The main logics behind the hypotheses are displayed 
in Figure 2.1.  All hypotheses for Study 1 are listed in Table 2.3.  
 
 
Main Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices 
EO and Venture Philanthropy Practices 
EO is generally conceived of as a unidimensional construct of innovativeness, 
proactiveness, and risk taking (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Miller, 1983).  Innovativeness 
reflects a tendency to support new ideas, novelty, experimentation, and creative 
processes, thereby departing from established practices.  Proactiveness refers to a 
propensity of anticipating and acting on future needs.  With such a forward-looking 
perspective, proactive organizations capitalize on emerging opportunities.  Risk taking 
reflects the organization’s willingness to break away from the tried-and-true and to invest 
resources and efforts in projects where the outcomes are unknown (Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003). 
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Figure 2.1. Conceptual Model for Study 1 
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Philanthropic Field 
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nonprofits 
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+ 
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Institutional Pressures from the 
Venture Capital Field 
• Donor/investor demand for financial 
outcomes 
• Affiliation with venture capital 
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• Management team’s training in business 
 
 
- 
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Table 2.3. A Summary of Hypotheses for Study 1: Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices 
 Hypotheses Core concept 
EO 
H1 EO is positively related to the extent of venture philanthropy practices. EO  
Regulative institutional pillars 
H2 The nonprofit status is negatively related to the extent of venture philanthropy practices. Attribute  
(The legal structure)  
H3a The demand of donors and investors for social outcomes is negatively related to the extent of 
venture philanthropy practices. 
Linkage  
(Donors’/investors’ 
demand) 
 
H3b The demand of donors and investors for financial outcomes is positively related to the extent 
of venture philanthropy practices. 
Normative institutional pillars 
H4a Affiliation with the Council on Foundations and other grantmaker professional associations is 
negatively related to the extent of venture philanthropy practices. 
Linkage  
(Affiliation with 
professional associations) 
 
H4b Affiliation with the National Venture Capital Association and other venture capital 
professional associations is positively related to the extent of venture philanthropy practices. 
H5a The management team’s training in nonprofits is negatively related to the extent of venture 
philanthropy practices. 
Attribute  
(The management team’s 
training) 
 
H5b The management team’s training in business is positively related to the extent of venture 
philanthropy practices. 
EO – The philanthropic institution interaction 
H6 EO moderates a negative effect of the nonprofit status on the extent of venture philanthropy 
practices, such that the relationship between the nonprofit status and venture philanthropy 
practices becomes positive for SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
EO-Regulative  
(The legal structure) 
H7 EO moderates a negative effect of donors’ and investors’ demand for social outcomes on the 
extent of venture philanthropy practices, such that the relationship between the 
donors’/investors’ demand for social outcomes and venture philanthropy practices becomes 
positive for SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
EO-Regulative 
(Donor/investor demand) 
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Table 2.3. (cont.) 
 Hypotheses Core concept 
H8 EO moderates a negative effect of affiliation with the Council on Foundations and other 
grantmaker professional associations on the extent of venture philanthropy practices, such that 
the relationship between affiliation with grantmaker professional associations and venture 
philanthropy practices becomes positive for SIFs with a higher level of EO.  
EO-Normative  
(Affiliation with 
professional associations) 
 
H9 EO moderates a negative effect of the management team’s training in nonprofits on the extent 
of venture philanthropy practices, such that the relationship between the management team’s 
training in nonprofit and venture philanthropy practices becomes positive for SIFs with a 
higher level of EO. 
EO-Normative  
(The management team’s 
training) 
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To engage in venture philanthropy practices, organizations must first originate a 
venture philanthropy model and tools.  Venture philanthropy is generally deemed as an 
approach bringing the discipline of the venture capital investment field to the 
philanthropic field (Frumkin, 2003) or vice versa.  As such, early creators of a venture 
philanthropy model (e.g., NewSchools Venture Fund, Silicon Valley Community 
Foundation) actively sought to learn funding tools and practices of venture capital 
investment and borrowed them to invent a venture philanthropy model (Fleishman, 
2009).  Or, many founders of the early venture philanthropy organizations were high-tech 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (e.g., Robin Hood Foundation, Social Venture 
Partners, Venture Philanthropy Partners).  These business entrepreneurs were 
undoubtedly familiar with venture capital investment but not with the culture and 
practices of traditional philanthropy (Hess, 2005).  They, too, needed to familiarize 
themselves with unfamiliar areas of practices, i.e., traditional philanthropy, so as to adapt 
their familiar practices in the venture capital field to philanthropy (Moody, 2008).   
These early venture philanthropists often focused their efforts on developing 
novel funding tools and practices for increasing the likelihood of success in nonprofits.  
These tools mirror a business-based venture capital investment model, such as the 
provision of a different kind of capital flow than nonprofits are used to receiving, the 
close monitoring of funded social ventures, and rigorous measurement of funding 
performance (Frumkin, 2008).  In fact, many early venture philanthropists (e.g., 
Community Wealth Ventures, Inc., 2002; James & Marshall, 2006) stress that creation of 
those novel tools and practices, especially those departing from established and familiar 
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practices, required creative processes and countless experimentations, namely 
innovativeness.   
However, innovativeness alone may not be sufficient to originate venture 
philanthropy tools.  Prior to creation, venture philanthropists need first to invest a 
significant amount of time and effort in comprehending opposite culture and practices of 
philanthropy and venture capital investment.  This process requires a high level of risk 
taking in many regards.  First, as a model is based on an unconventional idea, outcomes 
of using a venture philanthropy model are highly uncertain.  Second, investing in the 
creation and implementation of a venture philanthropy model may jeopardize the 
legitimacy of philanthropic organizations.  As the very idea of venture philanthropy 
stemmed from a criticism of traditional philanthropy as engaging in “inefficient” 
practices (Letts et al., 1997), early venture philanthropists faced vocal criticism from 
veterans of traditional philanthropy and nonprofits (e.g., Edwards, 2009, 2011; Sievers, 
2001).  Engagement in such a controversial and unproven business-based model can 
undermine the reputation and legitimacy of philanthropic organizations.  A recent study 
confirms that nonprofits experience a significant difficulty in engaging in entrepreneurial 
activities as they are concerned about stakeholders’ perceptions (Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd, 
2003).  Early venture philanthropists from the business field (e.g., Morino, 2005; REDF, 
2013) also admit that they needed to devote considerable time and effort to rethink 
philanthropic traditions and adjust and refine their business approaches into more 
acceptable types of practices in the philanthropic community.  
Furthermore, because a model was highly controversial and lacked legitimacy, 
early creators of venture philanthropy must have been proactive enough to introduce and 
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spread venture philanthropy ideas widely, so that the venture philanthropy model was 
received as a acceptable model before a negative image of the model that critics were 
painting penetrated the philanthropic field.  With these logics, I will posit the first 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1. EO is positively related to the extent of venture 
philanthropy practices. 
 
The Legal Structure and Venture Philanthropy Practices 
Institutions’ regulative pressures are represented by state influence through 
government mandates and regulations.  Institutional scholars have found that the state’s 
institutional pressures for organizational conformity sustain and perpetuate adherence to 
legitimated organizational activities (Baum & Oliver, 1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Oliver, 1992).  As such, explicit processes of the mature legal regimes in philanthropic 
field and venture capital field are expected to regularize many aspects of SIFs’ practices 
and funding tools.  
Since the beginning of the 20th century (Cutlip, 1965), American philanthropy has 
grown into the institution of charitable giving totaling $ 298.42 billion in 2011 (The 
Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, 2012).  $41.67 billion of U.S. giving came 
from foundations, in which many nonprofit SIFs are included (Moody, 2008).  Nonprofits 
are regulated primarily by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which provides them both 
benefits and constraints alike.  Under U.S. tax law, nonprofits typically enjoy exemption 
from property, sales, and corporation income taxes.  Those nonprofits qualified to be 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) “501(c)(3) public charities” are granted special tax 
treatments, such as deductions of contributions to them (Internal Revenue Service, 2003). 
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Nonprofits, especially IRC 501(c)(3) public charities, receive these benefits under 
the condition that they are “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes” (Internal Revenue 
Service, n.d.).  A subsidy theory dictates that exemption and deductibility for nonprofits 
are needed to promote the provision of certain kinds of benefits to the public (Simon et 
al., 2006; Weisbrod, 1998).  Therein, the IRS regulates types of funding and financing 
tools available for nonprofits.  Traditionally, as nonprofits themselves, funders in the 
philanthropic field have designated their financial resources to other nonprofits.  And, as 
nonprofits are not allowed to finance by equity capital from the mainstream capital 
markets (Hansmann, 1980; Tuckman, 1993), major funding tools in the philanthropic 
field have been non-market-based resources, such as philanthropic donations and grants 
(Wei-Skillern, Austin, Leonard, & Stevenson, 2007).  Since venture philanthropy often 
addresses a use of market-based funding tools, nonprofit SIFs are not likely to take a risk 
by implementing venture philanthropy tools because results of not complying with 
government’s mandates will be highly punitive (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).    
In recent years, however, market-based funding tools have been developed for 
philanthropic funders.   One of the most notable examples is program-related investments 
(PRIs), which are defined as investments by the regulations under U.S. Code Section 
4944(c) (Federal Register, n.d.).  While PRIs are funding tools based on the market-based 
mechanism (e.g., equity and debt), the primary purpose of PRIs is to accomplish one or 
more of the charitable purposes described in U.S. Code Section 170(c)(2)(B).  The IRS 
requires private foundations to use PRIs to substantially further the accomplishment of 
their exempt activities (Internal Revenue Service, n.d.).  Compliance with these legal 
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requirements necessitates additional resources on the part of SIFs.  Therefore, even 
though some market-based funding tools are now available for nonprofit SIFs for their 
venture philanthropy practices, they may not choose to use these tools due to possible 
costs.  These logics will direct us to the next hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 2. The nonprofit status is negatively related to the extent of 
venture philanthropy practices. 
 
Donors’ and Investors’ Demand for Funding Outcomes and Venture Philanthropy 
Practices 
Regulative pressures can be both formal and informal, and are represented by an 
organization’s dependence on resource providers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 
2008a).  SIFs, either nonprofit or for-profit, allocate funding from their donors and 
investors to support social ventures.  Thus, meeting the donors’ and investors’ demands 
and goals is critical for SIFs for their own legitimacy and economic viability. 
Institutionalized values and beliefs shape definitions and criteria of social 
acceptability and responsiveness to publicly defined rules and practices (Oliver, 1991).  
Because a venture philanthropy model was non-existent before the 1990s, SIFs must first 
originate it.  Many SIFs (Community Wealth Ventures, Inc., 2002) have explained that 
creation of a venture philanthropy model involved numerous experiments.  As discussed 
above, philanthropic-minded donors and venture capital investors have almost 
contradictory interests in mind.  Whereas philanthropic donors generally care about the 
public good provisions and missions (Ostrander, 2007; Payton & Moody, 2008; 
Vesterlund, 2006), venture capital investors usually demand superior return on 
investment (Muzyka et al., 1996; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999).  The propensity of 
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philanthropic donors can be explained by the concept of “nondistribution constraint” 
(Hansmann, 1980).  The nondistribution constraint shapes a perception of donors such 
that the nonprofit status should be an indicator of trustworthiness and a major goal of 
entrepreneurs who choose to create a nonprofit venture as a pursuit of mission rather than 
of profit (Bilodeau & Slivinski, 1998).  As such, philanthropic-minded donors demand 
SIFs remain trustworthy and use well established funding tools in the philanthropic field: 
philanthropic grants.  With such donors’ demand, SIFs may choose to refrain from 
engaging in an untested model of venture philanthropy.  
In addition to the dichotomous nature of donor/investor demand, the nature of the 
donor/investor-recipient relationship also varies extensively between the philanthropic 
field and the venture capital field (Barman, 2007).  The typical donor-recipient 
relationship nurtured in traditional philanthropy is reciprocal given the contextual nature 
of charitable giving (Halfpenny, 1999; Healy, 2000, 2004; Ostrander & Schervish, 1990; 
Ostrander, 2007; Sokolowski, 1996; Wolfe, 1998).  On the other hand, the typical 
investor-recipient relationship in the venture capital field is a classic vertical principal-
agent agency type (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2003; Barney, Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 1989; 
Sahlman, 1990; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2001; Wright & Lockett, 2003).  Close 
involvement in daily operations of funded organizations, often through serving on the 
board, is typical in the venture capital field, but atypical and is often considered 
inappropriate in the philanthropic field (Orosz, 2000).  Since serving on the board of 
funded social ventures is one of the common venture philanthropy practices (Letts et al., 
1997), SIFs, if donors are philanthropic-minded, are less likely to engage in venture 
philanthropy, as their donors do not regard venture philanthropy as legitimate.  
  46 
Conversely, because of a strong belief in efficacy of a business model among business 
entrepreneurs and investors (Kenney, 2000), using a business-based model of venture 
philanthropy is plausible for SIFs, whose investors are primarily from the venture capital 
field.  Given these logics, I hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 3a. The demand of donors and investors for social outcomes is 
negatively related to the extent of venture philanthropy practices. 
 
Hypothesis 3b. The demand of donors and investors for financial 
outcomes is positively related to the extent of venture philanthropy 
practices. 
 
Affiliation with Professional Associations and Venture Philanthropy Practices 
In the normative pillars, professional and trade associations are powerful 
institutional actors for the definition and promulgation of normative rules and standards 
of professional practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  They designate appropriate ways 
for organizations to behave through professional training and educational programs 
(Scott, 2008a).  Creation and implementation of new business practices always require 
significant investment of resources.  Early proponents of venture philanthropy claimed 
that a venture philanthropy model was ground-breaking (Moody, 2008).  Creation of this 
novel model, therefore, must entail specialized skills and knowledge of traditional 
philanthropy and venture capital investment.  This suggests that solid training from 
professional associations representing both the philanthropic field and the venture capital 
field is indispensable for SIFs to successfully create and employ a venture philanthropy 
model.   
As the leading trade association that represents the venture capital industry, the 
National Venture Capital Association reinforces professional standards in the field 
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through training (Bruton et al., 2005; Fried & Hisrich, 1995).  A venture capital model 
constituting five sequential steps—which venture capitalists regard as the most effective 
way to pursue their investment goals (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984)—has been spread to 
member organizations through the Association’s trainings and publications.  Because 
venture philanthropy is based on this venture capital model (Letts et al., 1997), a venture 
philanthropy model is not unconventional for the Association’s members.  
The normative pillars not only provide benefits but often also impose constraints 
on organizational practices (Scott, 2008a), and do so, to a greater extent, on philanthropic 
organizations because they are extremely sensitive to their public legitimacy (Frumkin, 
2008).  As the most influential professional association for traditional philanthropic 
foundations, the Council on Foundations, too, sets professional standards and goals for 
philanthropic foundations and provides training to its member organizations.  Its 
professional standards suggest that member organizations be committed to the public 
benefit (Council on Foundations, n.d.).  According to the Council’s view, standard 
practices of philanthropy entail an effective use of grants and reciprocal donor-recipient 
relationships (Orosz, 2000; Prewitt, 2006b).  While a venture philanthropy model has 
philanthropy as the end, the means is venture capital practices.  Thus, member 
organizations of the Council on Foundations are not trained for this business-based 
model, even though it is modified into a philanthropic purpose.   
Institutional theory dictates that networks facilitated by professional associations 
are also critical sources for legitimacy (Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 1998).  Legitimacy is 
critical for organizations to survive and thrive (Suchman, 1995) and a legitimized social 
position is instrumental for institutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008a). 
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The reciprocity and exchange of resources with peer organizations through professional 
networks build trust and a sense of obligation to each other, and then enhance 
organizations’ commitment to the field (Gulati, 1995).  This reinforces that SIFs should 
adhere to standard practices according to leading professional associations—the Council 
on Foundations in philanthropy and the National Venture Capital Association in venture 
capital.  SIFs affiliated with the Council on Foundations are more likely to accede to the 
values shared with other philanthropic organizations when this environment is highly 
interconnected (Oliver, 1991).  
In sum, through a formal membership program and network, the Council on 
Foundations and the National Venture Capital Association provide their member 
organizations with a variety of benefits, such as legitimacy and interactions among peer 
organizations.  To receive these benefits, member organizations are obligated to follow 
the associations’ professional standards.  These logics lead to the next set of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a. Affiliation with the Council on Foundations and other 
grantmaker professional associations is negatively related to the extent of 
venture philanthropy practices. 
 
Hypothesis 4b. Affiliation with the National Venture Capital Association 
and other venture capital professional associations is positively related to 
the extent of venture philanthropy practices. 
 
Management Team’s Training and Venture Philanthropy Practices 
New institutional scholars predict normative isomorphism by growing 
professionalization of managers because such professionalization exercises substantial 
influence in shaping organizational strategy and practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Conformity to institutional norms and rules often necessitate the hiring of specific types 
of professionals who hold certifications or accreditations.  Hiring those professionals then 
  49 
becomes an important source of legitimacy for organizations (Casile & Davis-Blake, 
2002).  Furthermore, informal networks among professionals who receive similar training 
help organizations obtain knowledge and skills to pursue their goals (Scott, 2008a).  
Moody's (2008) exploratory study confirms that since creating a venture 
philanthropy model requires specialized skills of venture capital investment, training of 
the management team is instrumental for SIFs to create a venture philanthropy model.  
Moody found 5 of his 13 interviewees—in a disproportionate number (relative to other 
nonprofit leaders)—were MBAs and/or had work experience in the business world.  In 
the early days, there was a notable preponderance of people with ties to the Stanford 
Graduate School of Business, where they both built professional networks and were 
socialized into the mind-set that a business approach should be used to improve the 
nonprofit sector.  Today, SIFs often ask for a degree and/or professional experience in 
business, finance, or management consulting as a qualification for a new position (e.g., 
Acumen Fund, the Omidyar Network).  For SIFs aligned with these professionals who 
share pro-business values and pro-market ideology (Dart, 2004a), engaging in a venture 
philanthropy model that borrows business models, however modified or adapted, 
establishes “moral legitimacy” (Suchman, 1995).   
 However, borrowing business models was not necessarily deemed legitimate in 
traditional philanthropy.  Isomorphism scholars suggest that the repertoires constructed in 
a newly institutionalized field not only enable action but can limit it, as well (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1983).  Letts and her co-authors (1997) illustrated that 
traditional philanthropic foundations tend to employ those trained in nonprofits or a 
program area relevant to their giving focus (e.g., environmental science, education).  A 
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recent report (Mirabella, 2007) found that despite a growing emphasis on “management” 
(O’Neill, 2005), the largest proportion (47%) of nonprofit management programs are 
institutionally located within a college of liberal arts or a school of public affairs and 
administration.  This finding should not be surprising, given that nonprofits (and 
government) are theorized to emerge from “failures of business”—“the market and 
contract failures” put forth by nonprofit economists (Weisbrod, 1975).  Considering this 
antagonistic origin of the philanthropy-business relationship, many nonprofit 
practitioners and scholars have been deeply skeptical about a benefit of using venture 
philanthropy (Edwards, 2009; Frumkin, 2003, 2008; Sievers, 2001).  With the theoretical 
and empirical evidence, I will posit:  
 
Hypothesis 5a. The management team’s training in nonprofits is 
negatively related to the extent of venture philanthropy practices. 
 
Hypothesis 5b. The management team’s training in business is positively 
related to the extent of venture philanthropy practices. 
 
Moderating Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices 
A main research question of this study is whether or not moderating effects exist 
between EO and institutional pressures on SIFs’ engagement in venture philanthropy.  
This contingency idea assumes that SIFs with a higher level of EO resist negative 
pressures from the traditional philanthropic field and choose to originate and employ a 
business-based model of venture philanthropy.  In this study, SIFs are viewed as 
organizations embedded in two institutions—traditional philanthropy and venture 
capitalism.  EO then is expected to enable those institutionally constrained organizations 
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to acquire adequate skills and resources and to strategically resist and shape institutional 
pressures.  
Drawing on EO and the new institutionalism, three main mechanisms can be 
proposed for how EO creates multifaceted effects in enabling SIFs to take a strategic 
approach to institutional constraints of philanthropy.  (1) EO resolves the “paradox of 
embeddedness” of SIFs.  Because high embeddedness in institutions influences 
organizations’ perceptions (Baum & Oliver, 1992; Dacin, 1997; Garud et al., 2007), EO 
reshape SIFs’ perceptions about the venture capital business model and its possible 
impacts on traditional philanthropy.  (2) EO empowers SIFs to look for, locate, and 
leverage adequate resources to originate a novel model of venture philanthropy.  (3) EO 
also helps SIFs with their legitimacy management.  Because the institutional duality 
exposes SIFs to ambiguity (Kostova & Roth, 2002), EO enables SIFs to manage and 
maintain legitimacy in the two contrasting institutions of philanthropy and venture 
capitalism through effective communication with influential institutional actors (i.e., 
professional associations and major peer organizations).  
 As discussed above, innovativeness reflects organizations’ openness to novelty, 
experiments, and new creative solutions (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).  EO scholars have 
conceptualized innovativeness of business firms to increase their chances of capitalizing 
on emerging opportunities (Wiklund, 1999).  Yet, innovativeness is not limited to 
economic opportunities but incorporates mission-based opportunities, as well.  Nonprofit 
innovativeness is thus realized in organizations’ fulfillment of increased net revenues, of 
social mission, or even both together (Morris et al., 2011).  Risk taking also enhances 
organizations’ willingness to commit significant resources to uncertain projects where 
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outcomes are unknown and a potential for meaningful loss may even occur (Lumpkin & 
Dess, 1996; D. Miller & Friesen, 1978).  These theoretical implication suggest that EO 
directs SIFs to new and different perspectives regarding how a business model, though 
uncertain and unconventional, may assist with their pursuit of mission, as demanded by 
philanthropic-minded donors, and fulfillment of charitable purposes, as required by the 
IRS.  With a high level of EO, SIFs reconsider their assumption that the use of market-
based models does not necessarily create mission drift and jeopardize their social 
legitimacy (Jones, 2007; Weisbrod, 2004), by finding a way to accommodate professional 
norms set by the Council on Foundations.  Moody's (2008) empirical account explains 
how early venture philanthropists have learned certain benefits of using a business model 
to achieve their philanthropic goal effectively and efficiently (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-
Skillern, 2006).  
 Once their perception of a business model has been reshaped, SIFs next need to 
acquire adequate resources (e.g., time, human capital, knowledge) and invest them in 
experimenting and developing a novel model of venture philanthropy into an effective 
tool to fulfill their goals.  EO enables organizations to obtain new ideas and resources 
through a variety of networks with their existing resource base, combine them effectively, 
and enhance organizations’ overall mix of resources (Stam & Elfring, 2008; Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2005).  As such, EO empowers SIFs embedded in traditional philanthropy to 
seek and gather new ideas and practices of venture capital investment through 
professional networks and to sort different perspectives, both positive and negative, so as 
to make a proper decision about how new resources from venture capitalism can most 
appropriately be combined with their existing resources from traditional philanthropy.  
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Risk taking enhances SIFs’ skills to choose and implement novel ideas even in ambiguity 
and to create a most effective approach leading to exceptional outcomes, to which 
organizations have not previously been exposed and which otherwise may be ignored out 
of fear.  A high level of EO also empowers institutionally constrained organizations to 
access multiple networks.  Obtaining resources from multiple networks, rather than a 
single network, helps organizations diminish the chance of failure associated with risk 
taking behaviors (Uzzi, 2001).  These processes reduce fear that SIFs embedded in 
traditional philanthropy may have of an unproven model and thus encourage SIFs to 
engage in venture philanthropy.  
 However, maintaining institutionally accepted goals and legitimacy is a difficult 
task.  It is even more so for SIFs, because conflicting institutional logics caused by the 
institutional duality create a significant degree of ambiguity (Hoffman, 1999).  This 
ambiguity undermines organizations’ ability to determine institutional expectations.  
Thus, SIFs must stay alert and act proactively to counter any sign of mission drift.  Here, 
proactiveness plays an important role.  Proactiveness in the for-profit context is defined 
as the tendency of an organization to anticipate future wants and needs and to pursue 
change ahead of the competition (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).  Morris and his co-authors 
(Morris et al., 2011) argue that mission-pursuing organizations can be proactive in terms 
of both social innovations (a pursuit of mission and social outcomes) and commercial 
innovations (a pursuit of financial resources and economic outcomes).  Hence, EO 
enables SIFs to develop a proactive attitude toward legitimacy management before it is 
jeopardized and to exploit high-quality communication with major actors in the 
philanthropic field in order to determine their expectation.  Through close social relations 
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with powerful institutional actors, SIFs are able to maintain trust with peer organizations 
even while engaging in an unconventional model of venture philanthropy.  Close social 
relations also help SIFs look for the way to adjust a business-model into a more 
appropriate model for philanthropy while maintaining legitimacy in the field. 
In sum, EO enables and empowers SIFs to sort conflicting institutional signals, 
manage ambiguity caused by institutional duality, and meet demands from actors in the 
philanthropic field to maintain their legitimacy and economic vitality.  Given this logic, 
four hypotheses are developed:  
 
Hypothesis 6. EO moderates a negative effect of the nonprofit status on 
the extent of venture philanthropy practices, such that the relationship 
between the nonprofit status and venture philanthropy practices becomes 
positive for SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
 
Hypothesis 7. EO moderates a negative effect of donors’ and investors’ 
demand for social outcomes on the extent of venture philanthropy 
practices, such that the relationship between the donors’ demand for social 
outcomes and venture philanthropy practices becomes positive for SIFs 
with a higher level of EO. 
 
Hypothesis 8. EO moderates a negative effect of affiliation with the 
Council on Foundations and other grantmaker professional associations on 
the extent of venture philanthropy practices, such that the relationship 
between affiliation with philanthropic associations and venture 
philanthropy practices becomes positive for SIFs with a higher level of 
EO. 
 
Hypothesis 9. EO moderates a negative effect of the management team’s 
training in nonprofits on the extent of venture philanthropy practices, such 
that the relationship between the management team’s training in 
nonprofits and venture philanthropy practices becomes positive for SIFs 
with a higher level of EO. 
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Hypotheses For Study 2: Factors Affecting Social And Financial Performance 
 Study 2 investigates the main effects and moderating effects on SIF performance.  
While the method chapter will discuss performance in more detail to construct variables, 
it is important to first understand how performance is conceptualized in the nonprofit 
context because it differs significantly from how performance is conceptualized in the 
for-profit context.  I thus begin with conceptualization of SIF performance.  The main 
logics behind the hypotheses for Study 2 are displayed in Figure 2.2 and all hypotheses 
for Study 2 are listed in Table 2.4.  
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Figure 2.2. Conceptual Model for Study 2 
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Table 2.4. A Summary of Hypotheses for Study 2: Effects on Social and Financial Performance 
 Hypothesis Core concept DV 
EO 
H10 EO is positively related to social performance.  
EO 
  
Social 
performance 
H11 EO is positively related to financial performance. 
 
Financial 
performance 
Regulative institutional pillars  
H12 The nonprofit status is positively related to social performance.  
Attribute  
(The legal structure) 
Social 
performance 
H13 The nonprofit status is negatively related to financial performance. Financial 
performance 
H14a The demand of donors and investors for social outcomes is positively related 
to social performance. 
 
 
Linkage  
(Donor/investor 
demand) 
 
Social 
performance H14b The demand of donors and investors for financial outcomes is negatively 
related to social performance. 
H15a The demand of donors and investors for social outcomes is negatively related 
to financial performance. 
 
Financial 
performance H15b The demand of donors and investors for financial outcomes is positively 
related to financial performance. 
Normative institutional pillars 
H16a Affiliation with the Council on Foundations and other grantmaker professional 
associations is positively related to social performance. 
 
 
Linkage  
(Affiliation with 
professional 
associations) 
 
Social 
performance H16b Affiliation with the National Venture Capital Association and other venture 
capital professional associations is negatively related to social performance. 
H17a Affiliation with the Council on Foundations and other grantmaker professional 
associations is negatively related to financial performance. 
 
Financial 
performance H17b Affiliation with the National Venture Capital Association and other venture 
capital professional associations is positively related to financial performance. 
 
  
58 
Table 2.4. (cont.) 
 Hypothesis Core concept DV 
H18a The management team’s training in nonprofits is positively related to social 
performance. 
 
 
Attribute  
(The management 
team’s training) 
 
Social 
performance H18b The management team’s training in business is negatively related to social 
performance. 
H19a The management team’s training in nonprofits is negatively related to 
financial performance. 
 
Financial 
performance H19b The management team’s training in business is positively related to financial 
performance. 
EO – Venture capital institution interaction 
H20 EO moderates a negative effect of donors’ and investors’ demand for financial 
outcomes on social performance, such that the relationship between donors’ 
and investors’ demand for financial outcomes and social performance 
becomes positive for SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
EO-Regulative 
(Donor/investor 
demand) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social 
performance 
H21 EO moderates a negative effect of affiliation with the National Venture 
Capital Association and other venture capital professional associations on 
social performance, such that the relationship between affiliation with venture 
capital professional associations and social performance becomes positive for 
SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
EO-Normative  
(Affiliation with 
professional 
associations) 
 
H22 EO moderates a negative effect of the management team’s training in business 
on social performance, such that the relationship between the management 
team’s training in business and social performance becomes positive for SIFs 
with a higher level of EO. 
EO-Normative  
(The management 
team’s training) 
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Table 2.4. (cont.) 
 Hypothesis Core concept DV 
EO – Philanthropic institution interaction 
H23 EO moderates a negative effect of the nonprofit status on financial 
performance, such that the relationship between the nonprofit status and 
financial performance becomes positive for SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
EO-Regulative  
(The legal structure) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
performance 
H24 EO moderates a negative effect of donors’ and investors’ demand for social 
outcomes on financial performance, such that the relationship between the 
donors’ and investors’ demand for social outcomes and financial performance 
becomes positive for SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
EO-Regulative 
(Donor/investor 
demand) 
 
H25 EO moderates a negative effect of affiliation with the Council on Foundations 
and other grantmaker professional associations on financial performance, such 
that the relationship between affiliation with philanthropic associations and 
financial performance becomes positive for SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
EO-Normative  
(Affiliation with 
professional 
associations) 
H26 EO moderates a negative effect of the management team’s training in 
nonprofits on financial performance, such that the relationship between the 
management team’s training in nonprofits and financial performance becomes 
positive for SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
EO-Normative  
(The management 
team’s training) 
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Conceptualization of SIF Performance 
Performance is measured by how effectively and efficiently a goal is achieved.  
The institutional duality, however, makes SIFs’ funding goals multifaceted.  The market 
size and potential do not guarantee high performance (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-
Skillern, 2006), as financial considerations of investing in profit-maximizing ventures are 
often not comparable to investing in mission-maximizing ventures.  For this reason, prior 
literature on SIFs and social entrepreneurship (Bonini & Emerson, 2005; Emerson, 2000, 
2003; O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud, Saltuk, Bugg-Levine, & Brandenburg, 2010) often 
discusses two broadly defined types of performance: (1) social performance, and (2) 
financial performance.   Entrepreneurship scholars also assess investment performance, 
focusing either on (1) funders and funds (Dimov & Shepherd, 2005) or (2) their invested 
ventures (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2006; De Clercq & Sapienza, 2006).  I will draw on these 
implications as a framework to conceptualize social performance and financial 
performance for this study.  
 
Social Performance  
Social performance has been discussed and defined primarily in the traditional 
philanthropic field.  According to Frumkin (2008), there are two types of philanthropic 
giving: (1) instrumental giving and (2) expressive giving.  The former is deemed more 
“strategic,” as it is focused on achieving a particular policy objective and is intended to 
accomplish a significant impact on specified social problems.  Expressive giving, on the 
other hand, reflects a donor’s personal desire to support a cause or organization without 
necessarily expecting noticeable impacts.  This classification suggests that social 
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performance is determined not only by how large an impact is made on society, but also 
by how much a donor’s own value is met.  
Funding performance is measured on the status and performance of funded 
ventures (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2006; De Clercq & Sapienza, 2006), as well.  With a 
primary goal of attaining social missions, social ventures seek to create socially desirable 
values that are not spontaneously produced by private markets.  Austin and his co-
researchers (Austin, Gutierrez, Ogliastri, & Reficco, 2006) have found two different 
measures explicating social performance by social ventures: (1) depth (how much value 
is attained; and (2) breadth (how widely the impact is made).  Depth of social 
performance is recognized by how much social mission is attained, to what degree the 
values of beneficiaries are fulfilled, and what outputs are created for them.  Such values 
for beneficiaries are often qualitative (Kanter & Summers, 1987), and are ensured, for 
instance, through removal of social and economic barriers and mitigation of undesirable 
side-effects of economic activity (Austin, et al., 2006).  These outcomes reflect the 
uniqueness of social issues of each beneficiary group, community, and socio-economic 
condition.  Hence, social performance needs to be defined and bounded in its value 
proposition for each stakeholder, especially beneficiaries.  
 
Financial Performance  
In a mainstream venture capital investment, financial performance can be 
predicted from potential risks and returns of investment associated with how likely funds 
and their funded ventures alike are to attain economic goals (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 
1999; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  As such, major criteria to infer financial performance of 
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venture capital investment include (1) return on investment (ROI) (Shepherd, Armstrong, 
& Lévesque, 2005); and (2) the status and outcomes of funded ventures, such as an initial 
public offering (IPO), acquisition by another company, and additional financing 
(Cochrane, 2005; De Clercq & Dimov, 2008; Dimov & Shepherd, 2005).  Pursuing 
superior financial performance, funders are often most interested in the performance of 
funded ventures, because better performance of funded ventures is more likely to bring 
higher return (Shepherd et al., 2005).  
Two types of financial resources are discussed for SIFs’ funded social ventures: 
(1) market-based resources, such as sales of goods/services, fees, loans, PRIs 
(foundations’ loans or equity often at below-market interest rates), and stock (if a venture 
is for-profit); and (2) non-market-based resources, such as donations, grants, and 
government contracts (Emerson, 1998, 2000; Grønbjerg, 1993; Tuckman, 1993; Young, 
2006).  Financial self-sufficiency of funded social ventures is often measured by net 
assets, total revenue increase, and income diversification via commercial revenue (Alter, 
2004; Coombes, Morris, Allen, & Webb, 2011; Kaplan, 2001; Morris, Coombes, 
Schindehutte, & Allen, 2007).  To secure revenue, social ventures often rely on a wide 
range of and/or mix of financing instruments (Chell, 2007; Emerson, 2003).  Due to fiscal 
constraints of nonprofits, diversification of revenue streams is considered as a way to 
mitigate a financial risk in case of the loss of some donor bases.  Therefore, many SIFs, 
such as Acumen Fund, insist on revenue diversification as a main criterion determining 
self-sustainability of funded social ventures (Emerson, Spitzer, & Mulhair, 2006).  Other 
SIFs, such as Google.org and the Omidyar Network, even choose to structure their own 
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organizations as a hybrid between nonprofit and for-profit (Fleishman, 2009) so they are 
able to provide diverse financial resources to their funded social ventures.  
Despite the merits of having market-based resources, institutional theory indicates 
that non-market philanthropic resources are more critical for social ventures than market-
based resources, as such philanthropic resources represent the public acceptance and 
legitimacy of recipient organizations.  Philanthropic resources are often indispensable for 
social ventures to attain breakeven in their commercial activities, also, because their 
“clients” can rarely afford to pay for services.  Furthermore, the centrality of social 
missions often makes social ventures less attractive to mainstream investors (Wei-
Skillern et al., 2007).  Thus, seeking philanthropic resources may be a more efficient—or, 
the only available—strategy for social ventures to enhance financial performance.  
 
Additional Implications for Social and Financial Performance 
 A review of how social and financial performance has been conceptualized 
stresses that SIF performance is complex and multifaceted.  To develop a theory and 
hypotheses, understanding other implications for superior SIF performance is critical.  
Prior literature has shown: (1) funders’ capacity to estimate a risk-return balance to find 
the right investment for superior performance (Dimov & Shepherd, 2005; Dimov, 
Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 2007); and (2) funded social ventures’ organizational capacity 
(Cable & Shane, 1997; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  Cooperative relationships between 
funder and recipient have been found to enhance capacity-building of funded social 
ventures in the philanthropic field (Grønbjerg, Martell, & Paarlberg, 2000).  These 
implications are reflected in the following discussions.    
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Main Effects on Social and Financial Performance  
EO and Social and Financial Performance 
 Miller (1983) suggests that EO facilitates an organization’s willingness to support 
new ideas and engage in strategies in which the outcome may be highly uncertain.  EO 
literature has extensively discussed a positive relationship between EO and firm 
performance (Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 2001; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003; Wiklund, 1999; 
Zahra & Covin, 1995).  While organizational goals and processes differ between for-
profits and nonprofits, the same logics are applied to the EO-performance relationship in 
the nonprofit context (Coombes et al., 2011; Morris & Jones, 1999; Pearce et al., 2010).   
 Morris, Webb and Franklin (2011) propose that nonprofit innovation can be 
manifested in fulfillment of social missions, revenue augmentation by earned income 
activities, or a combination of both.  The IRS data demonstrates that despite Reagan’s 
budget cuts, the number of nonprofits actually increased by more than thirty percent 
(Salamon & Abramson, 1982; Salamon, 1987).  That is, nonprofits found and exercised 
innovations directed particularly at financial performance exemplified by market-based 
strategies such as new earned income activities (Chetkovich & Frumkin, 2003; Foster & 
Bradach, 2005; Young, 2007). 
 Accounts by philanthropic scholars (Anheier & Leat, 2006; Fleishman, 2009) also 
imply that EO can contribute to improving SIFs’ social performance.  They suggest that 
if foundation officers are open to a new organizational and managerial culture and are 
willing to adopt novel activities, it will help reshape their foundation’s mission and goal 
selection.  This adaptation process, in turn, helps a foundation discover a new innovative 
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way to partner with a social venture that produces great social impacts and raises funds 
effectively. 
 Innovativeness empowers an organization’s efforts to pursue new combinations 
that provide a new basis for meeting stakeholders’ needs (Pearce, Kramer, & Robbins, 
1997), which leads to social performance.  Many empirical accounts support this.  
Leading SIFs, such as Ashoka and Acumen Fund, address an innovative way to solve 
grave societal ills and to make a positive impact in society by combining and mobilizing 
resources offered by their “fellows,” who are social entrepreneurial professionals.  
Simultaneously, this innovative network is very cost-effective, as it is composed of like-
minded and highly motivated volunteers.  Other SIFs create innovative ways to manage a 
proper balance of funding return and risk.  The Omidyar Network, for instance, has 
nonprofit and for-profit divisions.  This unique hybrid structure enables the Omidyar 
Network to diversify types of funding tools and types of portfolio ventures.  Pacific 
Community Ventures decouples their core technology (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977) to enhance social performance and financial performance together by 
providing social services to the underserved through its 501(c)(3) unit, whereas making 
equity investment to achieve high return through its for-profit unit.  REDF proposes 
novel investment vehicles based on different mixes blending social and financial returns: 
(1) capital generating greater financial return than social return; (2) capital generating a 
blend of social and financial return with financial returns lower than the risk-adjusted 
market rate for greater social returns; and (3) capital maximizing social return, but no 
direct financial return other than the tax deduction from philanthropic giving (Emerson, 
Bonini, & Brehm, 2003).  
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 Risk taking is the willingness to act outside of accepted practices and norms 
(Pearce et al., 2010).  As such, risk taking is also instrumental for SIFs’ use of novel 
funding tools, because these tools have not been proven and future outcomes are highly 
uncertain.  Nonprofit proactiveness refers to a posture of anticipating and acting on future 
social needs, financial needs, and stakeholder needs (Morris et al., 2011).  Such a 
forward-looking perspective helps SIFs seek and identify a potentially serious societal 
issue proactively and invest in programs that help limit damage in society.  The 
Rockefeller Foundation’s investment in the “Green Revolution” led by Norman Borlaug 
is a good example of how nonprofit proactiveness can make a massive (worldwide, in 
this case) and long-lasting social impact by innovating agricultural technology and saving 
over a billion people from starvation (Fleishman, 2009).  With those theoretical and 
empirical accounts, I will posit:  
   
Hypothesis 10. EO is positively related to social performance. 
 
Hypothesis 11. EO is positively related to financial performance. 
 
The Legal Structure and Social and Financial Performance 
The role of institutional influence is particularly significant in highly regulated 
fields where well-laid-out rules and laws govern organizational forms and operations 
(DiMaggio, 1988).  As discussed in Study 1, nonprofit SIFs are typically structured as 
IRC 501(c)(3) public charities or foundations9.  As legal coercion from the traditional 
philanthropic field is highly strong, acquiescence can best serve nonprofit SIFs’ interests 
                                                
9 The common classification of American foundations is based on the law that charters foundations.  The 
approximately 60,000 foundations are generally classified into four subgroups: independent grant-making 
foundation (90 percent), corporate foundations (about 4 percent); operating foundations (about 3 percent); 
and community foundations (1 percent).	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(Oliver, 1991).  That is, IRS requirements and taxpayers’ demand shape goals of SIFs’ 
funding performance.  Institutional theorists argue that when the force of government 
mandates buttress cultural expectations, organizations are made more aware of public 
interests and then are less likely to respond defiantly because the consequences of 
noncompliance are highly punitive and strictly enforced (Oliver, 1991).  Prior to 1969, 
the only sanction for a tax-exempt organization’s serious transgressions was termination 
of tax-exempt status (Simon et al., 2006).  
A subsidy theory (Simon et al., 2006; Weisbrod, 1998) also underscores that as 
tax-exempt entities, nonprofit SIFs must be legitimate and accountable to the public by 
channeling their funding for advancement of social causes and meeting public demand.  
Federal regulations also require SIFs structured as community foundations (e.g., the 
Center for Venture Philanthropy of the Peninsula Community Foundation) to choose 
grant committee members representing the broader community.  In sum, under today’s 
regulative system in the philanthropic field, SIFs must play an “instrumental role” of 
philanthropy (Frumkin, 2008) in producing and providing the public good in society at 
large (Grønbjerg et al., 2000; Guo & Brown, 2006; Orosz, 2000; Ostrower, 2006).  As 
discussed in the previous sections, these approaches lead to higher social performance.  
With this logic, the next hypothesis is posited:  
 
Hypothesis 12. The nonprofit status is positively related to social 
performance. 
 
In the mainstream venture capital field, profitability is the most common indicator 
to evaluate financial performance (Muzyka et al., 1996; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999).  
Philanthropic scholars warn of a possible trade-off between social performance and 
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financial performance, because a pursuit of both may result in harmed institutional 
legitimacy (Kanter & Summers, 1987).  Thus, conformity to philanthropic regulative 
pressures is likely to deter SIFs from pursuing superior financial performance.  Although 
increased revenue is not entirely contradictive to the IRS requirements of nonprofits, 
surplus is encouraged insofar as it is used for the public good purpose (Peredo & 
Chrisman, 2006).  For instance, private foundations may use PRIs, but they must obey the 
IRS rules to keep their tax-exempt status.  In sum, nonprofit organizations can be more 
resistant to pressures from economic rationality because efforts to manage financial 
performance can be perceived as inconsistent with the goal of high quality social service 
delivery (Whetten, 1978).  This logic leads to the next hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 13. The nonprofit status is negatively related to financial 
performance. 
 
Donors’ and Investors’ Demand for Funding Outcomes and Social and Financial 
Performance 
Donors and investors are institutional actors coercing organizational behaviors 
because of their power over recipient organizations, which are dependent on those 
providers of critical resources for organizational survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Scott, 2008).  According to institutional theory, resource providers prefer socially 
acceptable organizations, as these organizations do not threaten the providers’ reputation 
for good judgment (Baum & Oliver, 1991).  Philanthropy allows donors to “express their 
values, to single out particular issues or causes as being worthy of attention, and, through 
gifts of money, to support activities that benefit the public” (Frumkin, 2008, p. 1).  As 
such, these philanthropic donors demand social outcomes—fulfillment of mission and 
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provision of the public good.  As prior literature has used “mission pursuit” as one of the 
critical indicators to assess social performance (Coombes et al., 2011), SIFs’ efforts to 
meet their donors’ demand for social outcomes help enhance social performance.  
Institutional scholars have found that internal and external tensions and additional 
opportunity costs negatively affect financial performance (Heugens & Lander, 2009).  
Especially, tensions with resource providers can easily become sources of constraints and 
disturbances interfering with the routines an organization relies upon to pursue their work 
effectively and efficiently (Basu, Dirsmith, & Gupta, 1999).  Because tensions can arise 
from divergences between their philanthropic-minded donors and financial performance, 
conforming to philanthropic donors’ demand for social outcomes is thought to deter SIFs 
from pursuing financial performance.  Also, due to different methods required for 
assessing social and financial performance, meeting philanthropic donors’ demand for 
social performance while trying to enhance financial performance will create substantial 
burden.  Furthermore, SIFs’ use of market-based funding tools to pursue financial 
performance may lead to a “crowding-out effect”—or reduction of philanthropic revenue 
(Kingma, 1995; Okten & Weisbrod, 2000).  Philanthropic donors may take 
commercialization of SIFs’ funding as a sign that SIFs may not need their donations, and 
as a result, withdraw their support (Weisbrod, 1998).  Then, the next two hypotheses are 
offered:    
 
Hypothesis 14a. The demand of donors and investors for social outcomes 
is positively related to social performance. 
 
Hypothesis 14b. The demand of donors and investors for financial 
outcomes is negatively related to social performance. 
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Economic accountability and rationalization are important objectives of 
institutional pressures from investors who demand financial outcomes (Pfeffer & Leong, 
1977).  Institutional theorists dictate that resource providers prefer organizations which 
have “rational” strategies from the providers’ perspective and isomorphic organizations 
are more likely than their deviant counterparts to attract financial resources of higher 
quality at favorable terms (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1999).  For venture capital 
investors who have a central concern about financial performance, performance data must 
be calculated and presented by objective methods standardized in the venture capital 
institutions (Shepherd, Zacharakis, & Baron, 2003).  Unlike social performance, financial 
performance allows for this quantitative measurement.  Conforming to venture capital 
investors also helps enhance financial performance by funded social ventures, which then 
leads to enhancing SIFs’ own financial performance.  A close relationship between 
funders and funded ventures is common in the venture capital field.  This close 
relationship is found to facilitate an efficient provision of various added values to assist 
funded ventures with building organizational capacity including increased net revenue 
and acquisition of other funding (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2004).  
On the contrary, if major donors are from the traditional philanthropic field, 
conformity to their demand for social outcomes is likely to hinder financial performance.  
Attempts to quantify performance are recognized as harmful by philanthropic donors, 
because quantitative methods are not capable to measure their unique values and thus 
may ignore them (Edwards, 2009, 2011).  As a result, SIFs’ attempt to conform to 
philanthropic donors’ demand and to enhance financial performance create internal and 
external tensions (Heugens & Lander, 2009).  A central drive to pursue social mission 
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may also allow SIFs whose major donors are highly philanthropic to be less concerned 
about financial performance (Zietlow, 2001).  Adequate organizational capacity to pursue 
financial performance may not be even available.  Therefore, the following hypotheses 
are posited regarding effects on financial performance.  
 
Hypothesis 15a. The demand of donors and investors for social outcomes 
is negatively related to financial performance. 
 
Hypothesis 15b. The demand of donors and investors for financial 
outcomes is positively related to financial performance. 
 
Affiliation with Professional Associations and Social and Financial Performance 
As influential institutional actors, professional associations set norms in the 
particular organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Norms specify how things 
should be done (Scott, 2008a, pp. 54–55) and direct SIFs’ attempts to define performance 
and set the primary goal (Zacharakis et al., 2007).  And, by following institutional norms, 
organizations gain legitimacy and become social acceptable.  Legitimacy is critical for 
superior performance from the institutional theory perspective, as performance is often 
conceptualized as “symbolic”—a type of performance shaped by organizational 
reputation and public perception (Heugens & Lander, 2009).  
The Council on Foundations has established the primary goal of philanthropy as 
“maximizing the public good” (Council on Foundations, n.d.).  The public good means 
differently in each case, as values that each stakeholder has are idiosyncratic.  This 
idiosyncrasy creates a substantial uncertainty.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) illustrate 
where there is significant uncertainty and when legitimacy pressures are strong, 
organizations engage in “mimetic behavior,” i.e., mimicking successful organizations 
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within the same field.  Thus, facing uncertainty, SIFs look for the most socially 
acceptable cases of other organizations through professional networks.  If SIFs are 
affiliated with the Council on Foundations, they gain access to other organizations 
through the Council’s professional network and most likely learn practices of how to 
achieve superior social performance, because that is the shared goal of the Council’s 
member organizations.   
A pursuit for superior performance entails a rigorous performance measurement.  
While measuring financial performance is a standard practice for venture capital firms, 
measuring social performance against this standard practice leads to considerable 
opportunity cost.  According to institutional theory, bearing additional opportunity cost is 
a hurdle for efficient operation, and thus undermines organizational performance 
(Heugens & Lander, 2009).  Therefore, I hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 16a. Affiliation with the Council on Foundations and other 
grantmaker professional associations is positively related to social 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 16b. Affiliation with the National Venture Capital Association 
and other venture capital professional associations is negatively related to 
social performance. 
 
 The primary goal defined by the National Venture Capital Association is to 
maximize ROI and bring a high financial gain to limited partners (Wasserman & 
Robinson, 2000).  Pursuing this taken-for-granted goal, SIFs are expected to enhance 
financial performance.  Affiliation with the Council on Foundations provides legitimacy 
for SIFs, however in return obliges SIFs to follow the common goal of philanthropy.  
From an institutional perspective, the goal is not necessarily about efficiency, but rather 
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symbolic.  Organizational adaptation is initially to improve efficiency and productivity, 
but later becomes primarily for legitimacy purposes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Organizations may choose to engage in mimetic behavior even when the behavior 
undermines efficiency of organizational management (Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 2006).  
This potential trade-off between legitimacy and performance is due to the fact that, on 
one hand, legitimacy-based imitation enables organizations to increase their probability 
of survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), while on the other, the likelihood of survival can be 
obtained at the expense of financial performance (Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 2006; 
Henderson, 1999).  Thus, the pursuit of the Council’s goal may ensure survival of SIFs, 
but may also cost their financial performance.  Given this logic, I will hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 17a. Affiliation with the Council on Foundations and other 
grantmaker professional associations is negatively related to financial 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 17b. Affiliation with the National Venture Capital Association 
and other venture capital professional associations is positively related to 
financial performance. 
 
Management Team’s Training and Social and Financial Performance 
Isomorphism scholars dictate that a profession plays a crucial role in advancing 
normative isomorphism in an organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 
2008a).  People who have the same credentials, formal education and professional 
experiences manage organizations in much the same way (Shenhav, 1995; Sutton et al., 
1994).  Norms often are spread not only through formal but also informal networks 
created by those former classmates or colleagues (Moody, 2008) and such informal 
networks enhance information exchanges.  The “structuration” theory (Giddens, 1979) 
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suggests that such increases in the amount of interaction among organizations accelerate 
the development of a consensus on goals.  As such, professionals trained in nonprofits 
view their performance goals as maximizing the public good, whereas professionals 
trained in business define their performance goal as maximizing ROI.   
Organizations are more willing to acquiesce to institutional pressures when these 
pressures or expectations are compatible with internal goals (Oliver, 1991).  Thus, if the 
management team is trained in nonprofits, the pursuit of social performance is compatible 
with the management’s goal, which then encourages SIFs to carry out this shared goal.   
Conversely, if the management team is trained in business, the goal is not compatible 
with what social performance will lead to.  This goal divergence creates internal tensions 
and harms performance (Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 2006).  If consistency of goals is low, 
SIFs may even lack the capacity to maintain adequate social performance and 
simultaneously conform to expectations of the business-trained management team 
(Oliver, 1991).  Thus, I posit:  
 
Hypothesis 18a. The management team’s training in nonprofits is 
positively related to social performance. 
 
Hypothesis 18b. The management team’s training in business is negatively 
related to social performance. 
 
The quality of the management team with financial capacity has been discussed as 
the most important determinant for superior financial performance (Shepherd & 
Zacharakis, 1999).  However, the mission centrality of nonprofit-trained professionals 
may lead to their lower attention to managerial execution and fail to emphasize the 
importance of financial performance (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006).  A 
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nonprofit’s much smaller economic incentives for employees may hinder SIFs from 
obtaining adequate human capital to enhance financial performance (Oliver, 1991).  The 
significant heterogeneity of stakeholders with whom nonprofit managers typically work 
(Maguire et al., 2004) may also create management and cultural tensions in an effort to 
pursue strong financial performance.  While a founder may be entrepreneurial and want 
to experiment with revenue augmentation activities, many constituencies may be simply 
threatened by the idea of seeking double-bottom-line (Chell, 2007).  Given these, I posit:  
 
Hypothesis 19a. The management team’s training in nonprofits is 
negatively related to financial performance. 
 
Hypothesis 19b. The management team’s training in business is positively 
related to financial performance. 
 
Moderating Effects on Social and Financial Performance 
  Summarizing the review and meta-analysis results by Heugens and Lander 
(2009)10, three reasons are considered for a negative relationship between conformity to 
institutional pressures and performance: (1) positive costs resulting from a need to 
acquire required resources to resist institutional constraints (Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 
2006); (2) internal and external tensions which can interfere with organizational effective 
management (Basu et al., 1999); and (3) lowered potential of differentiation, thereby 
lowered sustained competitive advantage (Deephouse, 1999).  Above all, conflicting 
institutional logics caused by the institutional duality (Kostova & Roth, 2002) impedes 
SIFs from determining what are institutional expectations on the nature of performance 
                                                
10 Heugens and Lander (2009) distinguish “substantive performance,” defined as the extent to which 
organizations are able to generate accounting-based profits or increase their overall market value, from 
“symbolic performance” defined as the extent to which they generate positive social evaluations, which 
leads to an organization’s legitimacy.  
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goals.  Because performance is assessed based on how well the goal is met, this goal 
ambiguity undermines SIFs’ effort to improve performance.  
 These implications suggest that for SIFs to achieve superior performance despite 
institutional pressures, SIFs need to do one or more of the followings.  (1) Because 
conformity to different institutional demands necessitates additional costs for investment 
and these costs undermine performance, EO needs to enable SIFs to obtain and manage 
knowledge-based resources effectively and efficiently enough to minimize costs for 
additional investment.  (2) SIFs need to mitigate conflicts and goal ambiguity to achieve 
superior performance.  Because conflicts and goal ambiguity easily arise from competing 
institutional logics and they also repress performance, EO needs to enable SIFs to 
manage these conflicts and identify performance goals through close communication with 
stakeholders.  (3) Because realizing funding social outcomes requires time and 
cooperative relationships with stakeholders, EO needs to help SIFs build social capital 
and manage trust with stakeholders.    
 
EO Moderating Effects on the Venture Capital Institutions-Social Performance 
Relationship 
This study predicts that SIFs with a higher level of EO are able to achieve 
superior social performance even under the negative pressures of the venture capital field. 
The pursuit of multiple and competing goals usually necessitates additional costs for 
investment and these costs tend to undermine performance (Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 
2006).  Thus, for enhancing performance while meeting investors’ demand for financial 
outcomes, it is essential for SIFs to have a capacity of obtaining and managing 
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knowledge-based resources effectively and efficiently to reduce costs.  The resource-
based theory (Barney, 2001) dictates that the way an organization is organized can lead to 
a positive relationship between performance and resources.  Drawing on EO and the 
resource-based view, Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) have argued that EO can improve an 
organization’s overall resources and performance as well.  Thus, EO is thought to 
enhance SIFs’ resource base.  Innovativeness facilitates SIFs’ effort to pursue competing 
goals of a social performance and venture capital investors in the most efficient and cost-
effective way.  Proactiveness is of vital importance for SIFs’ effective acquisition and 
management of unique resources.  These unique resources are not abundant and SIFs 
need to obtain those unique resources before other organizations retain them.  Risk taking 
is indispensable to avoid additional costs, also.  Making an investment in a type of a 
project that goes against institutional demands requires organizations to take a risk.  
Some organizations—in particular, risk-averse nonprofits—may take a longer time to 
decide whether or not they undertake a novel project.  While such a cautious attitude is 
perceived as wise, they will also incur additional costs from time and efforts to confirm 
the validity.  Funding any ventures, especially social ventures, is highly risky.  In almost 
all circumstances, funders need to proceed without guarantees of success.  
Many empirical accounts support this theoretical argument.  REDF established 
the Farber Fellow/Intern Program to recruit MBA students from business schools.  In the 
early days of venture philanthropy, the biggest challenge was to capture and measure 
social impact, which traditional philanthropists thought would be impossible (Kanter & 
Summers, 1987).  As a leading SIF, REDF originated an innovative and complex method 
to monetize social impacts, called “Social Return on Investment (SROI)” by applying 
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business accounting concepts.  With data from this method, their investors from the 
venture capital industry could better capture where their investment was.  Creating this 
type of complex method, with no other preceding model available, would normally have 
been extremely costly.  However, REDF managed to minimize the cost by using its 
Farber fellow (Suzi Chun) and Farber intern (Jay Wachowicz) (Emerson et al., 2000).  As 
one of the first recipients of the federal Social Innovation Fund (Corporation for National 
and Community Service, n.d.), REDF’s accomplishments in producing significant social 
benefits have been widely acknowledged.  Simultaneously, with its entrepreneurial 
actions, REDF has substantially reduced the cost incurring from creating the new metric 
tool to meet demands from their venture capital investors, while making a substantial 
social impact.  Thus, I hypothesize:    
 
Hypothesis 20: EO moderates a negative effect of donors’ and investors’ 
demand for financial outcomes on social performance, such that the 
relationship between investors’ demand for financial outcomes and social 
performance becomes positive for SIF with a higher level of EO. 
 
Hypothesis 21: EO moderates a negative effect of affiliation with the 
National Venture Capital Association and other venture capital 
professional associations on social performance, such that the relationship 
between affiliation with venture capital professional associations and 
social performance becomes positive for SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
 
Hypothesis 22: EO moderates a negative effect of the management team’s 
training in business on social performance, such that the relationship 
between the management team’s training in business and social 
performance becomes positive for SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
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EO Moderating Effects on the Philanthropic Institutions-Financial Performance  
Relationship 
EO is grounded in the strategic choice perspective and concerns the “intentions 
and actions of key players functioning in a dynamic generative process” (Lumpkin & 
Dess, 1996: p. 136).  EO promotes “dispersed” entrepreneurship (Birkinshaw, 1997, 
1999), which is the involvement of multiple management levels in the formulation and 
implementation of entrepreneurial strategies (Richard et al., 2004).  That is, EO enhances 
an organizational capacity to manage conflicts arising from diverse stakeholders at 
multiple levels—the management team, donors and investors, government, professional 
associations and peer organizations, and community stakeholders and beneficiaries.  A 
high level of EO enables SIFs to interpret and scan different institutional expectations, 
choose the most appropriate and applicable demands to meet, identify their primary 
goals, and learn the most effective way to assess performance outcomes of their 
institutional actors to meet their idiosyncratic demands before any conflicts arise.  
Managing institutional conflicts and goal ambiguity is critical to attain superior 
performance, and thus, such entrepreneurial activities of SIFs are likely to lead to better 
performance.  
 A capacity for managing conflicts from the institutional duality is particularly 
important when SIFs are nonprofit and/or rely on philanthropic donors for funding.  
These actors are critical resources for the organizations (Bridges & Villemez, 1991) or 
governments with legislative power over them (Abzug & Mezias, 1993).  Conflicting 
institutional logics can cause inconsistency between organizational interests and 
institutional requirements.  Imbalance or lack of consensus among institutional actors in 
  80 
the environment may impede conformity to the institutional demand (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977).  As discussed previously, an inability to meet demands from the IRS and 
philanthropic donors often leads to concrete and severe punitive results.  At the same 
time, when institutional influence is highly uncertain and unpredictable (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978), SIFs may exert greater effort to reestablish the illusion or reality of 
control and stability over future organizational outcomes (Oliver, 1991).  For instance, 
during periods of instability in the acquisition of funding, SIFs may be more willing to 
comply with the demands imposed upon them by philanthropic donors.  However, by 
doing so, SIFs may sacrifice financial performance because of a gap in goals.  EO 
enables SIFs to find innovative ways to manage conflicting institutional pressures and 
still to attain superior financial performance.  
 Decoupling (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 
1999) was found to be one of the main strategies for SIFs to manage conflicts.  During 
my exploratory and qualitative research, the CEO of one of the interviewee organizations 
explained their challenges in pursuing financial outcomes as an IRC 501(c)(3) public 
charity while providing job training and other social service programs to the unemployed 
in the community.  Several years later, they decided to create another organization 
structure as a limited liability corporation solely for the purpose of running successful 
equity investment and achieving competitive ROI for their investors.  According to her, 
conflicts disappeared and the fund has been yielding a competitive profit because 
investment managers now have a very clear goal of performance they need to 
accomplish.  With these empirical accounts, the last set of the hypotheses for this 
dissertation are developed:  
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Hypothesis 23: EO moderates a negative effect of the nonprofit status on 
financial performance, such that the relationship between the nonprofit 
status and financial performance becomes positive for SIFs with a higher 
level of EO. 
 
Hypothesis 24: EO moderates a negative effect of donors’ and investors’ 
demand for social outcomes on financial performance, such that the 
relationship between the donors’ demand for social outcomes and 
financial performance becomes positive for SIFs with a higher level of 
EO. 
 
Hypothesis 25: EO moderates a negative effect of affiliation with the 
Council on Foundations and other grantmaker professional associations on 
financial performance, such that the relationship between affiliation with 
philanthropic associations and financial performance becomes positive for 
SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
 
Hypothesis 26: EO moderates a negative effect of the management team’s 
training in nonprofits on financial performance, such that the relationship 
between the management team’s training in nonprofits and financial 
performance becomes positive for SIFs with a higher level of EO. 
 
Summary 
This chapter introduces a theoretical framework of dominant institutions’ 
pressures on SIFs and conceptualizes social and financial performance.  Hypotheses are 
posited, discussing organizations’ EO, the legal structure, donors’ and investors’ demand 
for funding outcomes, affiliation with professional associations, and the management 
team’s training as key main-effect factors affecting SIFs’ venture philanthropy practices 
and social/financial performance.  The hypotheses also consider moderating effects, as 
represented by EO and negative institutional pressures, on SIFs’ responses to institutional 
constraints.  In the next chapter, I review the methodological considerations implemented 
to test these hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHOD 
 
This chapter introduces the empirical context of the study and justifies my 
decision of using this sample to pursue my theoretical and empirical inquiries.  Second, I 
review the data sources used to construct a comparable sample selection and introduce 
the criteria that define the population of interest.  Third, I discuss the operationalization 
and the measures of dependent, independent, and control variables.  Finally, the chapter 
concludes by reviewing the analytical procedures applied.   
 
The Overview of Research Methods 
The majority of data for this study were gathered through surveys.  Ensuring 
construct and content validity is critical to conduct survey research, but a challenge in 
this study is that it examines an emerging field and there is only very limited prior 
research that exists on the subject.  Under such circumstances, scholars often employ a 
qualitative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lee, 1999; Marshall & Rossman, 2010).  
The rationale for my decision to begin my research in a qualitative method is based on 
several factors.  The empirical case I investigated is an emerging field of SIF and the 
focal phenomenon of SIF is not well understood (Van Slyke & Newman, 2006).  There 
were numerous nuances that needed to be clarified first.  Most publications on SIFs are 
anecdote-based and lack systematic quantitative data.  In sum, “qualitative research is 
often the most ‘adequate’ and ‘efficient’ way to contend with the difficulties of an 
empirical situation” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 18). 
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This study accordingly employed a triangulation strategy entailing mixed research 
methods (Denzin, 2009; Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 2000).  The 
triangulation method is particularly effective and appropriate when a case is not well 
understood, because the use of multiple measures may uncover some unique variance that 
otherwise may have been neglected by single methods (Jick, 1979).  Content analysis is a 
methodology that reliably develops measures to interpret textual material (Krippendorff, 
2004) and that in the last decade has been increasingly used in management studies 
(Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007).  Table 3.1 presents methods applied to each stage of 
this empirical study.  
 
Table 3.1. Research Methods Used for This Study 
Purpose Research method Data source 
Qualitative method 
Scale 
construction  
Content analysis (Krippendorff, 
2004, 2012) 
• Interviews 
• Organizational publications 
Quantitative method 
Hypotheses 
testing 
Multiple regression with 
interaction terms (Aiken & 
West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, 
West, & Aiken, 2003) 
• Survey questionnaire  
 
 
Sample 
The empirical context of this study is the emerging field of social investment 
funders (SIF) in the United States (Young, 2007).  As many authors point out (Bielefeld, 
2009; Moody, 2008), the field lacks a clear, standardized definition specifying what SIF 
organizations are.  In the last decade, a variety of new terms were coined describing 
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unique “hybrid” funding practices (Young, 2004).  Major examples include such terms as 
“venture philanthropy” (Frumkin, 2003), “social venture capital” (Miller & Wesley, 
2010) and “impact investing” (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011).  Despite some 
discrepancies in the terminology, all these terms share one idea: linking philanthropy and 
for-profit venture capital practices to support nonprofit, and sometimes for-profit, 
organizations whose primary services are mission-oriented and beneficial to the public 
(Peredo & Chrisman, 2006), i.e., collectively consumed public goods (Weisbrod, 1988), 
rather than maximizing profit for personal and shareholders’ private wealth (Chell, 2007) 
(hereafter called social ventures).  However, empirical studies suggest that the values 
generated by social ventures are not limited to social elements.  Within their 
entrepreneurial process of social ventures, there is a balance of social and economic 
behavior that creates both social and economic values (Austin et al., 2006; Emerson et al., 
2000).   
This study defines SIFs as organizations that utilize both philanthropic and 
venture capital investment practices to support social ventures and whose primary goal is 
to create positive, and often non-monetary, values in society, while generating financial 
consequences to some degree.  “Financial consequences” are exemplified through diverse 
forms, such as a social venture’s fiscal sustainability revenue as part of its organizational 
capacity developed through a funder’s financial and non-financial support (Letts et al., 
1997).  Other forms of financial consequences include tangible benefits, such as financial 
return on investment for investors (Emerson, 2003) and the augmentation of a social 
venture’s revenue (Zietlow, 2001).  In this study, SIFs are distinguished from mainstream 
venture capitalists, who primarily invest in ventures in markets with high growth 
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potential and a focus on maximizing economic benefits for shareholders (Muzyka et al., 
1996; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999).  SIFs are also differentiated from traditional 
foundations, which chiefly use non-market, philanthropic funding tools such as grants.  It 
should be noted, however, whether or not SIFs are new and distinct from their traditional 
counterparts is highly debatable (Frumkin, 2003).  Yet, compared to traditional 
philanthropic foundations, a distinct characteristic of SIFs is identified in their rigorous 
adaptations of venture capital practices, such as an investment cycle consisting of deal 
origination, screening, evaluation, and structuring, and post-investment activities and exit 
strategy (De Clercq & Dimov, 2008; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984) and language typically 
used in the venture capital and high-tech industries, such as “investment” instead of 
“grant” (Frumkin, 2003; Moody, 2008). 
A recent study has found that the distinct practices and language of SIFs are the 
artifacts developed during the “structuration” process (Giddens, 1984) under the strong 
institutional influence of the philanthropic field and the venture capital field (Moody, 
2008).  These two established fields are divergent or almost antithetical in terms of many 
aspects of institutions (Scott, 2008a), which creates the institutional duality.  Anecdotes 
in prior studies also imply that the adaptation of a venture philanthropy model may 
necessitate that organizations be entrepreneurial because they need to break through 
conservative culture (Anheier & Leat, 2006; Fleishman, 2009; Hess, 2005; Prewitt, 
2006b). 
These implications allow SIFs to be the ideal sample for my investigation based 
on the application of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and institutional theories, and they 
justify my application of institutional theory to entrepreneurial organizations in a single-
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country study.  Scholars are cautioned against using institutional theory for single-
country studies because single-country studies increase the difficulty in judging the 
impacts of institutions (Bruton et al., 2010).  However, in my study, significant disparity 
exists in institutional elements, such as laws, norms, and culturally shared ideas (Scott, 
2008a), between the philanthropic field and the venture capital field in the United States.  
Having multiple distinct institutions is indispensable “for scholars to be able to address 
the effects of institutions so that theory can be developed for use by other scholars” 
(Bruton et al., 2010, p. 432).  The traditional philanthropic field and the venture capital 
field have such competing and conflicting natures in their regulative, normative, and 
cultural systems that it justifies my research plan.  
 
Sampling Method 
Two primary challenges surface in forming the proper sample for research on 
SIFs: (1) The lack of a universally agreed-upon definition of SIFs; and (2) a limited 
population size, which unavoidably leads to a small sample size.  A lack of clear 
definitions can be a serious threat to undermine construct validity.  In this situation, it is 
critical to look both at researchers and to subjects as sources of agreement on the most 
useful definition (Babbie, 1998).  I thus consulted a variety of both scholarly and 
practitioner-oriented sources to construct my sample. 
First, I attended the Social Capital Markets Conference in San Francisco from 
October 13-15, 2008, along with my advisor; this is a leading conference inviting 
numerous SIFs.  We conducted preliminary interviews with conference presenters and 
participants representing SIFs to establish realism in the field.  I made continued efforts 
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to interview industry experts and to review relevant publications issued from fall 2008 to 
spring 2011 to enhance my understanding about the field.   
Second, I reviewed scholarly literature to determine how SIFs were 
conceptualized and what types of organizations were included in the studies (Table 3.2).  
As most prior studies stress, SIFs comprise an extremely diverse group, ranging from 
nonprofit funders such as public charities, private foundations and giving circles that use 
grants as their main funding tool (Community Wealth Ventures, Inc., 2000; Frumkin, 
2003; Moody, 2008) to for-profit funders and some newly created nonprofits that make 
equity investments (Clark & Gaillard, 2003; Miller & Wesley, 2010).  Some researchers 
include influential long-standing foundations in their samples (Fleishman, 2009; 
Standlea, 2006).  
Third, I interviewed four industry experts.  Two experts are CEOs at large 
professional associations, one for a social venture capital fund and the other for a private 
foundation.  Another expert is a consultant specializing in mission-based investments of 
private foundations.  The fourth expert is a former director of one of the leading SIFs and 
the thought leader in the field, who coined the terms “venture philanthropy” and “impact 
investing.”  The chief objective of these interviews was to clarify whether it is 
appropriate to study organizations labeled as “venture philanthropists” and those labeled 
as “social venture capital investors” together in the same research.  The former do not 
necessarily utilize equity investment as a funding tool.  Recent publications about 
“impact investing” tend to exclude these funders and focus on equity investors only.  
However, findings from my interviews confirm that both “venture philanthropy” and 
“social venture capital” should be discussed in the same realm for social investing.  This 
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broad conceptualization is similar to the approach of John (2006) and Scarlata & 
Alemany (2010).  My study aims to capture the variances in the extent to which a wide 
range of internal and external factors drive organizations to employ the venture 
philanthropy model.  Thus, I follow a broader definition to include diverse organizations 
in my sample as long as they use venture philanthropy practices to some degree.   
The second threat to the sample construction of SIFs is a possible small sample 
size resulting from the very limited size of the population and difficulty in obtaining 
responses from the intended survey participants.  To deal with these potential threats, 
authors in prior empirical studies about SIFs (Miller & Wesley, 2010; Scarlata & 
Alemany, 2008, 2010) relied on multiple sources to identify their sample organizations 
(Table 3.3).  For instance, Scarlata and Alemany (2010) used five different sources to 
identify their sample organizations.  Although their response rate is favorable in the field 
(54 percent), their sample size is 40 organizations, because the population they identified 
is as small as 74.  The field of SIFs has grown dramatically since then.  To assure a 
statistical power for regression analysis (Cohen & Cohen, 1983), my committee members 
and I determined that the sample size in my study must include more than 50 
organizations.  Thus, I sought a greater number of sources than five to maximize a search 
result for constructing my primary sample.  
Consequently, a total of 16 different sources were reviewed to identify 
organizations for my study (Table 3.4).  These sources are broadly classified into two 
types: (1) Self-identified sources, in which organizations identify themselves as SIFs; and 
(2) third party–identified sources, in which third parties, such as scholars, identify 
organizations as SIFs.  Self-identified sources include the Guidestar database (under the 
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keyword of “venture philanthropy”), directories of SIF associations such as Investors’ 
Circle, Social Venture Partners, and Community Development Venture Capital Fund 
Alliance.  Survey reports (e.g., Venture Philanthropy Partners, 2002) and case studies 
about venture philanthropy by scholars (e.g., Fleishman, 2009; Moody, 2008) are among 
third-party sources used for this study.  
Table 3.5 exhibits steps that this study sequentially took in order to construct the 
final population for the empirical analysis.  My sampling procedure consisted of two 
steps.  The initial step was to review the sources listed in Table 3.3, and this step yielded 
528 organizations as the primary population.  However, this population was found to 
include organizations that were not applicable to my research design.  Examples of those 
organizations were: unincorporated voluntary groups; foreign organizations incorporated 
and operated outside the United States; organizations providing services and goods, 
rather than financial resources, as their primary activity; and membership associations 
without funding social ventures themselves.  Thus, the next step was to screen this 
primary population by using six criteria that allowed me to properly utilize theoretical 
lenses of EO and institutional theories for analysis.  For inclusion in the sample, 
organizations had to meet the following criteria: (1) being institutional funders that are 
formally incorporated as either nonprofit or for-profit under the United States laws; (2) 
having a formal operation base under the United States laws; (3) having funding as a 
primary activity; (4) using at least some of the venture philanthropy approaches; (5) 
having an explicit social intent; and (6) having information about organizations and 
contacts available.  These criteria identified 291 organizations as the final population, 
which I invited to participate in the survey.   
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There are several justifications for the sample selection criteria of this empirical 
study.  First, this study excluded individual investors, as the unit of analysis for both EO 
and institutional theory is often at the organization level.  Foreign organizations that do 
not have any operation in the United States were also excluded in order to examine 
organizational behaviors by the same legal and societal conditions and to reduce 
unobserved heterogeneity resultant from different legal and normative systems between 
countries.  This study also excluded 134 organizations that were misclassified as SIFs but 
turned out to be program providers, membership associations, or consulting firms.  
Funders that do not employ a venture philanthropy model or do not have a social intent 
were also excluded.  Finally, organizations that did not provide contact information 
needed to be removed from the list because survey questionnaires could not be delivered.        
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Table 3.2. Definitions of SIFs by Selected Prior Literature 
Authors Term used 
for SIF 
Definition Organization types 
included in the study 
Clark & Gaillard 
(2003) 
“Double-
bottom line” 
private equity  
“[I]nvestment funds and organizations that make early-stage equity investments in 
scalable for-profit ventures and that do so with the intent of positively impacting 
social or environmental problems.” (p. 3) “Each of the funds in our survey 
identified itself as interested in investing to achieve social or environmental impact 
as well as financial return — an approach this group prefers to call ‘double bottom 
line’ investing.” (p. 5) 
Nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations that make 
equity investments  
Community Wealth 
Ventures (2000) 
Social 
venture funds  
“[W]e defined a social venture fund as follows: a multi-donor fund specifically 
created to address social issues that utilizes venture capital practices to maximize 
investor value and impact.” (p. 8) 
Nonprofit organizations 
including giving circles 
and foundations 
Eikenberry (2006)  Venture 
philanthropy 
“is structured to follow a venture philanthropy model—applying venture capitalist 
principles to philanthropy.” (p. 522) 
Nonprofit organizations 
including giving circles 
and foundations 
Fleishman (2009) Venture 
philanthropy  
“In this approach, the foundation provides financing in exchange for significant 
involvement in and some degree of control of the program being supported. For 
instance, a foundation that is basically playing a Partner role might ask for the right 
to specify particular strategic implementation tasks to be performed by the grantees 
according to an agreed-upon timeline, with specified benchmarks and required 
performance reports.” (p. 7) 
Foundations  
Frumkin (2003) Venture 
philanthropy  
“Rather than simply being a purveyor of charitable funds for deserving 
organizations of all sorts, venture philanthropy promised to turn donors into hard-
nosed social investors by bringing the discipline of the investment world to a field 
that had for over a century relied on good faith and trust.” (p. 8) 
Nonprofit organizations 
including giving circles 
and foundations 
James & Marshall 
(2006) 
Venture 
philanthropy  
“[W]hat is arguably new is that [venture philanthropy] folds these practices into a 
systematic framework that mimics the vaunted for-profit venture capital model. In 
short, venture philanthropists aspire to build the capacity of nonprofit 
organizations.” (p. 108) 
Foundations 
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Table 3.2. (cont.) 
Authors Term used 
for SIF 
Definition Organization types 
included in the study 
John (2006) Venture 
philanthropy  
“There is no single accepted definition of venture philanthropy. Several terms are 
used interchangeably, including strategic philanthropy, high-engagement 
philanthropy, effective philanthropy or philanthropic investment. For the purpose of 
this paper, venture philanthropy is defined primarily by the relatively high level of 
engagement of the funder in the organisation being supported, over an extended 
time period, injecting skills or services in addition to finance.” (p. 7) 
Nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations that 
provide a wide range of 
funding including grants 
and equity  
Miller & Wesley 
(2010) 
Social 
venture 
capitalists 
(SVCs) 
“Social venture capital (also called patient capital or venture philanthropy) uses a 
new model for funding social ventures. Like commercial venture capital, this model 
allows the entrepreneur to exchange involvement in the operations for continued 
funding as SVCs often invest through equity in the early stages of social ventures 
using limited liability corporations or partnerships.” (p. 707) 
Nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations that make 
equity investments 
Moody (2008) Venture 
philanthropy 
“[A] core set of principles and practices that are espoused by the majority of venture 
philanthropy organizations… 1) Investments in a long-term (3-6 year) plan for 
social change; 2) A managing partner relationship; 3) An accountability-for-results 
process; 4) Provision of cash and expertise; and 5) An exit strategy” (Gray & 
Speirn, 2004, p. 1). Venture philanthropy involves close monitoring of 
predetermined performance goals and measurements as well as joint problem 
solving with nonprofit investees throughout the long-term duration of the funding.” 
(p. 9)  
Nonprofit organizations 
including giving circles 
and foundations 
Scarlata & 
Alemany (2008) 
Philanthropic 
venture 
capitalists 
(PhVCs) 
“Philanthropic venture capitalists are social subjects whose aim consists of 
investing those funds raised from various donors—who may be wealthy individuals, 
enterprises, and/or foundations—in organizations with high social impact. In order 
to maximize the social return from the investment, PhVCs engage in a value-added 
partnership with the target organization and mete out financing based on the 
reaching of milestones. As such, PhVCs monitor the progress of the firms they back 
not only providing capital but also expertise and strategic guidance. Besides, in case 
PhVCs take a seat on the board of directors of the organizations they back, they 
retain important rights which allow them to intervene in the company’s operations 
when necessary.” (p.3)  
Nonprofit organizations 
including foundations 
(European for-profit 
funds included) 
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Table 3.2. (cont.) 
Authors Term used 
for SIF 
Definition Organization types 
included in the study 
Scarlata & 
Alemany (2010) 
Philanthropic 
venture 
capitalists 
“[A]n intermediated investment in small-medium SEs with a potential for a high 
social impact. Financial return considerations may, however, also be taken into 
account but must be of secondary importance to the attainment of social impact.” 
Nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations that 
provide a wide range of 
funding including grants 
and equity (European 
funds included) 
Van Slyke & 
Newman (2006) 
Venture 
philanthropy  
“In contrast to a traditional, hands-off charitable grant awarded to a nonprofit 
organization by a community, private, or corporate foundation, venture 
philanthropists and their philosophy of high-engagement regard funding as a long-
term investment. Whereas many foundations have traditionally provided grants for 
a single year or perhaps as long as three years, venture philanthropists and their 
organizations, funders, and staff, such as Venture Philanthropy Partners and the 
Roberts Enterprise Development Fund, generally enter into a relationship with a 
social enterprise nonprofit organization for a longer period of time because they 
believe the nonprofit can benefit from long-term engagement and substantial 
financial investments and levels of strategic assistance in the organization. The 
investments of strategic assistance and capitalization are intended and designed to 
build organizational systems and capacity focused on achieving lasting outcomes 
for the clients they serve.” (p. 347) 
Community foundation 
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Table 3.3. Sources and Selection Criteria for Sample Constructions, Sample Size and Return Rate of Selected Prior Literature 
Study Source Selection criteria Sample size and return rate 
Miller & 
Wesley 
(2010) 
• Database of National Venture Capital 
Association  
• Columbia University Research Initiative in 
Social Entrepreneurship (RISE) survey 
(2003) 
• Directly fund ventures on a 
competitive basis (excluding 
foundations and angel investors) 
• Dedicate at least 10% of the 
assets to social ventures through 
equity investment  
• Invest in early-stage ventures 
• Executives have experience and 
some decision-making authority 
in funding decisions 
• 57 responses from 274 program 
analysts and executives who made 
funding decisions on social 
ventures (20.7% response rate) 
 
Scarlata & 
Alemany 
(2010) 
• Database of European Venture 
Philanthropy  
• Database of National Venture Capital 
Association  
• Morino Institute (2000) 
• John (2006) 
• Identified by other sample organizations 
• Provide financial and non-
financial resources 
• Fund social enterprises 
• Have exit strategies 
• Seek social impact 
 
• 40 responses from 74 funds 
including 36 U.S. nonprofit, 
foundations, and for-profit (54% 
response rate) 
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Table 3.4. Sources Used to Construct the Sample for This Study 
Self-/Third 
party–identified                                                                                                                                                        
Type Source used for this study 
Self-identified 
sources 
Directories and 
databases of 
membership 
associations 
1. Guidestar databases under the keyword of 
“venture philanthropy” 
2. The Foundation Center’s Foundation Director 
Online database under the keyword “venture 
philanthropy” 
3. Panelist lists of the Social Capital Market 
Conferences in 2008, 2009, 2010 
4. Directory of Investors’ Circle 
5. Director of Social Venture Partners 
6. Directory of Social Investment Forum’s 
Socially Responsible Financial Services 
group 
7. Directory of Community Development 
Venture Capital Fund Alliance 
Third party-
identified sources 
Survey reports, 
scholarly 
publications, and 
peer 
organizations  
1. Columbia University Research Initiative in 
Social Entrepreneurship (RISE) survey 
(2003) 
2. Community Wealth Ventures/Venture 
philanthropy Partners (2002) 
3. Community Wealth Ventures/Venture 
philanthropy Partners (2000) 
4. Capers, Collins & Gooneratne (1997) 
5. Firstenberg (2003) 
6. Fleishman (2007) 
7. Moody (2007) 
8. Standlea (2006) 
9. Identified by peer organizations  
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Table 3.5. Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Sources to identify the primary population:  
Number of 
organizations 
(1) Guidestar database under the keyword “venture philanthropy” 107 
(2) The Foundation Center’s Foundation Director Online database 
under the keyword “venture philanthropy” 
100 
(3) Panelist lists of the Social Capital Market Conferences in 2008, 
2009, 2010 
247 
(4) Directories of membership associations (Investors’ Circle, 
Social Venture Partners, Social Investment Forum’s Socially 
Responsible Financial Services group, and Community 
Development Venture Capital Fund Alliance) 
72 
(5) Columbia University Research Initiative in Social 
Entrepreneurship (RISE) survey (2003) 
54 
(6) Community Wealth Ventures/Venture Philanthropy Partners 
surveys (2002; 2000)  
91 
(7) Research publications (Capers, Collins & Gooneratne, 1997; 
Firstenberg, 2003; Fleishman, 2007; Moody, 2007; Standlea, 
2006) 
60 
(8) Identified by peer organizations  2 
Minus duplicated listings among (1) ~ (8) (205) 
Primary population total 528 
 
Selection criteria: 
 
(1) Formally incorporated institutional funders with legal status of 
nonprofit or for-profit (government agencies are excluded)  
(2) 
(2) Domestic organizations (Organizations that do not have an 
office incorporated in the United States are excluded) 
(13) 
(3) Funding as a primary activity (Service providers, associations, 
and research organizations are excluded) 
(134) 
(4) Explicit use of venture philanthropy model  (12) 
(5) Explicit social intent  (4) 
(6) Availability of information about organizations and contacts (72) 
Final population of interest total 291 
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Survey Instrument 
Main data for this study were gathered by a survey questionnaire.  The survey 
contained 19 questions along with a brief instruction of the survey participation and 
clarification of key terms used in this study, and it comprised the following five parts: (1) 
general information, (2) staff and leadership team, (3) funding performance, (4) 
relationships with social enterprises, and (5) revenue and other financial information.  
Assuring the accuracy of measurement of the constructs under examination is the 
greatest difficulty in conducting survey research (Barrett, 1972).  Hence, scholars should 
make efforts to ensure construct validity and reliability when developing a survey 
instrument (Babbie, 1998; Hinkin, 1995, 1998).  Techniques to deal with the problems of 
reliability, which refers to the consistency of measurement (Schwab, 2004), include the 
test-retest method and the split-half method (Cohen et al., 2003; Gallagher, Ritter, & 
Satava, 2003; Peter, 1979).  However, the limited size of this study’s population of 
interest did not allow for these techniques.  I chose to use another recommended method, 
which is to use established measures that have proven their reliability in previous 
research (Babbie, 1998).  As such, many measures in this study were adapted from prior 
empirical studies, such as Miller/Covin and Slevin scale for EO (Covin & Slevin, 1989; 
Miller, 1995), Demov and Shepherd scale rating the strength of training (Dimov & 
Shepherd, 2005), dichotomous measures for the organizational structure (Baum & Oliver, 
1991) and for a tie with professional associations (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986a; Uzzi, 
1997).  These measures are discussed further in the subsequent section about variables.  
Furthermore, many of my survey items were scaled using 5-point Likert-type scales.  
This decision was made because research (Lissitz & Green, 1975) shows that Coefficient 
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alpha reliability with Likert scales increases up to the use of five points.  Yet the question 
about affiliation with professional associations (“Is your organization currently affiliated 
with any of the following professional associations?”) used three items because 3-point 
Likert-type scales have also been found to produce adequate internal consistency (Hinkin, 
1995).   
The primary concern I had in generating survey items is content and construct 
validity.  The case of this study is an emerging field, which lacks standardized 
definitions.  The phenomena are not well understood without sufficient prior empirical 
studies, from which I could use established measures.  Because definitions of constructs 
serve a key role in construct validation (Schwab, 2004), the condition in my case makes 
constructs more abstract and thus more difficult to be measured (Hinkin, 1998).  To 
minimize potential biases and other issues affecting the accuracy of data, therefore, I 
followed Hinkin’s recommendation (Hinkin, 1995, 1998) to generate the preliminary 
items both deductively and inductively.  
 
Deductive Method for Item Generation  
Item generation should begin with a strong theoretical framework to assure 
content validity in the scales (Hinkin, 1995; Perry, 1996).  Hence, my survey items were 
developed first in a deductive manner, starting with the conceptual dimensions identified 
in the literature review.  Analysis of this study is based on EO and institutional theory.  
Also, SIFs have been discussed in the context relevant to philanthropy (as venture 
philanthropy), commercial investment (as social venture capital funds), social 
entrepreneurship (as funders), and rigorous measurement.  Given these, the literature I 
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reviewed was selected from the following categories11: (1) social entrepreneurship and 
social investment; (2) EO; (3) institutional theory; (4) nonprofit evaluation; and (5) 
venture capital and philanthropic foundations.  
 
Inductive Method for Item Generation  
The inductive method I took in generating survey items was based on content 
analysis of data from two types of sources.  First, I conducted semi-structured interviews 
with three professionals from SIFs located in Indianapolis in June 2011.  The interviews 
were very open-ended in nature.  During interviews, the interviewees were asked to 
provide descriptions about a variety of practices in funding social ventures, measuring 
funding performance and outcomes, and managing the organization, as well as gathering 
the information about the organization such as structure, history, and human resources.  
Their responses were tape-recorded with the interviewees’ permission, and transcribed.  
The interview data were then classified into a number of categories through an iterative, 
multi-stage content-analysis process (Guler, 2007; Nicholson & Anderson, 2005).  First, 
the interview transcripts were reviewed to identify recurrent themes relevant to the study.  
I then open-coded the transcripts and broke them down into labels, such as 
                                                
11 Some reviewed studies are as follows: (1) social entrepreneurship and social investment (e.g., Anheier & 
Leat, 2006; Austin, Stevenson & Wei-Skillern, 2006; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Bielefeld, 2009; Brainerd, 
1999; Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011; Cohen & Winn, 2007; Dorado, 2006; Emerson, 2003; John, 2006; 
Kaplan, 2001; Katz, 2005; Kaplan, 2001; Letts, Ryan & Grossman, 1997; Ostrower, 2006; Urban Institute, 
2006); (2) EO (e.g., Caruana, Ewing & Ramaseshan, 2002; Coombes, Morris, Allen & Webb, 2010; Covin 
& Slevin, 1988, 1989, 1991; Covin & Wales, 2012; Davis, Marino, Aaron & Tolbert, 2011; Helm & 
Andersson, 2010; Morris, Coombes et al., 2007; Lam et al., 2010; Pearce et al., 2010); (3) institutional 
theory (e.g., Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 2006; Baum & Oliver, 1992, 1996; 
D’Aunno, Sutton & Price, 1991; Dart, 2004; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Echols & Tsai, 2005; Frumkin & 
Galaskiewicz, 2004; Guler, 2007; Heugens & Lander, 2009; Kostova & Roth, 2002); (4) nonprofit 
evaluation (e.g., Benjamin, 2010; Carman, 2011; Herman & Renz, 1999; Jackson & Holland, 1998; Kanter 
& Summers, 1987; LeRoux & Wright, 2010); and (5) venture capital and philanthropic foundations (e.g., 
Dimov & Shepherd, 2005; De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006; Fairfield & Wing, 2008; Fleishman, 2007; 
Frumkin, 2003, 2006; Grønbjerg, Martell & Paarlberg, 2000; MacMillan et al., 1988). 
  100 
“entrepreneurial risk-taking attitude,” “satisfaction of members,” and “impact on society” 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008).   
The second source of data resulted from analysis of SIFs’ organizational 
materials, such as websites and annual reports, and descriptive survey reports of SIFs 
(Venture Philanthropy Partners, 2002).  Content analysis of these materials was 
conducted by two coders, namely a doctoral student and myself, for the purpose of 
validity (Krippendorff, 2012).  The use of the graduate student for the content analysis for 
scale development is validated by Hinkin (1995), because sorting is a cognitive task that 
requires intellectual ability rather than work experience (Schriesheim & Hinkin, 1990).  
Each coder reviewed the documents in a separate room and identified recurrent themes.  
These themes were coded with the frequency of the appearance in the Excel spreadsheets.  
I compared two documents to select eight items that two researchers pointed out as the 
most frequent themes exemplifying venture philanthropy practices and performance.  
These items were then used to develop a survey questionnaire.  The first draft of the 
survey questionnaire was then reviewed by my dissertation committee members. 
 
Methods Assessing Social Desirability and Other Biases 
Although Likert-type scales are the most frequently utilized for survey 
questionnaires (Hinkin, 1998), they may also be subject to distortion by various causes 
including social desirability bias.  Several strategies were implemented to attenuate 
response pattern biases in the survey study.  The first method was to include negatively 
worded, reverse-scored items in the survey instrument (Idaszak & Drasgow, 1987).  For 
this purpose, a philanthropic funding tool (i.e., grant) was utilized as a reverse-scored 
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item along with non-philanthropic funding tools (i.e., equity and loans) for the question 
about funding tools (“How often do you use each of the following funding instruments to 
fund social enterprises?”).  At the same time, I limited the use of the reverse-scored item 
primarily to a question about funding instruments in my study, because research finds the 
frequent use of reverse-scoring of items may cause systematic error to a scale (Jackson, 
Wall, Martin, & Davids, 1993) and reduce the validity of questionnaire responses 
(Schriesheim & Hill, 1981).   
Additional methods to remedy potential biases include differentiating modes of 
how survey questions were addressed (e.g., “How often do you use...?” “Is your 
organization…?”) and using mixed-mode surveys (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009).  
The subsequent section details the mixed-mode survey used for this empirical study.  I 
worked closely with my dissertation committee members to assure that the statements 
were simple with familiar language to target respondents and that all items were 
consistent in terms of addressing only a single issue.  Research (Holbrook & Krosnick, 
2010) shows that tests through a computer provide a higher sense of neutrality and thus 
the Internet survey mode is less susceptible to social desirability response bias because of 
self-administration.  Furthermore, the respondents were reminded that there were no right 
or wrong answers to the questions being asked of them, and they were guaranteed 
confidentiality (Covin et al., 1997).  To motivate the respondents to participate seriously 
in the study, all respondents were offered summaries of the results.    
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Pretest 
The deductively and inductively generated scale items were pretested from 
August to October 2011 to assess content validity (Hinkin, 1995, 1998).  My study aims 
to capture variances in direct and moderating effects of EO and institutional 
environments on venture philanthropy practices.  To meet this, my sampling needed to 
provide enough variation between these factors.  Consequently, nine SIFs were chosen as 
the pretest participants in a purposive rather than random or stratified manner (Eisenhardt 
& Graebner, 2007; Kistruck & Beamish, 2010) to represent variety according to a 
number of prima-facie characteristics such as legal structure, size and age (Table 3.6).  
Availability of access to the organizations played an important part in the final choice of 
the case organizations.  Semi-structured interviews along with a preliminary 
questionnaire were conducted.  
During the pretest, several further variables were identified.  Suggestions from the 
pretest participants were reflected in revising items in my questionnaire.  For instance, a 
founder of a venture capital fund warned that other venture capitalists are very unlikely to 
disclose their organizations’ financial data and that a survey containing questions about 
organizations’ financial data will suffer a very low response rate.  However, financial 
data, such as assets and operating budget, have been used as standard control variables in 
many nonprofit and EO studies (Guo & Brown, 2006; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003; 
Wiklund, 1999).  In particular because for-profit venture capitalists do not generally 
make their funds’ data available to the public, it is imperative to obtain some sort of 
financial data through the survey.  After consulting my committee members, I decided to 
include three survey questions about total assets, operating budget, and amount of 
  103 
funding, respectively, in my survey instrument.  However, these are multiple-choice 
questions asking respondents to choose the most applicable range of the financial data.  
These questions were pretested with for-profit SIFs.  The information gathered from the 
entire process was used to complete the final version of the survey questionnaire for 
review by my dissertation committee members.   
 
Data Collection Method 
Main data for this study were collected via surveys during November 2011 
through May 2012.  Considering the possible difficulty of gathering data from foundation 
and venture capital executives, which is pointed out by many prior empirical studies 
(Miller & Wesley, 2010; Zacharakis, McMullen, & Shepherd, 2007), I utilized mixed-
mode surveys composed of approaches in modes of online, mailing and phone contact 
and followed several suggestions by Dillman and his-coauthors (Dillman et al., 2009).  
To personalize the survey emails and letters, I collected target recipients’ names and 
email addresses and confirmed their mailing addresses, referring to their websites, and 
databases and directories that I used to identify the sample organizations in the first place.  
The strategy was chosen because it helped to reduce coverage and non-response errors, 
lower the costs of data collection, and increase response rate (Dillman et al., 2009).   
Data in this empirical study required an understanding about hands-on experience 
in funding decisions and the organization’s structure and overall management. Therefore, 
the survey was addressed to an individual who was identified as a decision-making 
authority in funding decisions within each organization.  For this purpose, chief executive 
officers (CEOs) were selected from small and mid-sized SIF organizations, which 
typically employ fewer than ten professionals and in which CEO is listed as one of the  
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Table 3.6. Pretested Organizations  
Case Type Structure Location Funding 
year 
Assets (2009) Main 
funding tool 
Funded social 
venture 
1 Education fund Nonprofit Indianapolis 2007 
 
$5,486,045 
 
Grant U.S. nonprofit 
2 Fund affiliated with IT venture Nonprofit 
 
Indianapolis 2002 $1,150,677 
 
Grant U.S. nonprofit 
3 Giving circle Nonprofit San 
Francisco 
1998 $1,228,300 
 
Grant U.S. nonprofit 
4 Community foundation Nonprofit San 
Francisco 
1990 
 
$1,174,000,509 
 
Grant U.S. nonprofit 
5 Private foundation Nonprofit New York 1994 $3,198,029 Grant U.S. nonprofit 
6 Community development 
financial institution 
Nonprofit New York 1995 
 
$5,732,313 
 
Equity  U.S.  
for-profit 
7 Venture capital fund 1 (greater 
social-intent) 
Hybrid San 
Francisco 
1998   $3,870,177  Equity U.S.  
for-profit 
8 Venture capital fund 2 (greater 
social-intent) 
For-profit San 
Francisco 
2006 N/A Equity  U.S. nonprofit/ 
for-profit 
9 Venture capital fund 3 (greater 
finance-intent) 
For-profit Indianapolis 
 
2004 N/A Equity, loan, 
grant 
U.S. for-profit 
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professionals in charge of their organization’s funding and investment activities.  
However, for organizations that have directors of funding and investment, I asked the 
directors rather than CEOs to respond to the survey.   
Various researchers have noted the significant limitations of reliance upon a 
single reporter in research where the organization is the unit of analysis because his/her 
interpretation may not represent the views of other members of the organization 
(Coombes, Morris, Allen, & Webb, 2011; Van Bruggen, Lilien, & Kacker, 2002).  
However, several factors justify my decision to mail a questionnaire to a single 
respondent at each sample organization.  First, a main purpose of this survey is to 
illuminate funding practices and management’s entrepreneurial posture.  No one but 
those with full knowledge of and responsibility for funding practices and organizational 
strategy can answer these research questions more precisely.  Second, an organization’s 
EO is typically operationalized from the perspective of its CEO (Wiklund & Shepherd, 
2003).  In large organizations, CEOs might be separated from ‘how a firm operates’ by 
layers of middle managers.  However, this is less likely a problem for SIFs, which are in 
general small and medium-sized organizations.  Third, my use of a single key informant 
approach is consistent with many prior studies (Covin & Slevin, 1989;  Miller & Friesen, 
1982; Zahra & Covin, 1995) that have collected measures of organization-level 
entrepreneurship from high-level executives, such as CEO and general manager.  
Research (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996) has argued that these executives are key decision 
makers in their organizations and appropriate respondents to surveys.  Fourth, a possible 
reduction of the sample size is a serious concern about a multiple-participant method.  
Coombes et al. (2011) addressed multiple participants at each sample organization (i.e., 
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executive director, board chairperson, and one random board member) and removed 
organizations from the analysis if they received less than two responses.  This method is 
not suited to my study with a limited population size of case organizations.   
All email correspondence and online surveys were administrated by an official 
survey center at Indiana University, the Center for Survey Research.  First, an email 
message was sent to survey participants on November 4, 2011, to introduce this empirical 
study as a research project by the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University (now 
known as Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy) and to outline the 
purpose of the study and the anticipated time commitment.  Upon the recommendation by 
the director and consultant at the Center for Survey Research, our introductory email was 
signed by the Director of International Programs at the Center on Philanthropy, along 
with myself as a project manager.  Considerable divergences exist in the main 
terminology used between organizations originating from traditional philanthropy (e.g., 
organizations identified by databases and resources primarily used among nonprofit and 
philanthropic funders such as the Foundation Center databases and Guidestar) and 
organizations actively involved in network associations constituting “impact investing” 
commercial investors (e.g., Social Capital Market Conferences).  I created two groups 
based on these characteristics.  The former group is called “the venture philanthropy 
group (VP),” and the latter, “the social venture capital group (SVC),” and I used different 
introductory messages tailored to each group.  Each message included the terms and 
concepts that are familiar to the appropriate group in order to avoid confusion in our 
requests.   
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The Internet version of the survey was first sent to all 291 organizations on 
November 11, 2011, with a follow-up on December 6, 2011 and the final reminder on 
January 25, 2012.  After three emails with the link to the Internet survey were sent out, I 
carried out the mail survey with organizations that had not participated in the survey from 
February 2012 to April 2012 but did not decline to answer.  A pre-notice postcard was 
first mailed to 252 organizations.  Then, the invitation letter and two follow-ups were 
mailed along with a business reply envelope and a copy of the survey questionnaire.  As a 
follow-up and final reminder to increase the response rate (Dillman et al., 2009), 
telephone calls were placed to all non-responding organizations from April to May 2012, 
three weeks after the last mail survey was distributed.  A graduate student made follow-
up phone calls to determine if the addressees had received the questionnaire and if they 
intended to complete and return the material.   
After a series of mixed-mode surveys, 146 responses were received with 19 
undeliverable, which yielded a 53.7% response rate (Table 3.7).  This response rate is 
considerably higher than that of other empirical studies targeting venture capitalists (20.7 
percent in Miller & Wesley, 2010; 19 percent in Shepherd, 1999) and analyzing EO in 
the nonprofit context (22% in Davis, Marino, Aaron, & Tolbert, 2011; 26.3 percent in 
Helm & Andersson, 2010; 21% in Morris, Coombes, Schindehutte, & Allen, 2007).  
Hager and his co-authors document that a typical response rate in nonprofit research 
ranges from 26 to 50 percent (Hager, Wilson, Pollak, & Rooney, 2003).    
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Table 3.7. Calculating the Response Rate 
Surveys sent out 291 
Surveys that were returned due to inaccurate contact 
information  
19 
Surveys that were returned completed  146 
Response rate: 146 ÷ (291 – 19)  53.7% 
 
 
 
Missing Value Treatment and Multiple Imputation Analysis 
My review of data from 146 responses identified a considerable number of 
missing values in my dataset.  Missing value theorists (Fichman & Cummings, 2003; 
Graham, 2009) consider more than 5 percent of missing values as significant, because 
this degree of missing values reduces the statistical power and causes biased statistical 
inferences in uncertain ways, in particular if missing data are not missing completely at 
random (MCAR), that is, missingness does not depend on the values of variables in the 
dataset subject to analysis (Rubin, 1976). Little’s chi-square statistics (Little’s MCAR 
test) identified my data as MCAR, as the result was not significant and thus could not 
reject the null hypothesis, which assumes that data are MCAR. (Chi-Square = 762.836, 
DF = 717, Sig. = .114).  Several diagnostic tests were performed to determine which 
missing value treatment method is more appropriate in this study between multiple 
imputation and listwise deletion.  The univariate statistics analysis was conducted to 
assess the extent of missing data, which are explained by the number and the percentage 
of missing values (Table 3.8).  The results confirmed that the extent of missing data is not 
minimal (less than 5%), and thus, it is imperative to impute data in order to avoid biased 
estimates (Fichman & Cummings, 2003).  Charts displayed from the Missing Value 
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Pattern Test and the Missing Value Pattern Charts also suggest that listwise deletion 
would lose much of the information in my dataset, and there are many values that would 
need to be imputed in order to achieve monotonicity.  
After having consulted my dissertation committee members and a professor in the 
Department of Statistics at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, I decided to 
use the multiple imputation method (Little & Rubin, 2002; Rubin, 1987, 1996) to treat 
missing values in this study.  Proposed by Rubin (1987), a theoretical framework of 
multiple imputation is based on repeated imputations, each set of which is used to create 
a complete dataset through a Monte Carlo technique in which the missing values are 
replaced by m>1 simulated versions (Schafer & Graham, 2002).  This method replaces 
each missing value with a set of plausible values that reflect the uncertainty about the 
right value to impute.  
 
Table 3.8. Univariate Statistics Results   
 N Mean S.D. Missing values 
Count % 
Venture philanthropy practices 130 2.1059 .95933 17 11.6 
EO 122 4.8497 .87126 25 17.0 
Donor demand for social results  120 4.31 .858 27 18.4 
Donor demand for financial results 120 2.89 1.321 27 18.4 
Affiliation with Council on Foundations 117 .63 .857 30 20.4 
Affiliation with National Venture Capital 
Association 
108 .22 .569 39 26.5 
Affiliation with other grantmaker associations 113 1.22 .933 34 23.1 
Affiliation with other venture capital associations 91 .54 .847 56 38.1 
Management team’s work experience in nonprofits  123 4.30 .839 24 16.3 
Management team’s work experience in business 127 4.26 .838 20 13.6 
Management team’s education in nonprofits  123 3.610 1.0987 24 16.3 
Management team’s education in business  126 4.056 .9192 21 14.3 
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Missing value scholars argue that a multiple imputation method is superior to 
other methods, including listwise deletion, a widely used method to treat missing values 
(e.g., Little & Rubin, 2002; Little, 1988; Rubin, 1987, 1996; Schafer, 2010).  If over 5 
percent of data are missing, which is the case in this study, a loss of data through listwise 
deletion leads to larger sample errors, wider confidence intervals, and a loss of statistical 
power in testing hypotheses (Allison, 2001; Fichman & Cummings, 2003; Graham, 
2009).  The unconditional mean imputation for the missing cases has a variance of zero, 
and thus typically produces biased estimates of regression coefficients, even if the data 
are MCAR (Jones, 1996).  Compared to those traditional missing value treatments, two 
modern methods, i.e., maximum likelihood and multiple imputations, yield unbiased 
parameter estimates with means, variances, covariances, correlations, and linear 
regression coefficients close to the true population value (Graham, 2009).  That is, the 
estimates (1) are approximately unbiased in large samples (consistency); (2) are close to 
being fully efficient, having minimal standard errors (asymptotic efficiency); and (3) 
produce asymptotic normality (Allison, 2001; Fichman & Cummings, 2003).  This 
empirical study conducts large multiple regression models with a small sample size.  A 
multiple imputation method is more appropriate than a maximum likelihood method, 
because the former performs very well in small samples (as low as N=50), even with very 
large multiple regression models (as large as 18 predictors) and even with as much as 
50% missing data in dependent variables (Graham & Schafer, 1999).   
To ensure a proper procedure of multiple imputations, I followed suggestions 
from missing value theorists.  Statistical analysis in my multiple imputations included all 
variables, dependent, independent and control (Allison, 2001), in the model that tests 
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effects both on venture philanthropy practices and on performance variables (Rubin, 
1996).  Dependent variables need to be included because leaving them out would yield 
regression coefficients that are attenuated toward zero (Landerman, Land, & Pieper, 
1997).  Furthermore, performance variables were treated as auxiliary variables for Study 
1 and, a venture philanthropy practices variable, for Study 2, in my multiple imputation 
model, i.e., the variables that are not part of the model’s substantive interest, but are 
highly correlated with the variables in the substantive model because inclusion of 
auxiliary variables in multiple imputation models may help get more accurate 
imputations (Graham, 2009).  The number of datasets I used was five, since five datasets 
were usually found to be sufficient to get parameter estimates that are close to being fully 
efficient (Allison, 2001; Rubin, 1987).  Fichman and Cummings (2003) suggest the 
datasets should be less than five, or sometimes as few as two or three.  A procedure of 
multiple imputations also produced descriptive statistics for each variable with imputed 
value.  I checked the results and corrected the imputation model if any negative values 
were generated through imputations.  The mean values, standard deviations, and 
minimum and maximum values in each set of imputed values were confirmed to be 
roughly equal to those in the original data.  
 
Nonresponse Bias Impact Assessment  
When doing survey research, one potential threat to the findings is nonresponse 
error.  Differences between the respondents and nonrespondents beyond sampling error 
result in nonresponse bias (Werner, Praxedes, & Kim, 2007).  Sample surveys with low 
response rates can produce biased samples.  The most commonly recommended 
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protection against this has been the reduction of nonresponse itself to increase the 
representativeness of the sample (Armstrong & Overton, 1977).  The response rate of 
53.7 percent in this study compares favorably with other studies in nonprofit and 
philanthropic research and entrepreneurship research.   
However, raising the response rate does not necessarily reduce nonresponse error.  
High nonresponse rates can still yield low nonresponse errors if the difference between 
respondents and nonrespondents is small, whereas low nonresponse rates can yield high 
nonresponse errors if respondents and nonrespondents differ dramatically (Keeter, Miller, 
Kohut, Groves, & Presser, 2000).  Thus, although greater response rates lower the 
probability of nonresponse bias, both empirical and theoretical evidence refuting 
nonresponse bias should be provided (Groves & Peytcheva, 2008). 
Rogelberg and Stanton (2007) propose nine techniques as a nonresponse bias 
impact assessment strategy (N-BIAS).  Some of the N-BIAS methods were not feasible in 
this study.  For instance, the passive nonresponse analysis, which examines the 
relationship between passive nonresponse characteristics and standing on the key survey 
topics being assessed, requires additional questions on the survey that tap into factors 
relevant to passive nonresponse.  Given that my survey instrument had as many as 19 
questions for respondents to answer, this approach would be counterproductive.  The 
wave analysis comparing late respondents to early respondents would not be appropriate, 
either, because I implemented mixed-mode survey methods.  Early respondents and late 
respondents possibly responded to different survey modes.  Research found responses 
vary by different survey modes (Sax, Gilmartin, & Bryant, 2003).  Considering these 
limitations in my data to implement certain methods, I chose to use the archival analysis 
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to compare respondents to nonrespondents on variables contained in archival sources 
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Rogelberg & Stanton, 2007).  Table 3.9 compares 
responding SIFs to nonresponding SIFs on variables for key organizational characteristics 
that may affect the pattern of survey responses (Tomaskovic-Devey, Leiter, & 
Thompson, 1994).  As the mean values in Table 3.8 show, respondents and 
nonrespondents are remarkably similar on the variables, except those for revenue and 
asset sizes.  However, discrepancies between respondents and nonrespondents do not 
automatically mean the existence of nonrespondent bias.  To determine it, Independent 
Samples t-Tests (.05 level) were conducted for each variable.  Results of t-test 
comparisons of all variables revealed no differences (i.e., p > .05) between these two 
subgroups. Thus, on these basic organizational attributes, the sample appears to be 
representative of the population from which it was drawn.  
 
Table 3.9. Comparison of Respondents to Nonrespondents  
Two-tailed test 
* Legal structure and geographic regions are based on dummy variables:  
Legal structure: Nonprofit = 1; For-profit = 2 
Geographic region: Applicable = 1; Not applicable = 0 
 
 
  Mean p-value 
  Respondents Nonrespondents  
Legal structure and age *    
 Nonprofit  1.2 1.2 .06 
 Age 21.8 22.3 .81 
     
Financial data    
 Revenue 9,219,722.1 55,287,168.9 .24 
 Assets 318,370,607.0 654,749,113.9 .39 
     
Geographic region *    
 Northeast .34 .34 .99 
 North Central .19 .17 .64 
 South .16 .19 .54 
 West .31 .30 .90 
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Measures 
 
 This section explains definitions and operationalization of the dependent, 
independent, and control variables used in analysis.  Table 3.15 also summarizes the 
measurement model latent variables, number of measurement items, measurement 
description and format, and Cronbach’s alpha.  
  
 
Dependent Variables 
 This empirical research constitutes two studies, each of which analyzes different 
sets of dependent variables in my dissertation research: (1) venture philanthropy 
practices, and (2) social and financial performance.   
 
Venture Philanthropy Practices (Study 1)  
The first dependent variable for this study is venture philanthropy practices 
measured by (1) the extent of an organization’s use of five non-philanthropic funding 
tools, and (2) the extent of the SIF’s participation on the board of a funded social venture.  
A five-point Likert-type scale ranges from 1 “Never” to 5 “Always” and is composed of 
six items: grant (a reversed-score item), equity, program-related investment (PRI), near-
equity, loans, and participation on the board.  Mean was used as an aggregated measure 
across six different items representing venture philanthropy practices, calculated by 
summing the score of each item, then dividing that sum by the number of items included 
in that sum.  I chose mean, rather than sum, of the items because of a high degree of 
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missing values in funding tool items, which would severely skew the aggregated 
measure12.   
Due to a lack of empirical studies that operationalized venture philanthropy 
practices, it was imperative for me to identify the most appropriate way to operationalize 
venture philanthropy.  This effort involved multiple steps.  The following part of this 
section presents the steps that define and distinguish venture philanthropy practices. 
The idea of venture philanthropy originates from a venture capital investment 
model, which involves five sequential steps: deal origination, deal screening, deal 
evaluation, deal structuring, and post-investment activities (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  
Drawing upon this model, venture philanthropy has evolved into distinct behaviors.  
However, due to a lack of commonly accepted definitions, there is no standard method to 
operationalize venture philanthropy practices.  Frumkin (2008) points out three core 
principles guiding a variety of venture philanthropy practices: (1) funding tools 
(provision of a large amount of financial support over longer periods of time); (2) new 
metrics of organizational performance; and (3) a close relationship between funder and 
recipient.  As the first step to operationalize venture philanthropy practices, content 
analysis was conducted on publications about SIFs to identify key terms that represent 
distinct venture philanthropy practices.  
The idea of venture philanthropy was first proposed by a Harvard Business 
Review seminal article about venture philanthropy (Letts et al., 1997), and then spread 
through many primary and secondary sources.  Thus, the reviewed publications were 
identified based on the following criteria: (1) seminal publications featuring SIFs (e.g., 
                                                
12 Multiple imputations were performed over the aggregated measure of venture philanthropy practices. 
Thus, when the variable was calculated, the data still had a high degree of missing values.  
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Table 3.10. Items Identified as Venture Philanthropy Versus Traditional Philanthropy by Literature Review 
Principle Traditional philanthropy Venture philanthropy Sources 
Characteristics of funding 
tools 
• Shorter funding term  
• Smaller amount 
• A philanthropic funding tool 
(grants)  
• Specific program support 
• Limited provision of technical 
assistance 
• Longer funding term 
• Larger amount 
• Market-based funding tools 
(e.g., equity, loans)  
• General operation support 
• Greater provision of technical 
assistance  
Acumen Fund (2013); Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation 
(2013); Clark & Gaillard (2003); 
Fleishman (2009); Frumkin 
(2008); John (2006); Letts et al., 
(1997); Miller & Wesley (2010); 
Omidyar Network (2013); 
Standlea (2006) 
Performance 
measurement 
• Less rigorous measurement  
• Measurement system 
developed primarily by a 
funded social venture 
• Less rigorous due diligence 
• No clear exit strategy 
• Rigorous measurement  
• New metric system developed 
by funders via adaptation of 
for-profit systems 
• Rigorous due diligence 
• A clear exit strategy 
Acumen Fund (2013); 
Community Wealth Ventures, 
(2002); Emerson et al. (2000); 
Fleishman (2009); Frumkin, 
(2008); Letts et al. (1997); Orosz 
(2000); REDF (2013); Standlea 
(2006) 
Relationship with funded 
organizations  
• Low involvement in a funded 
social venture  
• Not serve on the board  
• High involvement in a funded 
social venture  
• Serve on the board  
Community Wealth Ventures, 
(2002); Frumkin (2008); John 
(2006); Letts et al. (1997); Orosz 
(2000); Scarlata & Alemany 
(2008); Standlea (2006); 
Venture Philanthropy Partners 
(2013) 
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Community Wealth Ventures, Inc., 2002; Letts et al., 1997); (2) publications, including 
websites, generated by leading SIFs (e.g., Acumen Fund, REDF, Venture Philanthropy 
Partners); (3) industry reports; and (4) scholarly publications on venture philanthropy and 
case studies developed by academic institutions (e.g., Stanford Graduate School of 
Business/ REDF, 1998).  Table 3.10 displays tools and behaviors identified as venture 
philanthropy versus traditional philanthropy through content analysis on those 
documents. 
The next step was to review and sort these behaviors with three professionals 
from SIFs located in Indianapolis and industry experts who made suggestions during the 
process of my scale item generations.  Nine organizations participating in the pretest also 
reviewed the items.  An important objective during this sorting process was to delete 
items that were deemed to be conceptually inconsistent and not distinct enough as 
venture philanthropy practices (Hinkin, 1995).  As a result, many items needed to be 
deleted.  Although performance measurement has been discussed as one of the most 
important characteristics of venture philanthropy approaches, some reviewers expressed a 
concern about potential confusion among survey respondents, because even before a 
venture philanthropy idea emerged, organizations such as the United Way had begun to 
implement their own measurement tools to assess nonprofit funding practices.  A long 
funding term and a large size of funding support were also excluded.  Although these are 
widely acknowledged as unique venture philanthropy approaches (Letts et al., 1997), it is 
not possible to define what “long term” and “large size” mean.  Contrary to the claim by 
venture philanthropy proponents, research found many traditional philanthropic 
foundations provide multi-year grants (Grønbjerg et al., 2000).  Given the absence of a 
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metric that defines a typical duration of venture philanthropy approaches compared to 
traditional philanthropy approaches, this item would not be able to help me distinguish 
venture philanthropy from traditional philanthropy.    
The sorting and review processes yielded (1) funding tools, (2) a funder’s close 
relationship with a funded organization through the board seat, and (3) types of support 
including provision of non-financial technical assistance as variables that exemplify 
venture philanthropy practices.  As the last step to operationalize venture philanthropy 
practices, scale reliability was assessed since this is a newly developed measure (Hinkin, 
1995).  Table 3.11 shows a low Cronbach’s alpha for a scale including all items of 
funding tools, a close relationship, and provision of non-financial resources (α = .61).  
The scale excluding an item for provision of non-financial resources received a higher 
Cronbach’s alpha (α = .68), but it is still lower than .70 as recommended by Nunnally 
(Nunnally, 2010).  After deleting an item for loans through PRIs, the scale could attain an 
acceptable level of Cronbach’s alpha (α = .72).    
 
Table 3.11. Results of Scale Reliability Assessment for Venture Philanthropy 
Practices 
Funding tools Close relationship Types of support Cronbach's α 
6 tools (grant, equity, 
equity through PRIs, 
near-equity, loans 
through PRIs, loans) 
Participation on the 
board 
Provision of non-
financial resources 
.61 
6 tools (grant, equity, 
equity through PRIs, 
near-equity, loans 
through PRIs, loans) 
Participation on the 
board 
N/A .68 
5 tools (grant, equity, 
equity through PRIs, 
near-equity, loans) 
Participation on the 
board 
N/A .72 
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Social and Financial Performance (Study 2)  
Study 2 has two dependent variables—social performance and financial 
performance—each of which is analyzed by a different model.  I ascribe to the view that 
performance is multidimensional in nature and thus requires the use of multiple measures 
(Cameron, 1978; Chakravarthy, 1986; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005).  This is particularly 
true for social performance, because each nonprofit and philanthropic organization has its 
own unique social objectives, which will likely differ from those of other philanthropic 
organizations (Frumkin, 2008; Kanter & Summers, 1987; Kendall & Knapp, 2000).  In 
the case of performance of nonprofit organizations, it is conceivable that different 
performance items could move in opposite directions.  Different social performance 
indicators, for example, could influence outcomes.  Although the number of served 
students might be small (quantitative outcome), students may increase self-esteem to a 
significant degree (qualitative outcome).  Or, as financial performance indicators, 
donation revenue may decline even when sales revenue is increasing because donors may 
think their donations are no longer necessary given the success of a nonprofit’s 
commercial activity.  Yet, in either case, both dimensions are important indications of 
performance and the overall success of the organization. Therefore, a multiple dimension 
performance measure provides a better test to the overall performance of the 
organization.  I also incorporated organizations’ mission, goals and objectives, short-term 
and long-term outcomes, public and private benefits, and other elements of broader 
stakeholder satisfaction (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, several methods were utilized to generate and 
develop dimension items and they were integrated into social performance and financial 
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performance.  Dimension items about performance were first derived from content 
analysis (as explained earlier in this chapter).  The primary source reviewed for content 
analysis are two survey reports compiled on behalf of one of the leading SIFs, Venture 
Philanthropy Partners (Community Wealth Ventures, 2000, 2002).  These documents 
provide details of SIF funding performance, goals, and outcomes.  Two coders, including 
myself, conducted content analysis on the documents to identify concurrent themes and 
keywords relevant to definitions and the assessment of SIF funding performance.  I also 
reviewed the websites of my sample organizations as another primary source and 
scholarly studies as the secondary source to determine that the common themes identified 
were consistent.  The secondary sources reviewed include studies about nonprofit and 
philanthropy performance (see Table 3.12).  Following the prior literature (e.g., 
Westphal, 1998), the semi-structured interviews were also conducted with SIF 
practitioners and scholars.  Each reviewer was asked to provide descriptions about how 
he or she defines performance and what factors possibly help him or her enhance 
performance.  Their responses, as well as secondary sources, were then classified into a 
number of items by content analysis.   
As a result, a social performance variable was constructed from eight different 
items representing (1) meeting the needs of beneficiaries, (2) the number of beneficiaries 
served, (3) concrete outputs for beneficiaries, (4) scalability of funded programs, (5) 
advancement of the social cause by influencing policymakers and the public, (6) long-
term social impact, (7) alignment with mission, and (8) donor and investor satisfaction.  
A financial performance variable was constructed also from eight different items 
representing four different indicators of funded social ventures’ revenues: (1) total 
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revenue, (2) earned income/sales revenue, (3) philanthropic donations/grants, (4) growth 
in net assets, (5) another institutional funder’s acquisition of funded social ventures, (6) 
initial public offerings of funded social ventures, (7) internal rates of returns, and (8) 
direct financial benefits for survey participants or their donors/investors.  Survey 
respondents were asked about the importance of social and financial performance items 
and their satisfaction with each item.  
I used the performance scales employed by Covin, Slevin and Schultz (1997) and 
Sherwood and Covin (2008) to construct weighted average social and financial 
performance scores for the sampled organizations.  Consistent with the recommendations 
of Covin, Slevin and Schultz (1997), the “raw” satisfaction data is recorded to -2 to +2 
scale, which ensures that higher scores will be calculated for responses indicating greater 
satisfaction.  Each performance index is then created by summing the importance of 
satisfaction scores for each of the social and financial items, then dividing this figure by 
the sum of importance scores.  
Performance = ∑ (Criterion Satisfaction Score X Criterion Importance Score)  
∑ (All Criteria Importance Scores) 
 
 
Relevant data are gathered via a survey.  Subjective indicators were chosen, 
because subjective measures are particularly useful for assessing the broader, 
nonfinancial dimensions of performance, which are generally more accessible than 
objective indicators.  As the prior studies demonstrated (Stam & Elfring, 2008), the social 
performance scale and the financial performance scale in this study are shown to exhibit 
strong reliability and validity.  Cronbach's alpha of social performance is α = .81 and that 
of financial performance is α = .89
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Table 3.12. Performance Variables: Conceptualization and Measurement in Selected Studies About Nonprofit and 
Philanthropic Organizations  
Authors Social performance Financial performance 
Alter (2004) Outcomes relating to employment, education, 
wages, housing, use of public assistance, use of 
social services, reduced medical needs, increased 
quality of life, or changes in behavior and attitudes 
Financial self-sufficiency via earned income, income 
diversification, and cost savings 
Coombes, Morris, 
Allen, & Webb (2011) 
Eight areas related to the social mission (e.g., 
participation with school/educational program, 
overall influence on cultural development within the 
local community) 
Total revenues, net assets, and fundraising ratio 
Frumkin (2008) Process evaluation (program implementation, the 
capacity of the organization to achieve objectives), 
outcome evaluations (results that a program 
ultimately achieves) 
N/A 
John (2006) Mission outputs, client satisfaction, internal 
processes, employee learning and growth 
Financial indicators 
Kaplan (2001) Specific targets for increasing the scope of social 
impact (e.g., the number of customers/clients served, 
expansion to new sites), customer satisfaction  
Increased revenue, income stability 
Katz (2005) Indicators about how much influence a foundation 
has in its field  
 
Indicators about whether grantees have been 
strengthened or whether a funder is able to persuade 
other funders to fund its grantees 
Morris, Coombes, 
Schindehutte, & Allen 
(2007) 
N/A Total revenues and net assets 
Ostrower (2006) Influencing social policy 
 
Organizational development providing nonfinancial 
technical assistance  
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Table 3.12. (cont.) 
Authors Social performance Financial performance 
Pearce, Fritz, & Davis 
(2010) 
Member attendance  Total dollars given by members 
Whitman (2008) Various social values Indicators about how well it makes resource 
allocation decisions in line with its espoused social 
values 
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Independent Variables 
Entrepreneurial Orientation 
Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in this study is measured by the Miller/Covin 
and Slevin scale (1989), a 7-point/9-item Likert-type scale that assesses three items for 
each of three subdimensions of EO—innovativeness, risk taking, and proactiveness—at 
the organization level.  The subsequent section explains the steps to develop a scale to 
assess EO for this study.  Cronbach’s alpha for this final scale is 0.82, which is greater 
than the minimum recommended level, 0.70 (Hinkin, 1995).   
Recent studies show an increased interest in EO among nonprofit scholars and 
their active application of a concept and a scale of EO to the nonprofit context (Helm & 
Andersson, 2010).  In order to determine how this study applies an EO scale, I consulted 
one of my committee members who has developed the most widely used scale to measure 
EO (Covin & Slevin, 1989).  Table 3.13 explains that most prior studies adapted the 
Covin and Slevin (1989) scale with some modifications appropriate to their empirical 
cases, while Morris and his co-authors developed their original scales for their studies’ 
organizations (Coombes et al., 2011; Morris et al., 2007; Morris & Joyce, 1998).  Covin 
and Wales (2012) also introduced to me Hughes and Morgan's (2007) scale to measure 
five dimensions (autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, proactiveness, and competitive 
aggressiveness) reflecting the multidimensional EO construct (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).  
Another committee members who specializes in philanthropic studies, and three 
professionals from an Indianapolis-based SIF reviewed the original Miller/Covin and 
Slevin scale, Hughes and Morgan's (2007) scale, and the scales used by other empirical 
studies listed in Table 3.12. 
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During their review, Hughes and Morgan's (2007) scale was first eliminated 
because SIF professionals stressed that “competitive aggressiveness” is not a correct term 
to assess their practice (“We do not compete with other organizations; instead we 
collaborate with them.”)  The reviewers expressed their concerns about the use of the 
Helm and Andersson scale (2010), the Morris and Joyce scale (1998), and the Pearce, 
Fritz and Davis scale (2010) due to the large number of items in these scales.  Some 
scales have increased the number of items up to as many as 15 items from 9 items in the 
original Covin and Slevin scale.  Research suggests that scales with too many items can 
create problems with respondent fatigue or response biases (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997).  
Unlike the questionnaires used by these studies, my questionnaire includes many other 
scales.  Considering that adequate internal consistency reliabilities can be obtained with 
as few as three items (Hinkin, 1995), it is not necessary to increase the number of items 
in a scale for the purpose of reliability.  Our review process determined that the original 
Covin and Slevin scale (1989) should be used as a foundation.  
The Covin and Slevin scale was then pretested by nine case organizations.  While 
all pretest participants confirmed the scale is applicable in the context of this study, they 
also suggested that wordings in many scale terms needed to be modified because the 
original scale had been developed with for-profit firms.  Suggestions from participants in 
the pretest were discussed with my committee member who specializes in EO research 
and reflected in revisions in the scale items.  For instance, “firm” was replaced with 
“organization,” which is a more familiar term in the nonprofit and philanthropic field.  
Given that my intended survey respondents are funders, rather than direct service 
providers, “funding programs” was chosen to replace “products or services.”  In light of 
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suggestions by SIF professionals, one of the proactiveness items (“Typically adopts a 
very competitive, ‘undo-the-competitors’ posture”) needed to be revised because the item 
contained the concept of “competition.”  The final item reads as “Continuously makes 
changes, due to perceived changes occurring in the community we serve.” 
 
 
Institutional Regulative Pressure (1): The Legal Structure of SIFs  
Following an approach by Baum and Oliver (1992), the legal structure of an SIF 
is measured as either nonprofit (coded as 1) or for-profit (coded as 0) and analyzed as a 
dummy variable in regression analysis.  The use of binary variables for the legal structure 
is a commonly accepted measure in comparative studies on nonprofit versus for-profit 
organizations (Davis et al., 2011).  The survey questionnaire asked respondents to pick 
one of the following items as the most applicable legal status that structures their 
organizations: “Public charity 501(c)(3)”; “Limited liability company, limited 
partnership, or other business firm”; “Other structure”; and “Unincorporated.”  The 
questionnaire also asked respondents who chose “Other structure” to further describe 
their organizations’ structure.  Most respondents explained their organization as a 
“private foundation,” which should be classified as “Public charity 501(c)(3)” for the 
purpose of this study.  After a review of those descriptions, I allocated each case to an 
appropriate category, either nonprofit or for-profit.  Additionally, I used the National 
Center for Charitable Statistics database, the Guidestar database, and organizations’ 
websites, if any, to confirm the legal structures of my survey participants.   
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Table 3.13. Selected Empirical Studies Applying EO in the Nonprofit Context 
Authors Sample EO dimensions Methodology EO scale adapted 
Cools & Vermeulen 
(2008) 
1,797 commercial entrepreneurs and 
150 social entrepreneurs in Flemish 
organizations  
Innovativeness, 
risk taking, 
proactiveness 
Independent 
sample t tests 
A 10-item/ 5-point Likert 
scale adapted from Covin & 
Slevin (1989) and Miller & 
Toulouse (1986) 
Coombes et al. 
(2011) 
725 arts and culture nonprofits (the 
final sample was 140 nonprofits) 
 
Innovativeness, 
risk taking, 
proactiveness 
ANOVA  A scale by 
Morris & Joyce (1998) and 
Morris et al. (2007) 
Davis et al. (2011) 670 nursing homes in Florida (the 
final sample was 134 nursing home 
administrators) 
Innovativeness, 
risk taking, 
proactiveness 
Generalized linear 
model  
 
An 8-item/7-point Likert scale 
adapted from Covin & Slevin 
(1989) 
Helm & Andersson 
(2010) 
410 entrepreneurial and non-
entrepreneurial nonprofits in Kansas 
City (the final sample was 108 
organizations) 
Innovativeness, 
risk taking, 
proactiveness 
Principal 
components factor 
analysis  
A 20-item/8-point Likert scale 
adapted from Covin & Slevin 
(1989) 
Morris, Coombes, 
Schindehutte, & 
Allen (2007) 
685 social service nonprofits in 
Upstate New York (the final sample 
was 145 nonprofits) 
Innovativeness, 
risk taking, 
proactiveness 
Exploratory and 
confirmatory 
factor analyses  
A 15-item scale by Morris & 
Joyce (1998) 
Morris & Joyce 
(1998) 
Managers and staff from 19 blood 
centers attending trade conferences 
Innovativeness, 
risk taking, 
proactiveness 
Factor analysis  
 
A 14-item original scale  
Pearce, Fritz, & 
Davis (2010) 
252 religious congregations in  
St. Paul, MN, Philadelphia and 
Pittsburg, PA, Lincoln, NE, and 
Charlotte, NC 
 
 
 
Innovativeness, 
risk taking, 
proactiveness, 
competitive 
aggressiveness, 
autonomy 
Regression 
analyses  
A 15-item/7-point Likert scale 
adapted from Covin & Slevin 
(1989)  
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Institutional Regulative Pressure (2): Donors’ and Investors’ Demand for Social 
Versus Financial Outcomes 
A donors’ and investors’ demand variable is measured by the extent of their 
demand for social or financial outcomes from funding.  A 5-point Likert-type scale asked 
survey respondents “to what extent your funders/investors expect social and financial 
returns” and provided a rating ranging from 1 “Do not expect at all” to 5 “Very strongly 
expect.”  This is a single-item scale and separate scales were prepared for social outcome 
and for financial outcome.  Schriesheim, Hinkin and Podsakoff (1991) caution that a 
single-item scale may lack content and construct validity, internal consistency and test-
retest reliability.  However, this single-item scale has been widely accepted to assess 
funders’ goals and investors’ demand by prior literature on SIFs (Clark & Gaillard, 2003; 
Miller & Wesley, 2010).  Schriesheim et al. (1991) also mention that it is perhaps more 
preferable to use a thoroughly developed measure with conceptually consistent items than 
a multi-item scale.  Thus, as recommended by Hinkin (1995), both inductive and 
deductive methods were applied to the development of the donor/investor demand scale 
in order to enhance its construct validity.   
 
Institutional Normative Pressure (1): Affiliations with Professional Associations 
Following the conceptualization by Aldrich and Zimmer (1986), an independent 
variable for affiliations with professional associations is measured as a presence or an 
absence of a formal and/or informal tie with professional associations.   
A concept of embeddedness is often used to refer to the interconnections between 
an organization and social structures of a particular institutional field when it exists 
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(Baum & Oliver, 1991; Burns & Wholey, 1993; Dacin, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000).  Scholars construct network 
embeddedness in different ways.  For instance, Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) operationalize 
embeddedness at two different levels as (1) relational embeddedness as the number of 
alliances a pair of organizations had entered with each other, and (2) structural 
embeddedness as the number of common partners they shared from past ties.  Echols and 
Tsai (2005) implemented Burt's (2009) network redundancy measure to calculate the 
network embeddedness that represents the interconnectedness of each organization’s 
contacts within its own dataset.  These methods often require survey respondents to 
provide the information of their relationships with other organizations (Stam & Elfring, 
2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  With the considerable difficulty scholars experienced 
in collecting responses from foundations and venture capitalists, those methods would not 
be deemed to present sufficient data for my analysis.   
However, some prior studies used a simple measure.  The simplest measures of 
interconnectedness between organizations is exemplified by the presence or absence of a 
tie (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986b).  This simple measure was applied by Uzzi (1996), who 
created a dichotomous variable representing social capital embeddedness.  The present 
study follows these approaches to construct affiliation variables.  In agreement with 
DiMaggio and Powell’s conceptualization that the interconnectedness between 
organizations occurs through both formal and informal means (1991), I measured three 
levels of affiliations with professional associations, i.e., “Formal affiliation” (coded as 3), 
“Informal affiliation” (coded as 2), and “No affiliation” (coded as 1). “Formal 
affiliations” mean affiliations by formal membership with an association, whereas 
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“informal affiliations” are any other types of affiliations, including participation in a 
seminar or conference organized by a professional association, informal networking, and 
affinity groups.  I further created a different item representing a leading professional 
association at the national level (i.e., “the Council on Foundations” in the philanthropic 
field and “National Venture Capital Association” in the venture capital field) and 
professional associations at the local level (i.e., “Other grantmaker association(s)” in the 
philanthropic field and “Other venture capital association(s)” in the venture capital field).  
 Consequently, two scales were developed: the one for affiliations in the 
philanthropic field, and the other, in the venture capital field.  An aggregated measure is 
calculated by summing scores from two items in each scale.  For instance, if an 
organization is formally affiliated with the Council on Foundations (= a score of 3), but 
has only an informal relationship with a local grantmaker association (= a score of 2), the 
variable measuring this organization’s affiliations with professional associations in the 
philanthropic field is 5 (3 + 2).  
 
Institutional Normative Pressure (2): Management Team’s Training 
A management team’s training is measured by the strength of training that 
members of the management team collectively had in the nonprofit versus the business 
sectors.  The following section describes the steps I took in order to construct the training 
variable.  
Construction of a variable measuring the management team’s training is far from 
an easy task, because prior literature of institutionalism and human capital theory defined 
and measured training and experience in many different ways.  Therefore, I reviewed 
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major empirical studies measuring training as a variable (Table 3.14).  Following many 
studies listed in Table 3.14, I constructed variables to capture two dimensions of 
training—educational training and professional experience—of the management team.  A 
use of both educational training and professional experience in the measure is consistent 
with the implication made by DiMaggio and Powell (1983).  Human capital literature 
(Dimov and Shepherd, 2005; Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997) distinguishes 
general human capital, and specific human capital that refers to education and experience, 
with a scope of application limited to a particular activity or context.  Since my empirical 
analysis needs to illuminate differences between the philanthropic field and the venture 
capital field, I focused on measuring specific human capital.  To capture specific human 
capital as a source of institutional influences, I used commonly accepted names for 
degrees in higher education today: “philanthropy, nonprofit management, or public 
administration” from the traditional philanthropic field and “business administration” as 
specific human capital with regard to the venture capital field.   
In the final version of the scale, survey respondents were asked how they rated the 
work experience and educational training of their leadership team collectively in each of 
the following fields: (1) philanthropy, nonprofit management, or public administration, 
(2) business administration, (3) subject fields (e.g., environment, energy, health, arts, 
education, history), and (4) other.  A “subject fields” item and an “other” item were 
added upon suggestion from a respondent during the pretest, who cautioned that some 
respondents, who hold a degree in another field, might skip answering this question 
without picking either nonprofit management or business administration.  Following 
Letts et al. (1997), which implies that traditional philanthropic foundations tend to hire 
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program officers who had training in a specific subject field, I allocated a score for a 
“subject fields” category to “philanthropy, nonprofit management, or public 
administration.”  To create a variable that would capture the strength of the management 
team’s education and work training, I referred to a Dimov and Shepherd 5-point Likert-
type scale (2005).  Each of the training variables was scaled from 1 to 5 with the training 
strength ranging from 1 “None” to 5 “Extremely strong.”  “1” indicated a respondent 
rated “none” as the strength of his/her leadership training in a particular field; “2” 
represented “very little” training, and “5” indicated “extremely strong” training.  The 
subscales for work experience and educational training were summed to form a 
composite training scale in a nonprofit versus business field, in which those with high 
scores had both depth and breadth of experience.   
In the entrepreneurship literature (Table 3.13), work experience has been 
commonly measured as the number of years of experience, or signaled by achievement 
levels in employment, such as management or supervisory experience (Ang, Slaughter, & 
Ng, 2002; Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Honig & Karlsson, 2004).  Educational attainment 
has often been captured by the highest educational degree, which is also coded by the 
number of years (Wilson & Musick, 1997).  Given these practices in prior literature, I 
included scales measuring the number of years of experience each member of the 
leadership team possessed as an indicator for the strength of his/her educational and 
professional training.  However, the pretest results suggested that this method would 
severely decrease the response rate; most respondents could not answer for the training 
scales because they needed to ask their CEOs and board members to complete their 
response.  I consulted my committee members in regard to seeking the most appropriate 
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method to capture the information I would need for analysis on the leadership team’s 
training, and determined that the rating system measuring the depth (“none” through 
“extremely strong”) and the breadth (“work experience” and “educational training”) 
would be the most appropriate for my empirical study.  My decision was made also 
because as Table 3.13 exhibits, many institutionalism and philanthropic studies use 
relatively simple measures, such as a binary or categorical variable.  The coefficient 
alpha for the scales is 0.73, which suggests that the sampling domain has been captured 
adequately (Churchill, 1979). 
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Table 3.14. Selected Empirical Studies Measuring Human Capital   
Authors Sample Theoretical 
foundation 
Methodology Measure 
Ang, Slaughter & 
Ng (2002) 
1576 IT professionals 
in Singapore 
Institutional 
theory 
Hierarchical 
regressions 
• Education (a set of binary variables with 
associate's or bachelor's IT-related degree) 
• Work experience (total years that the individual 
has held any IT job) 
Casile & Davis-
Blake (2002) 
347 AACSB 
unaccredited business 
schools 
Institutional 
theory 
Ordered 
probit 
regressions 
• Work experience (a binary variable indicating a 
dean’s previous employment by an AACSB-
accredited institution) 
Chandler & 
Hanks, (1998) 
102 manufacturing 
and service firms  
Entrepreneurship ANOVA • Work experience (total years of experience in 
managing own businesses, as a general manager 
in a business owned by someone else, and/or in a 
technical position) 
Davidsson & 
Honig (2003) 
380 Swedish adults 
engaged in nascent 
activities with a 
control group of 608 
non-entrepreneurs  
 
Entrepreneurship Binomial 
logistic 
regression 
• Education (the highest level of education coded 
into number of years) 
• Workshop attendance (a binary variable to 
indicate attendance) 
• Work experience (total years of full-time paid 
work experience) 
• Supervisory experience (total years of experience)  
Dimov & 
Shepherd (2005) 
112 venture capital 
firms 
Entrepreneurship Hierarchical 
regression  
• Education (a score for each of the degrees to 
represent the proportion of management team 
members that attained MBA, law, science, and/or 
humanities degree) 
• Industry experience (a score for each type of 
experience based on the proportion of 
management team members who worked in 
finance, consulting, and/or law and had 
entrepreneurial experience) 
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Table 3.14. (cont.) 
Authors Sample Theoretical 
foundation 
Methodology Measure 
Forbes & 
Zampelli (2012) 
1,539 individuals 
(data from the 2006 
Social Capital 
Community Survey) 
Philanthropic 
and nonprofit 
studies 
Tobit • Education (6 binary variables representing the 
highest education levels achieved) 
• Health status (a binary variable to indicate 
whether or not a respondent is disabled) 
Gimeno, Folta, 
Cooper & Woo 
(1997) 
4,814 members of the 
National Federation of 
Independent Business 
Entrepreneurship Tobit, 
grouped data 
regression 
General human capital 
• Formal education (percentage of observations in 
sample with less formal education) 
• Management experience (multinomial categorical 
variable for the highest level of supervisory, 
management, and entrepreneurial experiences) 
Specific human capital  
• Similar business experience  (a binary variable to 
indicate similarity between present business and 
previous organization) 
Honig & Karlsson 
(2004) 
396 verified and 
accessible nascent 
entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurship Hierarchical 
logistic 
regression 
• Education (total years for the level of education 
completed) 
• Work experience (total years for full-time paid 
work experience) 
• Start-up experience (a dummy variable)  
Wilson & Musick 
(1997) 
2,854 individuals 
(data from the 
Americans’ Changing 
Lives panel study) 
Philanthropic 
and nonprofit 
studies 
OLS 
regression 
• Education (total years of schooling completed) 
 
  136 
Control Variables 
The model included three control variables: (1) SIFs’ age, (2) SIFs’ size, and (3) 
the legal status of funded social ventures.  These control variables are designed to adjust 
for institutional field and organizational differences that might impact the association 
between the measures of interest (Davis et al., 2011) and strategy-making processes 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1995).  Age and size are also standard control variables often used in 
the literature of EO (Pearce et al., 2010; Stam & Elfring, 2008; Wiklund & Shepherd, 
2005), neo institutionalism (Baum & Oliver, 1992), and philanthropic studies (Guo & 
Brown, 2006). 
I explored a possibility of using other control variables, in particular locations.  
Venture philanthropy literature often discusses the location as an important characteristic, 
since in the early stages, main thought leaders for venture philanthropy were known to be 
high-tech entrepreneurs located in the Silicon Valley area (Moody, 2008).  Also, 
community climate in favor of venture capital and entrepreneurial activities can help 
promote venture philanthropy practices, since venture capital investment is a familiar 
practice and thus will be deemed to be legitimate.  A venture-capital–friendly climate can 
be measured by the degree of concentration of venture capital firms in a particular region.  
I reviewed the data on Investments by Region in the MoneyTree Report (2010), the report 
compiled through collaboration between PricewaterhouseCoopers and the National 
Venture Capital Association based upon data from Thomson Reuters.  The concentration 
was calculated by the number of deals and amount for total deals, instead of the number 
of venture capital firms.  However, the results showed the same level of concentration 
among Silicon Valley, the Midwest, and the Northeast (score = 13) and indicated that the 
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location would not be a useful index for testing my hypotheses.  It was also noted by the 
pretest participants that as the field has been growing, some SIFs have opened offices in 
multiple locations.  Given these data, location was eliminated from this empirical study.  
 
Organization Age  
 I computed age by using 2012, the year when the survey was conducted, minus 
the year the organization was founded.  The majority of the founding year data was 
collected through the survey questionnaire, while Guidestar and the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS) National Nonprofit Database were used as the secondary 
source for obtaining the ruling years for nonprofit sample organizations.   
Age was controlled for the effect of organizational reputation and linkage in the 
institutional field.  Long-standing foundations are more likely to be deeply embedded in 
the traditional philanthropic field than SIFs created by high-tech entrepreneurs during the 
dot-com era (Moody, 2008).  The high degree of embeddedness can constrain those 
funders from implementing non-traditional activities (Kistruck & Beamish, 2010; Mair & 
Martí, 2006).  As such, age can be an indicator for the degree of influence within the 
high-tech and entrepreneurial culture, which then can affect the organization’s use of 
venture philanthropy approach.  
 
Organization Size  
Size was determined based on one of the four ranges of total assets (“less than $1 
million,” “$1 million to less than 10 million,” “$10 million to $1 billion,” “over $1 
billion”), from which the survey questionnaire asked respondents to pick one.  For the 
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regression model, the mid-point value was computed for each range.  Due to a 
considerably large range between the minimum size and the maximum size, I used log for 
the asset size.  
To account for an organization’s size, I considered a number of measures.  Prior 
research indicates a relationship between organization size and strategic behavior in 
entrepreneurial organizations (Chen & Hambrick, 1995).  Organization size is often 
measured as the total number of employees within the organization (Kreiser, Marino, 
Dickson, & Weaver, 2010) or financial data, such as revenue or assets.  This study’s 
survey questionnaire asked respondents about both the number of employees and the size 
of assets, revenue and operational budget.  My review of the collected data, however, 
suggested the number of employees would not be an accurate indicator describing an 
organization’s size because a considerable number of nonprofit SIFs were found to rely 
on volunteer labor.   
 
The Legal Structure of Funded Social Ventures 
The legal status of social ventures that a responding SIF funded is operationalized 
as either nonprofit (coded as 1) or for-profit (coded as 2) and is included as a dummy 
variable in the regression model.  I controlled the legal status of funded social ventures 
because the for-profit status of funded ventures allows funders to use equity investment 
as a funding tool, whereas the nonprofit status does not.  As such, a different legal status 
of funded social ventures directly impacts the ability to use market-based funding tools.  
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Table 3.15. A Summary of Measure for Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables  
Variable  Measure 
 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
Reference for 
measure  
Level of 
measurement 
Dependent variable     
 Venture philanthropy practices The extent of (i) use of venture capital 
funding tools, and (ii) participation on the 
board of a funded social venture, measured by 
a 5-point Likert scale 
.72 (Original 
scale) 
Scale score, 
interval 
 Social performance  Funder’s (i) stated values of the importance 
of social performance items and (ii) stated 
satisfaction with each item, whether it met 
its values and satisfaction 
.81 Covin, Slevin 
& Schultz 
(1997) 
Scale score, 
interval 
 Financial performance Funder’s (i) stated values of the importance 
of financial performance items and (ii) 
stated satisfaction with each item, whether it 
met its values and satisfaction 
.89 Covin, Slevin 
& Schultz 
(1997) 
Scale score, 
interval 
Independent variable     
 EO The level of entrepreneurial posture of the 
leadership team, measured by a 7-point Likert 
scale 
.82 Covin & 
Slevin (1989) 
Scale score, 
interval 
 Institutional regulative pressure 
(1): The legal structure 
 
Legal structure, nonprofit versus for-profit  N/A  
(Dummy 
variable) 
Baum & 
Oliver (1992) 
Bivariate  
 Institutional regulative pressure 
(2): Donors’ and investors’ demand 
for funding outcomes 
The extent of donors’ and investors’ demand 
for social versus financial outcomes, 
measured by a 5-point Likert scale 
N/A  
(Single item) 
Clark & 
Gaillard (2003) 
Scale score, 
interval 
 Institutional normative pressure 
(1): Affiliation with professional 
associations 
The depth (formal/informal) and the extent of 
affiliation with professional associations in 
the philanthropic versus venture capital field, 
measured by 3-point Likert scale 
N/A  
(Single item) 
Aldrich & 
Zimmer 
(1986), Uzzi 
(1996) 
Scale score 
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Table 3.15. (cont.) 
Variable  Measure 
 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
Reference for 
measure  
Level of 
measurement 
 Institutional normative pressure 
(2): The management team’s 
training 
The extent of the management team’s 
education and work training in nonprofit 
versus business, measured by a 5-point 
Likert scale 
.73 (Original 
scale) 
Scale score, 
interval  
 
 
Control variable     
 Age The survey year (2012) minus the respondent 
organization’s founding year 
N/A  
(Single item) 
 Scale score, 
interval  
 Size  The asset size determined by the midpoint of 
one of the four asset ranges 
N/A  
(Single item) 
 Scale score, 
interval  
 The legal structure of 
funded social venture 
Legal structure of funded social ventures, 
nonprofit versus for-profit 
N/A  
(Dummy 
variable) 
 Bivariate 
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Analytical Approach 
Moderated hierarchical regression analysis was utilized as the main statistical 
procedure for testing my hypotheses.  Moderated regression analysis allows for a 
comparison between alternative models with and without interaction terms, where an 
interaction effect only exists if the interaction term contributes significantly to the 
variance explained in the dependent variable over the main effects of the independent 
variables (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003).  This analytical approach has been widely employed 
in many empirical studies testing the interaction between EO and environmental or 
internal factors (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999; Bhuian et al., 2005; Covin et al., 1997; 
Covin & Slevin, 1988, 1989; De Clercq, Dimov, & Thongpapanl, 2010; Dess et al., 1997; 
Stam & Elfring, 2008; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003, 2005; Zahra & Covin, 1995).  This 
empirical study follows the approach by these prior studies.  Yet, there are several other 
reasons why I chose moderated hierarchical analysis over other analytical methods. 
First, my hypotheses indicate that the relationships between independent variables 
(institutional pressures) and dependent variables (venture philanthropy practices, social 
and financial performance) are conditional upon the level of organizations’ EO.  As such, 
the outcome of my analysis will be jointly determined by the interaction of the predictor 
and the moderator.  This suggests that my hypotheses reflect the form of moderation, and 
thus, moderated regression analysis is an appropriate technique (Arnold, 1982; Sharma, 
Durand, & Gur-Arie, 1981).  If hypotheses investigate that a predictive ability of certain 
variables differs across different environments, subgroup analysis should be used because 
this hypothesis reflects the magnitude, not the form, of moderation (Venkatraman, 1989).  
Second, the interactions this study investigates are continuous variables.  Cohen et al. 
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(2003) state that ANOVA should be avoided to examine continuous variable interactions.  
To apply ANOVA, continuous variables are often broken into categorical variables, and 
this dichotomization decreases measured relationships between variables (Cohen et al., 
2003).  Instead, scholars (Covin & Slevin, 1989) choose to use moderated regression 
analysis, instead, because it is regarded as a conservative method for identifying 
interaction effects in the sense that interaction terms are tested for significance only after 
other independent variables are entered into the regression equation. 
Prior to the application of a moderated regression technique, data were reviewed 
to assess whether modeling assumptions are satisfied.  Measures of skewness and 
kurtosis were assessed for each variable in the database.  For organization size, natural 
log was used to account for somewhat skewed distributions within these data. 
 
Model Specification   
The form of the moderated regression equation employed in this research was Y = 
a + bX + cZ +  dXZ, where Y is the dependent variables (venture philanthropy practices 
for Study 1 and social and financial performance for Study 2), X is the theoretically 
defined independent variable (the legal structure, donor/investor demand, affiliation with 
professional associations, the management team’s training), Z is the theoretically defined 
moderator variable (EO), and XZ is the interaction term (Sharma et al., 1981). 
 
The Transformation of the Variables 
The large numbers of interaction terms included in a moderated regression model 
is likely to cause serious multicollinearity.  Thus, to minimize correlations between the 
independent variables and their interaction terms, I followed recommendations by Aiken 
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and West (1991) and Cohen et al. (2003) for transforming variables.  Independent 
variables, if continuous13, were mean-centered by subtracting the corresponding variable 
mean from each value.  Such rescaling does not affect the substantive interpretation of 
the coefficients.  The mean-centered variables for this regression analysis were EO, 
donors’/investors’ demand, affiliation with professional associations, and the 
management team’s training.  With those mean-centered variables, I then computed 
interactive terms by multiplying the centered variable for EO and another centered 
variable representing each of the institutional factors, except the variable for the legal 
structure, which as a categorical variable does not need to be centered, according to 
Aiken and West (1991).  This process produced a total of four terms of interaction for: 
(1) EO and the legal structure; (2) EO and donor/investor demands; (3) EO and affiliation 
with professional associations; and (4) EO and the management team’s training.   
 
Multicollinearity Diagnostic Test Results  
The means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables are displayed in 
Table 3.16 for Study 1 and Tables 3.17 and 3.18 for Study 2.  Overall, correlations 
among the independent variables are relatively modest, ranging from -.54 to .47.  The 
correlations among variables do not suggest possible multicollinearity14.  Nonetheless, to 
minimize a threat of multicollinearity, I applied multicollinearity diagnosis by calculating 
values for the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance for each of the regression 
                                                
13 According to Aiken and West (1991), the criteria and categorical variables do not need to be centered.  
Thus, variables for venture philanthropy practices and for the legal structure of SIFs were not mean-
centered in this study.    
14 Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003) found that the correlations of the X and Z terms with XZ are 
substantial if variables remained uncentered, whereas the same correlations fell to zero in the centered case. 
This drop was referred to as an example of essential versus nonessential multicollinearity (Marquardt, 
1980).  
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coefficients.  Tolerance figures of variables range from .492 to .93, which is well above 
critical values of Tolerance (.10 , Cohen et al., 2003).  The VIF ranged from a low of 
1.057 to a high of 2.034, well below the cutoff of 10 (Cohen et al., 2003; Neter, 
Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985).  These results suggest that multicollinearity is not an issue 
in my analyses. 
  
Summary 
This chapter examines research methods, sampling and data collection methods, 
and analytical procedures of this dissertation and justifies using them for two empirical 
studies.  The operationalization and the measures of dependent, independent, and control 
variables are discussed and displayed in Table 3.15.  Several multicollinearity diagnostic 
tests were conducted to assure that multicollinearity is not a major issue in this study.  
With these results, the next chapter will discuss results of theory testing and analyses on 
main effects and moderating effects on SIFs’ venture philanthropy behaviors and 
social/financial performance.  
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Table 3.16. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations: Venture Philanthropy Practices, EO, and Institutional Pressures  
 Mean S.D. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
1. Venture philanthropy practices 2.11 .94 1.00                             
2. EO 4.84 .84 .14 ** 1.00                           
3. Nonprofit status .88 .32 -.54 ** .00  1.00                         
4. Donor/investor demand for 
social outcome 
4.34 .92 -.22 ** .06  .47 ** 1.00                       
5. Donor/investor demand for 
financial outcome 
2.83 1.35 .45 **   .01  -.46 ** -.38 ** 1.00                     
6. Affiliation with grantmaker 
professional associations 
1.94 1.49 -.25 ** .01  .27 ** .04  -.25 ** 1.00                   
7. Affiliation with venture capital 
professional associations 
1.00 1.15 .42 ** .19 * -.40 ** -.23 ** .14 ** .14 ** 1.00                 
8. Management team’s training in 
nonprofits 
7.87 1.75 -.27 ** .16 ** .42 ** .19 ** -.22 ** .28 ** -.27 ** 1.00               
9. Management team’s training in 
business 
8.35 1.68 .29 ** .10 ** -.20 ** .02  .11 ** -.14 ** .13 ** -.09 ** 1.00             
10. Organization age 25.75 23.63 -.15 ** -.05  .20 ** -.06  -.05  .32 ** -.22 ** .29 ** -.10 ** 1.00           
11. Organization assets a 7.58 1.22 -.12 ** .01 -.06  .01 .01 .10 ** -.03 -.03 .08 * .33 ** 1.00         
12. Nonprofit status of funded 
social venture 
.63 .48 -.38 ** .08 * .30 ** .01  -.08 * .27 ** -.19 ** .30 ** -.11 ** .23 ** .24 ** 1.00       
13. EO x donor/investor demand 
for social outcome   
.10 ** -.10 ** -.12 ** -.08 * .08 * -.03  .07 * -.14 ** .13 ** -.06  .14 * -.06  1.00     
14. EO x affiliation with 
grantmaker professional 
associations 
  
-.05  .01  -.06  -.04  .07 * -.07  -.02  -.02  -.02  .05  .01  -.12 ** -.06  1.00   
15. EO x management team’s 
training in nonprofits   
.06  -.03  -.13 ** -14 ** .11 ** -.02  .07 ** .04  -.04  -.02  -.04  -.13 ** .22 ** .37 ** 1.00 
n = 146  a Log-transformed  * p < .05 ** p < .01        Two-tailed tests. 
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Table 3.17. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations: Social Performance, EO, and Institutional Pressures 
 Mean S.D. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
1. Social Performance 3.68 .68 1.00                               
2. EO 4.84 .84 -.01  1.00                             
3. Nonprofit status .88 .32 .08 * 00  1.00                           
4. Donor/investor demand for 
social outcome 
4.34 .92 .14 * .06  .47 ** 1.00                         
5. Donor/investor demand for 
financial outcome 
2.83 1.35 -.03  .01  -.46 ** -.38 ** 1.00                       
6. Affiliation with grantmaker 
professional associations 
1.94 1.49 .08 * .01  .27 ** .04  -.25 ** 1.00                     
7. Affiliation with venture 
capital professional 
associations 
1.00 1.15 .02  .19 ** -.40 ** -.23 ** .14 ** .14 ** 1.00                   
8. Management team’s training 
in nonprofits 
7.87 1.75 .21 ** .16 ** .42 ** .19 ** -.22 ** .28 ** -.27 ** 1.00                 
9. Management team’s training 
in business 
8.35 1.68 -.06  .10 ** -.20 ** .02  .11 ** -.14 ** .13 ** -.09 ** 1.00               
10. Organization age 25.75 23.63 .03  -.05  .20 ** -.06  -.05  .32 ** -.22 ** .29 ** -.10 ** 1.00             
11. Organization assetsa 7.58 1.22 -.25 ** .01 -.06  .01 .01 .10 ** -.03 -.03 .08 * .33 ** 1.00           
12. Nonprofit status of funded 
social venture 
.63 .48 -.13 ** .08 * .30 ** .01  -.08 * .27 ** -.19 ** .30 ** -.11 ** .23 ** .14 * 1.00         
13. EO x nonprofit status    
-.01  -.01  .01  -.11 ** .09 ** -.05  .16 ** -.14 ** .04  .01  .08  -.10  1.00       
14. EO x donor/investor demand 
for financial outcome   
.05  .08 *              .10 ** .08 * -.03  .07 * -.03  .11 ** -.01  -.02  -
.02 
* .06 ** -.44 * 1.00     
15. EO x affiliations with venture 
capital associations   
-.04  .03  .17 ** .08  -.03  -.01  .09 ** .08 * -.14 ** .03  -
.04 
 .17 ** -.40 * .24  1.00   
16. EO x management training in 
business   
-.01     -.15 ** .04 ** .12 ** -.01  -.02  -.12 ** -.04  .23 ** .04  .12 ** -.02  -.19 ** .01  -.01  1.00 
n = 146  a Log-transformed * p < .05 ** p < .01        Two-tailed tests. 
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Table 3.18. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations: Financial Performance, EO, and Institutional Pressures 
 Mean S.D. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
1. Financial Performance 2.81 .73 1.00                               
2. EO 4.84 .84 .05  1.00                             
3. Nonprofit status .88 .32 .01  .00  1.00                           
4. Donor/investor demand for 
social outcome 
4.34 .92 -.06  .06  .47 ** 1.00                         
5. Donor/investor demand for 
financial outcome 
2.83 1.35 .01  .01  -.46 ** -.38 ** 1.00                       
6. Affiliation with grantmaker 
professional associations 
1.94 1.49 .07  .01  .27 ** .04  -.25 ** 1.00                     
7. Affiliation with venture capital 
professional associations 
1.00 1.15 -.05  .19 ** -.40 ** -.23 ** .14 ** .14 ** 1.00                   
8. Management team’s training in 
nonprofits 
7.87 1.75 .03  .16 ** .42 ** .19 ** -.22 ** .28 ** -.27 ** 1.00                 
9. Management team’s training in 
business 
8.35 1.68 .19 ** .10 ** -.20 ** .02  .11 ** -.14 ** .13 ** -.09 ** 1.00               
10. Organization age 25.75 23.63 .08 * -.05  .20 ** -.06  -.05  .32 ** -.22 ** .29 ** -.10 ** 1.00             
11. Organization assetsa 7.58 1.22 -.01   .01 -.06  .01 .01 .10 ** -.03 -.03 .08 * .33  1.00           
12. Nonprofit status of funded 
social venture 
.63 .48 .01   .08 * .30 ** .03  -.08 * .27 ** -.19 ** .30 ** -.11 ** .23  .14 * 1.00         
13. EO x nonprofit status    
.03  -.01  .01  -.11 ** .09 ** -.05  .16 ** -.14 ** .04  .01  .08  -.10  1.00       
14. EO x donor demand for social 
outcome   
.03  -.09 ** -.11 ** .08 * .08 * -.03  .07 * -.14 ** .13 ** -.10  .01 **   -.06 ** .38 * 1.00     
15. EO x affiliations with 
grantmaker professional 
associations 
  
.01  .01  -.05  -.03  .07 ** -.07  -.02  -.02  -.02  .08  .02  -.12  .26  -.06*  1.00   
16. EO x management training in 
nonprofits   
-.02  -.03  -.13 ***** .14 ** .10 ** -.02  .07 * .04  -.04  .02  .04  -.13 ** .42 ** .22**  .37*  1.00 
n = 146  a Log-transformed * p < .05 ** p < .01        Two-tailed tests. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
The present chapter explains the results of two studies, each of which tests 
hypotheses on different dependent variables: Study 1 (effects on venture philanthropy 
practices) and Study 2 (effects on social and financial performance).  Each study first 
introduces the descriptive statistics to organizations in the population of interest.  This is 
followed by the results of the moderated regression analyses, which are accompanied by 
the figures representing the main effects and the two-way interaction effects.  The chapter 
also assesses the model fit and interprets the findings from statistical analyses.    
 
Study 1: Factors Affecting Venture Philanthropy Practices 
This section discusses the results of Study 1, which analyzes effects on venture 
philanthropy practices by testing hypotheses 1 through 9. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables used in the 
regression analyses are displayed in Table 3.16 of Chapter 3.  Among the survey 
participants, 129 represented nonprofits and 17 represented for-profits.  The average SIFs 
had been in operation for 26 years.     
There are several results shown in the correlation matrix (Table 3.16) that warrant 
further discussion.  First and foremost, it is noteworthy that statistically significant 
correlations exist between venture philanthropy practices and each of the independent 
variables included in the study.  The directions of these results are consistent with 
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arguments in support of hypotheses posited in Chapter 2.  For instance, the positive 
correlation between venture philanthropy practices and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) 
(r = .14, p < .01) is suggested by hypothesis 1, which postulates that the more 
entrepreneurial the SIF is, the more likely it is to implement venture philanthropy 
approaches.  As hypotheses 3b, 4b and 5b suggest, venture philanthropy practices are 
positively and significantly correlated with all venture capital institutional variables, i.e., 
donors’ and investors’ demand for financial outcomes (r = .45, p < .01), affiliation with 
venture capital professional associations (r = .42, p < .01), and the management team’s 
training in business (r = .29, p < .01).  The correlations between venture philanthropy 
practices and all variables representing philanthropic institutional pressures are 
significant, yet negative.  These results are again consistent with the direction posited by 
hypotheses 2, 3b, 4b and 5b.   
The correlation between the nonprofit status and venture philanthropy practices is 
relatively high (r = -.54, p < .01), while a modest correlation exists between venture 
philanthropy practices and three other philanthropic institution variables, i.e., donors’ and 
investors’ demand for social outcomes (r = -.22, p < .01), affiliation with grantmaker 
professional associations (r = -.25, p < .01), and the management team’s training in 
nonprofits (r = -.27, p < .01).  Correlations between venture philanthropy practices and 
interaction terms associated with regulative institutional pressures, i.e., an interaction 
between EO and the nonprofit status (r = .12, p < .01) and an interaction between EO and 
donors’/investors’ demand for social outcomes (r = .10, p < .01), are also found to be 
consistent with the hypotheses.  In summary, the correlation results overall are consistent 
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with the implications of hypotheses at both the main effect and the interaction levels.  
Each of these correlation analysis findings is theoretically defensible in Study 1. 
Other noteworthy results include the negative correlations with organization age 
(r = -.14, p < .01) and organization size measured by assets (r = -.19, p < .01).  The 
results assure implications of the prior studies depicting SIFs as relatively young and 
small organizations (Community Wealth Ventures, Inc., 2002).  The nonprofit status of 
funded social ventures also has a negative and significant correlation with venture 
philanthropy practices (r = -.38, p < .01).  This was expected, given that the use of equity 
investment is an instrument available only to fund for-profit ventures.  The correlation 
between EO and the nonprofit status is close to zero albeit insignificant (r = .01, p > .05).  
What is particularly noteworthy here is the implication that the nonprofit status is not 
inherently antithetical to EO.  This result is consistent with prior empirical research on 
EO (Davis, Marino, Aaron, & Tolbert, 2011), which suggests that there is no significant 
difference in EO between nonprofits and for-profits.  Furthermore, the philanthropic 
institution variables and the venture capital institution variables show the negative 
correlations with one another.  That is, the correlation between donors’ and investors’ 
demand for social outcomes versus that for financial outcomes is -.38 (p < .01).  The 
management team’s training in nonprofits is very modestly, yet also negatively, 
correlated with the management team’s training in business (r = -.09, p < .01).  These 
correlations show the antithetical nature of pressures from two different institutional 
fields.   
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Results of Hypotheses Test 
Model Assessment 
As discussed in Chapter 3, I used moderated multiple regression analysis to test 
my hypotheses (Cohen et al., 2003), with a mean-centering procedure for the independent 
and moderating variables to minimize multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991).  Table 4.1 
presents the results for three models, testing direct and moderating effects of EO and 
institutional pressures on SIFs’ venture philanthropy practices (hypotheses 1 to 9).  In 
order to compare the obtained estimated coefficients, the coefficients reported in Table 
4.1 are standardized15. 
To test the hypotheses, Model 1 (the base model) enters all control variables first 
in regression equations to control for the potentially confounding effects of these 
variables.  This step permits a more accurate assessment of the predictive power of the 
independent variables (Covin et al., 1997).  Next, Model 2 includes the control variables 
and then introduces the eight main effects for venture philanthropy practices, offering an 
evaluation of hypotheses 1 to 5.  Finally, the four two-way interaction terms were added 
to the equation in Model 3 to test hypotheses 6 to 9.  This model represents the most 
conservative estimate of hypothesized effects, as it included all the control variables, 
main effects and interactions (Barrick & Mount, 1993).  Table 4.2 reports results from 
                                                
15 The (partial) regression coefficient B is often viewed as the premier causal indicator because it informs 
us about the estimated effect on the dependent variable of a change in the value of a putative cause.  
Nevertheless, B coefficient, as frequently presented, has limitations, especially those associated with 
measurement units that are unfamiliar or that lack intrinsic meaning.  As a consequence of a lack of 
consensus on measures, it is often easier to interpret ß than B. ß essentially rescales effects in terms of the 
standard deviations of the sample at hand. This is particularly useful when our research question has to do 
with comparing different variables for their (partialed) effects on Y in a given population represented by 
this sample. It is also often a necessary convenience when comparing effects of a given (conceptual) Xi on 
Y across studies, which may different on be different depending on the chosen measures of Xi and Y, and 
may even differ with regard to the population from which the sample was drawn.  Consequently, it is 
generally recommended that ß be reported, along with its SE in any research reports (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 
154).    
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Model 3, providing further details of regression results, including both unstandardized 
and standardized coefficients, standard errors, p-values, and t-statistics.   
Before interpreting the results, it is important to evaluate the changes in R2 and 
adjusted R2 in the models.  The critical test in moderated regression analysis is the 
increment in R2 when an interaction term is added to a regression equation already 
containing main effects (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).  Both R2 and adjusted R2 of the base 
model are .19 (p < .001), indicating that the control variables of organization age, 
organization size, and the nonprofit status of funded social ventures account for 19 
percent of the variance in venture philanthropy practices.  The main effects model, which 
includes control variables and all independent variables, makes a contribution over and 
above the base model with a considerable increment (∆R2 = .32, p < .001) of R2 and 
adjusted R2 (R2 = .51, adjusted R2 = .50).  Finally, both R2 and adjusted R2 increase from 
the main effect model to the two-way interaction model (R2 = .53, adjusted R2 = .52), 
although these increases are very modest (∆ R2 = .02, p < .001).  In sum, the increment in 
R2 and adjusted R2 is present throughout analysis.  The increments in R2 and adjusted R2 
are also statistically significant for each term added, suggesting that the interaction terms 
also added unique variance.  As this increment in R2 is statistically significant16, barring a  
                                                
16 It should also be noted that R2 is critical from the standpoint of statistical power. The power of a 
statistical test (the probability of detecting an effect when that effect should in fact be detected) is a 
function of the alpha level set to test hypotheses (the statistical level at which null hypotheses will be 
rejected), the strength of the association between variables (the adjusted R2), the number of independent 
variables, and the size of the sample (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & 
Black, 1998).  
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Table 4.1. Results of Moderated Regression Analysis: Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices  
 
Variables 
Model 1 
(Base Model) 
Model 2 
(Main Effects Model) 
Model 3 
(Two-way Interaction 
Model) 
Control         
 Organization age -.14 *** -.01  .01  
 Organization sizea .23 *** .16 *** .16 *** 
 The nonprofit status of funded social ventures -.37 *** -.25 *** -.26 *** 
 
Main effects  
      
 EO    .09 ** .09 ** 
 The nonprofit status   -.19 *** -.21 *** 
 Donor/investor demand for social outcomes   .04  .05  
 Donor/investor demand for financial outcomes   .30 *** .30 *** 
 Affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations 
  -.10 ** -.11 *** 
 Affiliation with venture capital professional 
associations 
  .27 *** .26 *** 
 Management team’s training in nonprofits   .05  .06 † 
 Management team’s training in business    .114 *** .11 *** 
 
Two-way interaction 
      
 EO x the nonprofit status     .06 † 
 EO x donor/investor demand social outcomes     -.01  
 EO x affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations  
    -.11 *** 
 EO x management team’s training in nonprofits     -.04  
        
 R2 .19 *** .51 *** .53 *** 
 Adjusted R2 .19 *** .50 *** .52 *** 
 ∆R2   .32 *** .02 *** 
 F-statistics 63.752 *** 74.020 *** 57.052 *** 
n = 146   † p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  a Log-transformed 
Dependent variable is venture philanthropy practices.  Standardized coefficients are reported      
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Table 4.2.  Results of Moderated Regression Analysis from Model 3: Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices 
  Unstandardized  Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 t-
statistics 
Sig. R2 Adjusted 
R2 
∆R2 F-
statistics  
 Variables B  S.E. Beta        
 (Constant) 1.51  .15  *** 9.925 .000     
Base 
Model 
Organization age .00  .00 .01  .114 .909 .19 .19  63.752*** 
Organization sizea .12  .02 .16 *** 5.736 .000     
The nonprofit status of funded social ventures -.51  .06 -.26 *** -9.351 .000     
 
Main 
Effects 
Model 
 
EO  .10  .03 .09 ** 3.281 .001 .51 .50 .32 74.020*** 
The nonprofit status -.61  .11 -.21 *** -5.700 .000     
Donor/investor demand for social outcomes .05  .03 .05  1.583 .114     
Donor/investor demand for financial outcomes .21  .02 .30 *** 10.334 .000     
Affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations 
-.07  .02 -.11 *** -3.533 .000     
Affiliation with venture capital professional 
associations 
.21  .03 .26 *** 8.390 .000     
Management team’s training in nonprofits  .03  .02 .06 † 1.854 .064     
Management team’s training in business  .06  .02 .11 *** 4.091 .000     
Two-way 
Interaction 
Model 
EO x the nonprofit status .20  .11 .06 † 1.833 .067 .53 .52 .02 57.052*** 
EO x donor/investor demand for social 
outcomes 
-.01  .04 -.01  -.134 .894     
EO x affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations  
-.08  .02 -.11 *** -3.956 .000     
EO x management team’s training in nonprofits -.02  .02 -.04  -1.197 .232     
n = 146   † p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  a Log-transformed  
Dependent variable is venture philanthropy practices.  Regression weights shown are coefficients obtained at the full model (Model 3) 
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Type I error, this is evidence that an interaction effect is present in Study 1 (Jaccard & 
Turrisi, 2003).  
In addition, to examine the regression errors, the model’s standardized residuals 
were plotted against the predicted values.  The plot reveals no extreme outliers. All of the 
standardized residuals are within three standard deviations of zero.  
 
Results of the Main Effects Model: Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices 
(Hypotheses 1–5) 
Table 4.1 displays the results of moderate regression for three models.  Model 1 
presents the results for the control variables when regressed on venture philanthropy 
practices.  In this base model, all control variables are statistically significant.  More 
specifically, the organization age (ß = -.14, p < 0.001) and the nonprofit status of funded 
social ventures (ß = -.37, p < 0.001) have negative effects on venture philanthropy 
practices.  As discussed in the section about correlations, these results are expected given 
that the literature repeatedly points out the majority of SIFs were created in the last two 
decades (Community Wealth Ventures, 2000, 2002), and as discussed in the section 
about the results in the correlation matrix, the equity investment approach is not possible 
if social ventures are nonprofit.  The prior literature (Letts et al., 1997) also stresses that 
SIFs often provide a larger amount of funding than do traditional foundations.  This 
implication from the literature matches the positive relationship between the organization 
size and venture philanthropy practices (ß = .23, p < 0.001).  Moreover, as per the control 
variables of the organization size and the nonprofit status of funded social ventures, the 
coefficient estimates remain significant in the same direction throughout analysis, 
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although the coefficient of the organization size is no longer significant in Models 2 and 
3.  
Model 2 in Table 4.1 tests the main effects by hypotheses 1 to 5 that relate SIFs’ 
EO and external institutional pressures with venture philanthropy practices.  As noted in 
the previous chapter, entrepreneurial posture is among the most frequently cited 
determinants that distinguish SIFs from their traditional counterparts (Fleishman, 2009; 
Prewitt, 2006b).  The prior literature of EO also relates strategic practices with 
organizations’ entrepreneurial posture (Covin & Slevin, 1991).  I expect, therefore, for 
the level of SIFs’ EO to be positively related to their venture philanthropy practices 
(hypothesis 1).  Accordingly, Model 2 within Table 4.1 presents a positive and significant 
relationship between EO and venture philanthropy practices (ß = .09, p < 0.01), providing 
support for hypothesis 1.  The variable remains significant and positive in the full model 
(Model 3), as well.   
Hypothesis 2 investigates an impact of SIFs’ legal structure on venture 
philanthropy practices, postulating a negative relationship between the nonprofit status 
and venture philanthropy practices.  Model 2 shows that the estimated coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant (ß = -.19, p < 0.001), which supports hypothesis 2.  
As shown in Model 3, this relationship likewise remains significant in the hypothesized 
direction throughout analysis and the negative effect becomes even stronger in the full 
model (ß = -.21, p < 0.001).  This confirms that the hypothesized effect is present.  
According to hypothesis 3, donors’ and investors’ demand for funding outcomes 
is likely to shape SIFs’ venture philanthropy practices, yet in a varying effect.  Donors’ 
and investors’ demand for social outcomes is likely to have a negative effect on venture 
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philanthropy practices (hypothesis 3a), whereas their demand for financial outcomes is 
positively related to venture philanthropy practices (hypothesis 3b).  The results in Table 
4.1 provide partial support for hypothesis 3.  The coefficient for donors’ and investors’ 
demand for financial outcomes (hypothesis 3b) is positive and statistically significant at 
the 0.001 level (ß = .30, p < 0.001), which supports hypothesis 3b.  The relationship 
remains positive and significant in the full model, also.  The coefficient for donors’ and 
investors’ demand for social outcomes, on the other hand, is positive (ß = .04), which is 
opposite of the direction posited by hypothesis 3a.  The coefficient also fails to achieve 
statistical significance.  The full model does not see the significant and negative 
coefficient estimates, either, and thus hypothesis 3a is not supported.   
Hypothesis 4 states that affiliation with grantmaker professional associations will 
negatively affect venture philanthropy practices (hypothesis 4a), whereas affiliation with 
venture capital professional associations will have a positive effect (hypothesis 4b).  
Results in Table 4.1 offer strong support for this hypothesis.  In Model 2, the coefficient 
for affiliation with grantmaker professional associations is -.10 and is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level, and the coefficient for affiliation with venture capital 
professional associations is .27 and is statistically significant at the 0.001 level.  Results 
in Model 3, which are deemed more conservative (Cohen et al., 2003), maintain the 
hypothesized relationships for affiliation with grantmaker professional associations (ß = -
.11, p < 0.001) and for affiliation with venture capital professional associations (ß = .26, 
p < 0.001), as well.  
Finally, hypothesis 5 expects a negative effect of the management team’s training 
in nonprofits (Hypothesis 5a) and a positive effect of the management team’s training in 
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business (Hypothesis 5b).  This hypothesis is partially supported.  Model 2 shows that the 
coefficient for the management team’s training in business is positive and statistically 
significant (ß = .11, p < 0.001), suggesting that hypothesis 5b is supported.  As shown in 
Model 3, this relationship remains the same throughout analysis (ß = .11, p < 0.001).  
However, Model 2 finds a positive relationship between the management team’s training 
in nonprofits and venture philanthropy practices (ß = .05), which is opposite to the 
hypothesized direction.  The result is not statistically significant, either.  In Model 3, the 
coefficient for the management team’s training in nonprofits attains marginal significance 
(p < 0.1), yet it is still positive.  As such, hypothesis 5a is not supported.   
To summarize, the main effects model shows a strong support for the hypotheses, 
with the results offering strong or partial support of all hypotheses (hypotheses 1 to 5).  It 
is particularly noteworthy that all hypotheses associated with venture capital institutional 
effects achieve strong support at the 0.001 level throughout analysis.  On the other hand, 
mixed results exist for the hypotheses testing the relationship between venture 
philanthropy practices and philanthropic institutional pressures.  These results will be 
discussed further in the subsequent chapter.   
 
Results of the Two-way Interaction Model: EO Moderating Effects on the 
Philanthropic Institutions-Venture Philanthropy Practices (Hypotheses 6–9) 
As aforementioned, moderated regression analysis should see the increment in R2 
by adding interaction terms to a regression equation containing main effects (Cohen & 
Cohen, 1983).  As seen in Model 3 within Table 4.1, the addition of the two-way 
  159 
interaction terms to the equation increases the explained variance in venture philanthropy 
practices (∆R2 = .02, p < 0.001).   
The two-way interaction effects were examined by testing hypotheses 6, 7, 8, and 
9.  These hypotheses postulate that SIFs’ EO moderates a negative effect of institutional 
pressures from the traditional philanthropic field on venture philanthropy practices.  
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 report results of the interaction effects.  First, hypothesis 6 implies that 
if a higher level of EO exists, the relationship between venture philanthropy practices and 
the nonprofit status changes from negative to positive.  As shown in Model 2 within 
Table 4.1, the coefficient for the nonprofit status is negative and statistically significant.  
Now, the full model shows that the interactive effect of SIFs’ EO and nonprofit status has 
a positive and marginally significant coefficient (ß = .06, p = .067).  This suggests that 
venture philanthropy practices is jointly determined by the interaction of entrepreneurial 
style and the organization’s legal structure.  Thus, hypothesis 6 receives support.    
However, hypotheses 7, 8, and 9 are not supported.  More specifically, the 
coefficient for the interaction between EO and affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations is statistically significant, but the direction is opposite to what hypothesis 8 
postulates (ß = -.11, p = .000).  The coefficients of interaction terms are negative and 
insignificant for two other philanthropic institution variables, i.e., donors’ and investors’ 
demand for social outcomes (ß = -.01, p = .894), and the management team’s training in 
nonprofits (ß = -.04, p = .232).  Again, these directions are opposite to the hypothesized 
directions, and as such, the results do not support hypotheses 7 and 9.  
A very small increment of R2 and adjusted R2 (∆R2 = .02) from the main effects 
model to the interaction model does not negate a possibility of an interaction effect 
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postulated by hypothesis 6.  According to Cohen et al. (2003), interactions typically 
account for only a few percentage points of variances over and above first-order effects in 
social science research.  By his Monte Carlo study, Evans (1985) also observes that an 
interaction term explaining 1 percent of the variance is likely to be significant.  In other 
words, when a genuine interaction exists, even under the most extreme conditions, the 
interaction effect usually explains at least 1 percent of the variance.  However, the 
interaction effect is likely to be insignificant if the main effects only absorb 10 percent of 
the dependent variable.  In my study, independent and control variables in the main 
effects model account for over 50 percent of the variance in the dependent variable.  
Thus, it is plausible to consider that the interaction effect is present in the relationship 
between SIFs’ EO and the nonprofit status.   
Nonetheless, to further investigate interaction effects on venture philanthropy 
practices, I performed several probing analyses: (1) the moderated multiple regression 
based on three sub-dimensions of EO (i.e., innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking) 
and (2) subgroup analysis (Sharma et al., 1981)17. 
 
                                                
17 Advocated by Aiken and West (1991), a simple slope analysis by plotting the interaction has been 
actively explored by the prior research on interaction effects (e.g., De Clercq et al., 2010; Miller & Wesley, 
2010; Richard, Barnett, Dwyer, & Chadwick, 2004; Stam & Elfring, 2008; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003).  
Put simply, we plot the interaction by defining the low level as one standard deviation from the mean and 
the high level as plus one standard deviation from the mean (Cohen et al., 2003).  I plotted the interaction, 
but did not include the result in this dissertation.  This is because of this artificial dichotomy, the use of this 
method was found to be highly debatable after I consulted with a member of my dissertation committee and 
a faculty member of the Department of Statistics at UNC at Greensboro.   
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Post Hoc Analyses on Interactions  
Analysis by EO Sub-dimension Measures 
As discussed in Chapter 2, EO is generally conceived as a unidimensional 
construct composed of three sub-dimensions—innovativeness, risk taking, and 
proactiveness—that must positively covary in order for EO to be manifested (Miller, 
1983).  As such, a most commonly employed EO measure is the Miller/Covin and Slevin 
(1989) scale developed on this conceptualization (Rauch et al., 2009).  My study also 
utilizes this Miller/Covin and Slevin scale to measure EO.   
Many studies applying EO to the nonprofit context (Cools & Vermeulen, 2008; 
Guo, Shockley, & Tang, 2009; Morris, Coombes, Schindehutte, & Allen, 2007; Pearce, 
Fritz, & Davis, 2010) stress a distinct manner in which EO manifests within nonprofit 
organizations.  For instance, Pearce et al. (2010) find that a positive relationship with 
performance exists in the dimensions of  innovativeness and autonomy dimensions, but 
not in proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness, or risk seeking.  Qualitative research by 
Guo et al. (2009) underscores that the individual dimensions of EO have different 
antecedents and consequences, depending on the environmental context.  Findings of 
these prior studies collectively suggest it is plausible to examine effects on venture 
philanthropy practices in the different sub-dimensions constituting EO.  Given these, the 
effects on venture philanthropy practices were analyzed in and compared across four 
measures of EO, i.e., the aggregated EO, innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking.  
Table 4.3 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the 
variables used for three different measures of EO.  The correlations here are generally 
modest.  The VIF ranged from 1.057 to 2.136 in the innovativeness measure, from 1.057 
  162 
to 2.049 in the proactiveness measure, and from 1.057 to 2.080 in the risk taking 
measure, demonstrating that all VIF values in three measures are well below the cutoff of 
10 recommended by Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1985).  Tolerance figures of 
variables range from .486 to .946 in the innovativeness measure, from .427 to .946 in the 
proactiveness measure, and from .491 to .946 in the risk taking measure.  All tolerance 
values are well above critical values, too.  Thus, multicollinearity should not be an issue 
in the sub-dimension measures.  
Table 4.4 highlights a comparison of the results from moderated regression 
analyses in four different measures.  The more detailed results of the innovativeness, the 
proactiveness, and the risk taking models are found in Appendixes 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively.  The comparison in Table 4.4 demonstrates an overall similarity of 
coefficients R2 and adjusted R2, in four measures.  This was expected, given that many 
prior studies find the salient dimensions of EO are highly intercorrelated with each other 
(Rauch et al., 2009).  Most importantly for my investigation about hypothesis 6, 
interaction terms in most sub-dimension measures have a significant and positive 
coefficient, which is consistent with hypothesis 6.  More specifically, the coefficient for 
the nonprofit status and innovativeness is .11 (p < 0.01) and that for the nonprofit status 
and proactiveness is .06 (p < 0.1).  However, the risk taking measure finds different 
results: The interaction effect for risk taking and the nonprofit status is not consistent 
with the hypothesis, but that of risk taking and donors’ demand for social outcomes is 
significant in the hypothesized direction (ß = .06, p < 0.01).  This result, then, directed 
me to the subgroup analysis.  
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Table 4.3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations in the Different Measures: Innovativeness, Proactiveness, and Risk 
Taking Dimensions  
 Innovativeness Proactiveness Risk taking 
Mean 4.56  5.10  4.87  
S.D. .95  .97  1.13  
1. Venture philanthropy practices .12 ** .20 ** .013  
2. Innovativeness/Proactiveness/Risk taking       
3. The nonprofit status .11 ** -.10 ** -.03  
4. Donor/investor demand for social outcomes .12 ** -.01  .01  
5. Donor/investor demand for financial outcomes -.02 ** .03  .01  
6. Affiliation with grantmaker professional associations -.02  -.01  .03  
7. Affiliation with venture capital professional associations .07 * .19 ** .18 ** 
8. Management team’s training in nonprofits .12 ** .21 ** .03  
9. Management team’s training in business .16 ** .13 ** -.06 * 
10. Organization age -.05  .01  -.08 * 
11. Organization assetsa .03  .06 * -.07 * 
12. Nonprofit status of funded social venture .08 * .01  .07 * 
13. EO x nonprofit status -.14 ** .08 * .04   
14. EO x donor/investor demand for social outcomes -.21 ** .23 ** -.06 * 
15. EO x affiliation with grantmaker professional associations -.01  .01  -.05  
16. EO x management team’s training in nonprofits  -.17 ** -.10 ** .02  
n = 146   * p < .05       ** p < .01  a Log-transformed   
Two-tailed tests.               The mean and standard deviation are based on the original variables, which are not mean-centered.  
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Table 4.4. Comparison of Results: Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices by 4 Measures 
  Aggregated 
EO  
 Innovativeness 
 
 Proactiveness 
 
 Risk taking 
 
 
           
Base Model 
Organization age .01  .01  -.01  -.01  
Organization sizea .16 ∗∗∗ .13 ∗∗∗ .16 ∗∗∗ .17 ∗∗∗ 
The nonprofit status of funded social ventures -.26 ∗∗∗ -.25 ∗∗∗ -.25 ∗∗∗ -.25 ∗∗∗ 
 R2 .19  .19  .19  .19  
 Adjusted R2 .19  .19  .19  .19  
          
 
 
Main Effects 
Model 
EO/each sub-dimension .09 ∗∗ .13 ∗∗∗ .09 ∗∗ -.01  
The nonprofit status -.21 ∗∗∗ -.23 ∗∗∗ -.20 ∗∗∗ -.18 ∗∗∗ 
Donor/investor demand for social outcomes .05  .05 † .06 † .06 † 
Donor/investor demand for financial outcomes .30 ∗∗∗ .29 ∗∗∗ .30 ∗∗∗ .30 ∗∗∗ 
Affiliation with grantmaker professional associations -.11 ∗∗∗ -.09 ∗∗ -.10 ∗∗ -.12 ∗∗∗ 
Affiliation with venture capital professional 
associations 
.26 ∗∗∗ .25 ∗∗∗ .26 ∗∗∗ .31 ∗∗∗ 
Management team’s training in nonprofits  .06 † .05 † .05  .07 ∗∗ 
Management team’s training in business  .11 ∗∗∗ .08 ∗∗ .11 ∗∗∗ .11 ∗∗∗ 
           R2 .51  .51  .51  .50  
 Adjusted R2 .50  .51  .50  .50  
 ∆R2 .32  .32  .32  .31  
          
Two-way 
Interaction 
Model 
EO/sub-dimension x the nonprofit status .06 † .11 ∗∗ .06 † -.06 † 
EO/sub-dimension x donor/investor demand for 
social outcomes 
-.01  -.02  -.03  .06 ∗ 
EO/sub-dimension x affiliation with grantmaker 
professional associations  
-.11 ∗∗∗ -.14 ∗∗∗ -.08 ∗∗ -.01  
EO/sub-dimension x management training in 
nonprofits 
-.04  -.03  -.04  -.01  
           R2 .53  .54  .52  .51  
 Adjusted R2 .52  .53  .51  .50  
 ∆R2 .02  .03  .01  .01  
n = 146   † p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  a Log-transformed    
Dependent variable is venture philanthropy practices.   Regression weights shown are coefficients obtained at the full model (Model 3). 
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The Subgroup Analysis 
 Sharma, Durand and Gur-Arie (1981) advocate that one should use both 
moderated regression and subgroup analysis in tandem to identify the presence of 
moderator variables.  The issue of subgroup analysis, however, was pointed out, because 
artificial dichotomization of a quantitative predictor leads to substantial power loss in 
tests of moderators (Aguinis & Gottfredson, 2010; Cohen et al., 2003).  Newsom, 
Prigerson, Schulz, and Reynolds (2003) also argue that the subgroup analysis does not 
properly represent how the focal predictor variable’s effect varies as a function of the 
moderator.  Nonetheless, the prior literature on EO has used the subgroup analysis as part 
of the post-hoc tests combined with the moderated regression (Covin et al., 1997; De 
Clercq, Dimov, & Thongpapanl, 2010).  Following these studies, my study also used the 
subgroup analysis as a post-hoc analytical method to confirm the presence of the 
interaction effect in the present study.  
To conduct the subgroup analysis, I first split the sample at the median value of 
EO (4.8).  Then, correlations were computed between venture philanthropy practices and 
the nonprofit status.  In the group with a lower level of EO, the correlation between these 
variables is r = -.63 (p < .01, two-tailed test).  In the group with a higher level of EO, this 
correlation is r = -.34 (p < .01, two-tailed test).  Using a Fisher z-transformation test 
(Arnold, 1982), z was computed, suggesting that these two correlation coefficients differ 
significantly (p < .01, two-tailed test).  The result of a Fisher z-transformation test implies 
that when the level of EO is higher, the negative impact of the nonprofit status on venture 
philanthropy is less severe.  This finding offers support for hypothesis 6, which advocates 
a presence of the interaction effect between EO and the nonprofit status on venture 
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philanthropy practices.  To underscore the results of my other hypotheses about 
interactions for Study 1, I conducted a Fisher z-transformation test to compare 
correlations between venture philanthropy practices and three other philanthropic 
institution variables (i.e., donors’ demand for social outcomes, affiliation with 
grantmaker professional associations, and the management team’s training in nonprofits). 
The results of a two-tailed test for these correlations fail to achieve the significant level.  
To summarize, the subgroup analysis provides the implications consistent with the results 
of the two-way interaction model of my hypothesis test.     
 
Study 2: Factors Affecting Social And Financial Performance 
This section discusses the results of Study 2, which analyzes main and moderating 
effects on two dependent variables—social performance and financial performance.  I 
employed moderated regression to estimate a separate set of three models (Model 1/the 
base model; Model 2/the main effects model; and Model 3/the full model) for each 
dependent variable.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Study 2 began to obtain the descriptive statistics.  The means, standard deviations, 
and correlations of the variables used for analysis on social performance are displayed in 
Table 3.17 and for analysis on financial performance in Table 3.18 in Chapter 3.  Recall 
that the correlations between a dependent variable (venture philanthropy practices) and 
all independent variables were consistent with arguments in support of hypotheses and 
were statistically significant in Study 1.  On the other hand, the correlations between 
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dependent variables (social versus financial performance) and independent variables do 
not offer a strong consistency with the implications of hypotheses in Study 2.  These 
correlations are very modest, ranging from r = -.25 to r = .14 in social performance 
analysis and from r = .06 to r = .19 in financial performance analysis. 
Table 3.17 illustrates that social performance is correlated with most independent 
variables in the hypothesized direction, but significant correlations exist only with the 
philanthropic institution variables.  These variables are the nonprofit status (r = .08, p < 
.05), donors’ and investors’ demand for social outcomes (r = .14, p < .05), affiliation with 
grantmaker professional associations (r = .08, p < .05), and the management team’s 
training in nonprofits (r = .21, p < .01).  Social performance is negatively correlated with 
two out of three venture capital institution variables, i.e., donors’ and investors’ demand 
for financial outcomes (r = -.03) and the management team’s training in business (r = -
.06).  Although these correlations are in the hypothesized direction, they are not 
statistically significant.   
The results in the correlation matrix for financial performance are less favorable.  
Table 3.18 shows that financial performance is correlated in the hypothesized direction 
with four independent variables, that is, the EO (r = .05), donors’ and investors’ demand 
for social outcomes (r = -.06), donors’ and investors’ demand for financial outcomes (r = 
.01), and the management team’s training in business (r = .19), among which only the 
management team’s training is significant (p < .01).  Three interaction terms (EO x the 
nonprofit status, EO x donors’ and investors’ demand for social outcomes, EO x 
affiliation with grantmaker professional associations) have modest correlations with 
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financial performance in the hypothesized direction, but none of these is statistically 
significant.  
 
Results of Hypotheses Test 
Model Assessment 
I employed the same analytical technique as that in Study 1, i.e., moderated 
multiple regression analysis.  Three regression models (Models 1 to 3) were estimated for 
both social performance analysis and financial performance analysis to investigate the 
unique contribution that each subset of predictors made toward both the explanation of 
the dependent variable and individual parameter estimates.  The independent and 
moderating variables were again mean-centered to limit a threat of multicollinearity.  
Table 4.5 and Table 4.7 present standardized coefficients in Models 1 to 3, testing effects 
on social performance (hypotheses 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21 and 22) and those on 
financial performance (hypotheses 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 23, 25 and 26), respectively.  In 
addition, Table 4.6 and Table 4.8 are included here to report further details of the test 
results.    
I examined a change in R2 and adjusted R2 in three models.  The results of social 
performance analysis (Table 4.5) and financial performance (Table 4.7) both present the 
increment in R2 when an interaction term is added to a regression equation of main 
effects, following suggestions by Cohen and Cohen (1983).  However, compared to the 
increments in Study 1, the values and the increments of R2 are considerably small in 
Study 2.  In social performance analysis, both R2 and adjusted R2 of the base model are 
.09 (p < .001), indicating that the control variables account for only 9 percent of the 
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variance in social performance, which is 10 percent lower than the variance explained in 
venture philanthropy practices in Study 1.  R2 and adjusted R2 of the base model for a 
financial performance study are even smaller (R2 = .01, adjusted R2 = .01).  The 
increments of R2 in Model 2 are only ∆R2 = .08 for a social performance study (p < .001) 
and ∆R2 = .06 for a financial performance study (p < .001), as opposed to a large 
increment in Study 1 (∆R2 = .32, p < .001).  Model 3 in Table 4.5 (for social 
performance) and Table 4.7 (for financial performance) shows an increment of ∆R2 = .01 
(p < .001) for social performance and of ∆R2 = .01 (p < .001) for financial performance.  
Although an interaction term explaining 1 percent of the variance can be significant, it is 
only so if the preceding main effects use about 80 percent of the variance in the 
dependent variable (Evans, 1985).  As seen in Table 4.7, the main effects of social 
performance and financial performance research absorb less than 6 percent of the 
dependent variables.  As such, the increment of R2 indicates that interaction terms are 
likely to be insignificant in the regression analysis on financial performance.  With this 
prediction, let us now turn to the results of hypothesis tests in Study 2.  I will first review 
the results of social performance and then discuss the results of financial performance 
analysis.  
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Table 4.5. Results of Moderated Regression Analysis: Effects on Social Performance  
 
Variables 
Model 1 
(Base Model) 
Model 2 
(Main Effects Model) 
Model 3 
(Two-way Interaction 
Model) 
Control         
 Organization age .16 *** .11 ** .12 ** 
 Organization sizea -.28 *** -.25 *** -.26 *** 
 The nonprofit status of funded social ventures -.13 *** -.17 *** -.16 *** 
 
Main effects  
      
 EO    -.04  -.04  
 The nonprofit status   -.03  -.02  
 Donor/investor demand for social outcomes   .17 *** .17 *** 
 Donor/investor demand for financial outcomes   .07 † .07 † 
 Affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations 
  .06  .04  
 Affiliation with venture capital professional 
associations 
  .09 * .12 ** 
 Management team’s training in nonprofits   .23 *** .23 *** 
 Management team’s training in business    -.04  -.06 † 
 
Two-way interaction 
      
 EO x donor/investor demand for financial 
outcomes 
    .03  
 EO x affiliation with venture capital professional 
associations  
    -.06 * 
 EO x management training in business     .05  
        
 R2 .09 *** .17 *** .18 *** 
 Adjusted R2 .09 *** .15 *** .16 *** 
 ∆R2   .08 *** .01 *** 
 F-statistics 25.433 *** 13.564 *** 11,133 *** 
n = 146   † p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  a Log-transformed 
Dependent variable is social performance.  Standardized coefficients are reported.      
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Table 4.6.  Results of Moderated Regression Analysis: Social Performance, EO, and Venture Capital Institution Pressures 
 
 
Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Standar-
dized 
Coefficients 
 t-
statistics 
Sig. R2 Adjusted 
R2 
∆R2 F-
statistics  
 Variables B  S.E. Beta        
 (Constant) 4.86  .15  *** 32.377 .000     
Controls 
Organization age .00  .00 .12 ** 2.909 .004 .09 .09  25,433*** 
Organization sizea -.15  .02 -.26 *** -7.088 .000     
The nonprofit status of funded social ventures -.23  .05 -.16 *** -4.205 .000     
 
Main  
Effects  
 
EO  -.03  .03 -.04  -1.175 .240 .17 .15 .08 13,564*** 
The nonprofit status -.04  .10 -.02  -.381 .703     
Donor/investor demand for social results .13  .03 .17 *** 4.255 .000     
Donor/investor demand for financial results .04  .02 .07 † 1.777 .076     
Affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations 
.02  .02 .04  .927 .354     
Affiliation with venture capital professional 
associations 
.07  .03 .12 ** 2.857 .004     
Management team’s training in nonprofits .09  .02 .23 *** 5.779 .000     
Management team’s training in business  -.03  .02 -.06 † -1.680 .093     
EO x donor/investor demand for financial 
outcomes 
.02  .02 .03  .907 .365 .18 .16 .01 11,133 
EO x affiliation with venture capital 
professional associations 
-.06  .03 -.06 * -2.070 .039     
EO x management training in business .02  .02 .05  1.334 .183     
n = 146   † p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  a Log-transformed  
Dependent variable is social performance.  
Regression weights shown are coefficients obtained at the full model (Model 3). 
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Table 4.7. Results of Moderated Regression Analysis: Effects on Financial Performance  
 
Variables 
Model 1 
(Base Model) 
Model 2 
(Main Effects Model) 
Model 3 
(Two-way Interaction 
Model) 
Control         
 Organization age .09 * .07  .07  
 Organization sizea -.04  -.07 † -.07 † 
 The nonprofit status of funded social ventures -.01  -.02  -.02  
 
Main effects  
      
 EO    .06 † .06  
 The nonprofit status   .02  .01  
 Donor/investor demand for social outcomes   -.10 * -.10 * 
 Donor/investor demand for financial outcomes   -.001  -.01  
 Affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations 
  .12 ** .12 ** 
 Affiliation with venture capital professional 
associations 
  -.12 ** -.12 ** 
 Management team’s training in nonprofits    -.03  -.02  
 Management team’s training in business    .23 *** .22 *** 
 
Two-way interaction 
      
 EO x the nonprofit status     .03  
 EO x donor/investor demand for social outcomes     .01  
 EO x affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations  
    .01  
 EO x management training in nonprofits     -.04  
        
 R2 .01  .07 *** .08 *** 
 Adjusted R2 .01  .06 *** .05 *** 
 ∆R2   .06 *** .01  
 F-statistics 1,913  4,970 *** 3,713 *** 
n = 146   † p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  a Log-transformed 
Dependent variable is financial performance.  Standardized coefficients are reported.      
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Table 4.8. Results of Moderated Regression Analysis: Financial Performance, EO, and Philanthropic Institution Pressures 
 
 
Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Standar-
dized 
Coefficients 
 t-
statistics 
Sig. R2 Adjusted 
R2 
∆R2 F-
statistics  
 Variables B  S.E. Beta        
 (Constant) 3.08  .17  *** 17.965 .000     
Controls 
Organization age .00  .00 .07  1.521 .129 .01 .01  1,913 
Organization sizea -.04  .02 -.07 † -1.682 .093     
The nonprofit status of funded social ventures -.03  .06 -.02  -.528 .598     
 
Main  
Effects  
 
EO  .05  .03 .06  1.629 .104 .07 .06 .06 4,970*** 
The nonprofit status .02  .12 .01  .188 .851     
Donor/investor demand for social outcomes -.08  .04 -.10 * -2.182 .029     
Donor/investor demand for financial outcomes -.01  .02 -.01  -.065 .948     
Affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations 
.06  .02 .12 ** 2.730 .006     
Affiliation with venture capital professional 
associations 
-.08  .03 -.12 ** -2.773 .006     
Management team’s training in nonprofits  -.01  .02 -.02  -.519 .604     
Management team’s training in business  .10  .02 .22 *** 5.836 .000     
Two-way 
Interaction 
EO x the nonprofits status .09  .12 .03  .772 .441 .08 .05 .01 3,713*** 
EO x donor/investor demand for social 
outcomes 
.01  .04 .01  .259 .796     
EO x affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations  
.01  .02 .01  .251 .802     
EO x management training in nonprofits -.02  .02 -.04  -.876 .381     
n = 146   † p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  a Log-transformed  
Dependent variable is financial performance.  
Regression weights shown are coefficients obtained at the full model (Model 3). 
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Results of the Main Effects Model: Effects on Social Performance (Hypotheses 10, 12, 
14, 16 and 18) 
Table 4.5 displays the results of three models testing hypotheses for social 
performance research.  All three control variables in the base model have statistically 
significant coefficients.  More specifically, the coefficients for the organization size (ß = -
.28, p < 0.001) and the nonprofit status of funded social ventures (ß = -.13, p < 0.001) are 
negative and statistically significant, whereas the coefficient for the organization age (ß = 
.16, p < 0.001) is positive and statistically significant.  The coefficient estimates of all 
control variables remain significant in the same direction throughout analysis.  The 
negative coefficient for the nonprofit status of funded social ventures is somewhat 
surprising, because one can relate superior social performance with funding nonprofit 
social ventures rather than for-profit ventures.   
Model 2 offers the assessment of hypotheses 10, 12, 14, 16 and 18 that investigate 
main effects of EO and institutional pressures on social performance.  A coefficient for 
EO (hypothesis 10) is neither statistically significant nor consistent with the hypothesis (ß 
= -.04, n.s.).  This relationship remains unchanged in the full model (ß = -.04, n.s.), 
suggesting that hypothesis 10 is not supported.  Considering that many prior studies find 
a positive relationship between EO and performance (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001; Wiklund 
& Shepherd, 2003, 2005), this result was not highly expected.  I will discuss results of 
additional analysis on the relationship of performance-EO in the last section of this 
chapter.  
Hypothesis 12 postulates a positive relationship between the nonprofit status and 
social performance.  Recall from the correlation matrix in Table 3.16 that the nonprofit 
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status was significantly and positively correlated with social performance.  Unlike the 
correlation, the estimated coefficient is neither statistically significant, nor positive (ß = -
.03, n.s.).  This negative coefficient remains insignificant in the two-way interaction 
model (ß = -.02, n.s.).  As such, hypothesis 12 fails to receive support.   
Hypothesis 14 argues that donors’ and investors’ demand for funding outcomes 
should have a positive effect on social performance (hypothesis 14a), but donors’ and 
investors’ demand for financial outcomes should have a negative effect on it (hypothesis 
14b).  As shown in Table 4.5, donors’ and investors’ demand for social outcomes has a 
positive and significant coefficient in both the main effects model and in the interaction 
model (ß = .17, p < 0.001), offering support for hypothesis 14a.  On the other hand, 
donors’ and investors’ demand for financial outcomes has a marginally significant, yet 
positive, coefficient in both models (ß = .07, p < 0.1), suggesting that hypothesis 14b is 
not supported.   
Hypotheses 16 postulate that positive relationship exists between social 
performance and affiliation with traditional grantmaker professional associations 
(hypothesis 16a), whereas a negative relationship exists between social performance and 
affiliation with venture capital professional associations (hypothesis 16b).  Results in 
Table 4.5 do not offer support for this hypothesis.  In the main effects model, the 
coefficient for affiliation with grantmaker professional associations is in the hypothesized 
direction, but it fails to achieve a statistically significant level (ß = .06, n.s.).  The 
coefficient remains statistically insignificant in the two-way interaction model.  On the 
other hand, the coefficient for affiliation with venture capital professional associations is 
statistically significant, but the direction is not consistent with the hypothesized direction 
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in the main effects model (ß = .09, p < 0.05) and the interaction model (ß = .12, p < 0.01), 
suggesting that the hypothesis fails to receive support.   
Hypothesis 18 suggests a positive effect of the management team’s training in 
nonprofits (hypothesis 18a) and a negative effect of the management team’s training in 
business (hypothesis 18b).  The coefficient for training in nonprofits is positive and 
statistically significant throughout analysis (ß = .23, p < 0.001), suggesting that 
hypothesis 18a is supported.  The coefficient for training in business is in the 
hypothesized direction (ß = -.04), yet is not statistically significant.  However, the 
coefficient turns out to be marginally significant in the hypothesized direction in the 
interaction model (ß = -.06, p < 0.1), suggesting that hypothesis 18b receives support in 
the most conservative model.   
In sum, the main effects model for social performance analysis provides mixed 
results with support for hypothesis 14a (donors’ and investors’ demand for social 
outcomes), 18a (the management team’s training in nonprofits) and 18b (the management 
team’s training in business).     
 
Results of the Two-way Interaction Model: EO Moderating Effects on the Venture 
Capital Institutions-Social Performance Relationship (Hypotheses 20–22) 
I estimated the two-way interaction model by testing hypotheses 20, 21, and 22.  
Here, the negative effects on social performance originate from the venture capital field.  
According to hypotheses 20, 21, and 22, if a higher level of EO interacts, the negative 
effects of the venture capital institution turn positive.  As shown in Table 4.5, the two-
way interaction model examines three venture capital institution variables, i.e., donors’ 
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and investors’ demand for financial outcomes (hypothesis 20), affiliation with venture 
capital professional associations (hypothesis 21), and the management team’s training in 
business (hypothesis 22).  Two interaction terms have a positive coefficient, but fail to 
reach a statistically significant level: EO x donors’ and investors’ demand for financial 
outcomes (ß = .03, n.s.) and EO x management team’s training in business (ß = .05, n.s.).  
The interaction term of EO and affiliation with venture capital associations obtained a 
marginally significant coefficient, but is not in the hypothesized direction (ß = -.06, p < 
0.1).  Given these results, hypotheses 20, 21, and 22 are not supported.  
 
Results of the Main Effects Model: Effects on Financial Performance (Hypotheses 11, 
13, 15, 17 and 19) 
The results of hypotheses for financial performance analysis are displayed in 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8.  Table 4.7 overviews the coefficients estimated from three models.  
Model 1 finds only a statistically significant coefficient for the organization age (ß = .09, 
p < 0.05).  Although some coefficients are not statistically significant, it is noteworthy 
that the direction of coefficients for all control variables remains the same across 
different models for social performance analysis and financial performance analysis.   
Hypothesis 11 postulates that EO and financial performance are positively related.  
The main effects model reports that EO has a positive and marginally significant 
coefficient (ß = .06, p < 0.1).  The coefficient, however, fails to maintain the significant 
level in the full model.  As such, hypothesis 11 is partially supported only in the main 
effects model.   
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Hypothesis 13 argues a negative effect of the nonprofit status on financial 
performance.  This hypothesis is not supported, because the coefficient is neither 
significant nor consistent with the hypothesized direction.   
Hypothesis 15 investigates a negative impact of donors’ and investors’ demand 
for social outcomes and a positive impact of donors’ and investors’ demand for financial 
outcomes on financial performance.  This hypothesis is partially supported.  The 
coefficient for donors’ and investors’ demand for social outcomes is statistically 
significant in the hypothesized direction (ß = -.10, p < 0.05) and this remains the same 
throughout analysis, providing support to hypothesis 15a.  On the contrary, donors’ and 
investors’ demand for financial outcomes is neither significant nor consistent with the 
hypothesis, failing to support hypothesis 15b.   
Hypothesis 17 assesses impacts of affiliation with professional associations on 
financial performance.  The coefficients for both affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations (ß = .12) and affiliation with venture capital professional associations (ß = -
.12) are statistically significant at the level of .01 throughout analysis.  However, the 
direction of coefficients for both predictors is opposite the hypothesized directions, and 
as such, hypothesis 17 fails to receive support.  
Hypothesis 19 finds partial support.  The management team’s training in business 
is in the hypothesized direction at the significant level of .001 in the main effects model 
(ß = .23, p < 0.001).  This direction remains the same in the full model (ß = .22, p < 
0.001), offering support for hypothesis 19b.  Hypothesis 19a, however, is not supported.  
The coefficient for the management team’s training in nonprofits is not significant 
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throughout analysis, although the direction is consistent with the hypothesis (ß = -.03 in 
the main effects model, ß = -.02 in the interaction model).  
 
Results of the Two-way Interaction Model: EO Moderating Effects on the 
Philanthropic Institutions-Financial Performance Relationship (Hypotheses 23–26) 
I tested hypotheses 23, 24, 25 and 26 by estimating the two-way interaction model 
for moderating effects on financial performance.  Four different factors of the traditional 
philanthropic field, which negatively influence financial performance, were proposed: (1) 
the nonprofit status; (2) donors’ and investors’ demand for social outcomes; (3) affiliation 
with grantmaker professional associations; and (4) the management team’s training in 
nonprofits.  Accordingly, I created four interaction terms by multiplying the centered 
variable of EO and each of these institutional factors.  These interaction terms were then 
entered in the moderated regression analysis.   
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show none of the four interaction terms is statistically 
significant.  It is pointed out that the coefficients for three out of four interaction terms 
are in the hypothesized direction (p = .03 for EO x the nonprofit status; p = .01 for EO x 
donors’ and investors’ demand for social outcomes; p = .01 for EO x affiliation with 
grantmaker professional associations).  Values of the adjusted R2 decreased, however, 
from the main effects model to the full model as shown in Table 4.7.  This undermines a 
fit for the model and thus negates a possibility of interaction effects in this model (Cohen 
et al., 2003).   
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Analysis on EO-Performance Relationships by EO Sub-dimension Measures 
Despite the varying magnitude of the relationships, cumulative knowledge in the 
entrepreneurship field suggests that EO leads to higher business performance (Rauch et 
al., 2009).  As Table 4.9 shows, the prior research in the nonprofit context finds mixed 
results about the relationship between EO and performance, also.  
 
Table 4.9. Selected Studies About the EO-Performance Relationships in the 
Nonprofit Context 
Authors Sample Findings about EO-performance 
relationships 
Coombes, Morris, Allen 
& Webb (2011) 
140 arts and culture 
nonprofits  
• EO is associated with social 
performance, but not financial 
performance. 
Helm & Andresson 
(2010) 
108 nonprofits in Kansas 
City  
• EO is not related to revenue measures 
and nonrevenue measures of 
performance. 
Morris, Coombes, 
Schindehutte & Allen 
(2007) 
145 social service 
nonprofits in Upstate 
New York   
 
• External environment does not moderate 
the EO-performance relationship. 
• EO is not associated with financial 
performance. 
Pearce, Fritz & Davis 
(2010) 
252 religious 
congregations in MN, 
PA, NE, and NC 
 
• EO has positive effect on performance. 
• Innovativeness, autonomy and 
environmental munificence are positively 
related to performance, but 
proactiveness, competitive 
aggressiveness, and risk seeking are not. 
 
 
Interestingly, Morris and his co-authors consistently have reached a conclusion that EO is 
not associated with superior financial performance, whereas it is associated with social 
performance (Coombes et al., 2011; Morris et al., 2007).  Recall that in my study, the 
result is quite different.  Pearce et al. (2010) also dictates that the relationship with 
performance varies across salient sub-dimensions of EO.   
Given these varying results of prior studies, I examined how EO is associated 
with social versus financial performance in three sub-dimension measures.  Table 4.10 
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lists the correlations and coefficients for social performance and financial performance in 
different measures of EO.  The results offer strong support for a notion that proactiveness 
is positively and significantly associated with both social and financial performance.  
Risk taking has a significant and negative—not positive, as hypothesized—impact on 
social performance.  
 
Table 4.10. Comparison of Results: Analysis on Effects on Social and Financial 
Performance by 4 Measures  
 Aggregated 
EO  
Innovativeness 
 
Proactiveness 
 
Risk- 
taking 
Social performance 
Correlation with 
EO/sub-dimension  
r = -.01 
(n.s.) 
r = -.04 
(n.s.) 
r = .11 
(p < 0.01) 
r = -.08 
(p < 0.05) 
Coefficient from the 
interaction model 
p = -.04 
(n.s.) 
p = -.03 
(n.s.) 
p = .08 
(p < .05) 
p = -.11 
(p < .01) 
Financial performance 
Correlation with 
EO/sub-dimension 
r = .05 
(n.s.) 
r = .01 
(n.s.) 
r = .10 
(p < 0.01) 
r = .001 
(n.s.) 
Coefficient from the 
interaction model 
p = .06 
(p < 0.1) 
p = .01 
(n.s.) 
p = .13 
(p < 0.05) 
p = .04 
(n.s.) 
 
 
Summary 
This chapter examines and assesses the model fit and results of the moderated 
regression analyses on main effects and moderating effects on SIFs’ venture philanthropy 
behaviors (Study 1) and social and financial performance (Study 2).  The chapter also 
discusses results of several post-hoc analyses of this dissertation such as analyses on EO 
subdimension measures and a subgroup analysis.  The next chapter will first review the 
results of all analyses introduced in the current chapter, and then propose theoretical 
implications and contributions, methodological limitations, and suggestions for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 Linking the new institutionalism to entrepreneurial orientation (EO), this 
dissertation was built from empirical analyses of 146 organizations in the emerging field, 
illustrating the institutional duality—the SIF field shaped by two contrasting mature 
institutions, namely traditional philanthropy and mainstream venture capitalism.  This 
chapter begins by summarizing the results for two empirical studies, followed by 
discussing theoretical implications and contributions to nonprofit and philanthropic 
studies, social entrepreneurship, the new institutionalism, and EO.  The chapter concludes 
with an examination on the study’s limitations and directions for future research. 
 
Summary of The Results 
 A total of 26 hypotheses were developed and tested by two studies: Study 1 
investigating effects on venture philanthropy practices (hypotheses 1–9); and Study 2 
investigating effects on social performance and financial performance (hypotheses 10–
26).  Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 display the results of hypotheses testing for main effects 
and moderating effects, respectively.  These tables show whether (1) the hypotheses were 
“supported” (i.e., a coefficient is significant in the hypothesized direction); (2) the 
hypotheses were “not supported” (i.e., a coefficient is significant but the direction is not 
consistent with a hypothesis); or (3) the results were “not significant (n.s.)” with the 
direction “consistent” or “not consistent” with a hypothesized direction.  
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Table 5.1. A Summary of Comparative Results: Main Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices (Study 1) and Social and 
Financial Performance (Study 2)  
 
Theoretical perspective 
 
Independent variable 
Study 1 Study 2 
Venture 
philanthropy 
practices 
Social performance Financial 
performance 
EO  EO H1 (+) H10 (+) H11 (+) 
   Supported n.s. (direction is not 
consistent) 
Supported 
Regulative  Attribute The nonprofit status H2 (-) H12 (+) H13 (-) 
   Supported n.s. (direction is not 
consistent) 
n.s. (direction is not 
consistent) 
Regulative  Linkage Donors’/investors’ demand for 
social outcomes 
H3a (-) H14a (+) H15a (-) 
  n.s. (direction is not 
consistent) 
Supported Supported 
Donors’/investors’ demand for 
financial outcomes 
H3b (+) H14b (-) H15b a (+) 
Supported Not supported n.s. (direction is not 
consistent) 
Normative  Linkage Affiliation with grantmaker 
professional associations 
H4a (-) H16a (+) H17a (-) 
Supported n.s. (direction is 
consistent) 
Not supported 
Affiliation with venture capital 
professional associations 
H4b (+) H16b (-) H17b a (+) 
Supported Not supported Not supported 
Normative  Attribute Management team’s training in 
nonprofits 
H5a (-) H18a (+) H19a (-) 
Not supported Supported n.s. (direction is 
consistent) 
Management team’s training in 
business 
H5b (+) H18b (-) H19b (+) 
Supported Supported Supported 
The signs within the parentheses indicate the direction of the relationship between a dependent variable (DV) and an independent variable (IV).  The plus (+) 
indicates that IV and DV are positively related and the minus (-) indicates that IV and DV are negatively related. 
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Table 5.2. A Summary of Comparative Results: Moderating Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices (Study 1) and Social 
and Financial Performance (Study 2)  
 
Theoretical perspective 
 
2-way interaction term 
Study 1 Study 2 
Venture 
philanthropy 
practices 
Social 
performance 
Financial 
performance 
EO -Regulative Attribute EO x the nonprofit status H6 (+) N/A H23 (+) 
Supported (Not tested) n.s. (direction is 
consistent) 
EO -Regulative Linkage EO x donors’/investors’ demand 
for outcomes 
H7 (+) H20 (+) H24 (+) 
n.s. (direction is 
not consistent) 
n.s. (direction is 
consistent) 
n.s. (direction is 
consistent) 
EO -Normative Linkage EO x affiliation with professional 
associations 
H8 (+) H21 (+) H25 (+) 
Not supported Not supported n.s. (direction is 
consistent) 
EO -Normative Attribute EO x management team’s training H9 (+) H22 (+) H26 (+) 
n.s. (direction is 
not consistent) 
n.s. (direction is 
consistent) 
n.s. (direction is 
not consistent) 
The signs within the parentheses indicate the direction of the relationship between a dependent variable (DV) and an independent variable (IV).  The plus (+) 
indicates that IV and DV are positively related and the minus (-) indicates that IV and DV are negatively related. 
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Results for the Main Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices (Study 1) and on 
Social and Financial Performance (Study 2)  
 Main effects analyses were conducted to answer the first guiding question of this 
dissertation: “Do EO and/or institutional pressures independently affect practices and 
performance of organizations embedded in the dual institutions?”  To answer this 
question, models based on two sets of dependent variables were analyzed: (1) venture 
philanthropy practices (Study 1); and (2) social and financial performance (Study 2).    
 As seen in Table 5.1, Study 1 lent strong support to six out of eight hypotheses 
tested for analysis on main effects of EO and institutional pressures.  It is noteworthy that 
EO and all regulative and normative variables of the venture capital institution (donors’ 
and investors’ demand for financial outcomes, affiliation with venture capital 
professional associations, and the management team’s training in business) were found, 
as hypothesized, to have a positive effect on the extent of venture philanthropy practices.  
On the other hand, the results of hypotheses for philanthropic institutional pressures were 
mixed.  Two out of four variables representing philanthropic institutions—the nonprofit 
status and affiliation with grantmaker professional associations—were found, as 
hypothesized, to have a negative impact on venture philanthropy practices.  However, 
hypotheses developed for donors’ demand for social outcomes and the management 
team’s training in nonprofits failed to receive support.  Nonetheless, it is reasonable to 
conclude from these results, coupled with the strong model fit and results from the post 
hoc analyses, that EO and institutional pressures can be major determinants of SIFs’ 
venture philanthropy practices—strategic behaviors by organizations embedded in the 
institutional duality.  
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 On the contrary, Study 2 did not lend strong and consistent support to the 
hypotheses.  EO was found to have a positive impact on financial performance, but not 
on social performance.  However, following suggestions by prior research (Guo et al., 
2009; Morris et al., 2011; Pearce et al., 2010) about unique effects of EO sub-
dimensionality in the nonprofit context, I conducted further analysis to investigate how 
each dimension of EO (innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking) is related to social 
and financial performance.  This post hoc analysis has found a statistically significant and 
positive relationship between proactiveness and both social performance and financial 
performance.  
 Interestingly, the nonprofit status variable, which showed strong support of 
hypotheses in Study 1, did not support hypotheses in Study 2.  Two variables were, 
however, found to be consistent with the hypotheses across social and financial 
performance: donors’ and investors’ demand for social outcomes and the management 
team’s training in business.  Despite these hypotheses being supported, it should be 
reminded that R2 (.17, p < .001) and adjusted R2 (.15, p < .001) of the main effects model 
in Study 2 were substantially small, relative to R2 (.51, p < .001) and adjusted R2 (.50, p < 
.001) of the main effects model in Study 1.  These low figures of R2 and adjusted R2 
undermine results from the overall hypotheses test of Study 2 (Cohen et al., 2003).  
 
Results for the Moderating Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices (Study 1) and 
on Social and Financial Performance (Study 2) 
 Moderating effects analyses were conducted to answer the second guiding 
question of this dissertation: Does EO help organizations resist institutional negative 
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pressures and still engage in strategic practices and enhance performance despite 
institutional constraints?  I examined this question by analyzing the models based on two 
sets of dependent variables.   
 By following Oliver's (1991) agency view of the new institutionalism, I 
developed and tested hypotheses for the moderating effects model, arguing that SIFs with 
a higher level of EO are more likely to engage in venture philanthropy practices against 
the pressure of the philanthropic institution in which they are deeply embedded.  It was 
also assumed that without an effect of EO, SIFs simply conform to environmental 
demand of traditional philanthropy institutions and avoid carrying out a business-based 
model of venture philanthropy.  A negative relationship between venture philanthropy 
practices and philanthropic institutional pressures alone, which the main effects model 
may have found, were expected to turn into a positive relationship with the EO-institution 
interaction term added.  Likewise, a negative relationship between social performance 
and venture capital institutional pressures would become positive if EO interacts; so 
would a negative relationship between financial performance and philanthropic 
institutional pressures become positive.    
 As Table 5.2 shows, both Study 1 and Study 2 do not lend strong support to my 
hypotheses, except one—hypothesis 6 that postulates a moderating effect between the 
nonprofit status and EO.  The fact that most hypotheses developed for moderating effects 
were not supported should not be too surprising, considering that many methodologists 
have noted how rare it is to report strong, unambiguous results in support of a moderator 
effect (Bobko, 1986; Cronbach, 1987; Mathieu, Aguinis, Culpepper, & Chen, 2012; 
Russell & Bobko, 1992; Venkatraman, 1989).  
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 Nevertheless, moderated regression and two post hoc analyses have confirmed 
that the interaction effect exists between the nonprofit status and EO.  This finding 
reinforces Oliver’s (1991) argument that organizations, if entrepreneurial in my 
hypotheses based on the new institutionalism and EO, are capable of resisting traditional 
philanthropy’s regulative pressures that are coercing SIFs to avoid engaging in business-
based practices otherwise.  This result will be further discussed below as part of the main 
contribution of my dissertation in advancing institutional theory and EO.  
   
Contributions and Theoretical Implications 
 Chapter 1 has identified gaps in the prior literature on nonprofit and philanthropic 
studies, social entrepreneurship, the new institutionalism and EO (Table 1.2).  Possible 
limitations notwithstanding, my dissertation is intended to contribute to these four 
scholarly fields by filling these gaps. 
 
Contribution to Nonprofit and Philanthropic Studies: Theory-Grounded Analysis 
on Venture Philanthropy 
 First, and most fundamentally, this dissertation contributes to nonprofit and 
philanthropic studies by enhancing our understanding about venture philanthropy through 
theory-grounded and systematic analysis, the need for which has been addressed (Van 
Slyke & Newman, 2006) yet has been filled to date by very few theory-grounded studies 
(Moody, 2008).  Through a theoretical lens of the new institutionalism and EO, my 
dissertation is poised to answer a vital question originating from the substantial 
heterogeneity of organizational processes and structures within the SIF field: Why do 
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some organizations engage in venture philanthropy while others do not?  Relative to 
other scholars who tended to focus on either organizations’ internal characteristics 
(Anheier & Leat, 2006; Fleishman, 2009; Letts et al., 1997; Prewitt, 2006b) or on 
environmental and inter-organizational relations with organizations (Moody, 2008), I 
took a contingency approach by examining how both an internal factor (EO) and 
environmental factors (institutional pressures) independently and jointly affected 
organizations.   
 “Understanding venture philanthropy” does not mean that this dissertation 
endorses this highly controversial concept in philanthropy.  Notwithstanding, venture 
philanthropy is a topic worthy of more scholarly examination because of its potential for 
theory advancement (Moody, 2008)—not only within our own field of nonprofit and 
philanthropic studies, but in other scholarly fields, as this dissertation has shown, such as 
institutional theory and EO.  I am arguing here that this approach not only benefits 
nonprofit and philanthropic studies itself, but also enhances its legitimacy in academia.   
 To be legitimate, a field must establish its own ontological and epistemological 
base, and to do so, it must be recognized by scholars in other fields of research (Busenitz 
et al., 2003).  Academic legitimacy, however, will not be fully achieved through 
borrowing and applying theories from other fields.  Despite the undoubted usefulness of 
their findings to nonprofit and philanthropic studies, most EO studies published in major 
nonprofit scholarly journals, such as Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly (e.g., 
Davis, Marino, Aaron, & Tolbert, 2011) and Nonprofit Management and Leadership 
(e.g., Helm & Andersson, 2010), to date have applied EO to the nonprofit context without 
making a larger theoretical impact in other scholarly fields.  Because “legitimation is 
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frequently mutualistic” (Suchman, 1995, p. 597), achieving academic legitimacy entails 
mutual contributions to theory advancement between different fields.  My dissertation is 
intended to show how analysis on philanthropic organizations can expand theoretical 
implications of other scholarly domains, as well as adding new insights on one of the 
most significant and controversial topics of our own field (Frumkin, 2008).    
 
Contribution to Social Entrepreneurship: Theory-Driven and Quantitative Analysis 
by Systematic Data Scrutiny and Theory Testing  
 This dissertation intends to make not only a theoretical but also a methodological 
contribution to advancing the field of social entrepreneurship.  As Short and his co-
authors (Short et al., 2009) have stressed, social entrepreneurship, despite all the growing 
excitement on this topic, will remain marginal as a scholarly field unless a more serious 
academic effort is made to advance theory by quantitative analysis and theory testing.  
Nevertheless, a lack of systematic data adequate to use for statistical analysis has been a 
main obstacle to the development of social entrepreneurship (Van Slyke & Newman, 
2006).  To tackle this, I gathered original data from 146 organizations.   
 Collecting valid data is vital for research.  Thus, I utilized many methods 
recommended to assure the validity of data and minimize threats of potential biases 
during the entire data collection and evaluation processes.  Scale items were developed 
both inductively and deductively, following Hinkin's (1995, 1998) recommendations.  I 
used mixed mode survey methods suggested by Dillman (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 
2009; Dillman, 1991); further I used a greater number of data sources to identify a larger 
population of interest than that used by previous SIF studies (Miller & Wesley, 2010; 
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Scarlata & Alemany, 2008, 2010).  These attempts enabled this empirical study to 
achieve a much higher response rate (53.7 percent)—twice as high as that of other 
empirical studies analyzing nonprofit EO, SIFs or other venture capital funds18.  Scholars 
often discuss that data collection on independent and dependent variables may have 
introduced common method bias, especially if data are collected through the same survey 
(Stam & Elfring, 2008).   Thus, the use of both primary and secondary data sources to 
identify sample organizations and different survey modes (Internet, mail, phone or 
meetings) were addressed in this study to minimize a threat of comment method bias.  
Rogelberg and Stanton's (2007) nonresponse bias impact assessment strategy (N-BIAS) 
was further implemented to ensure data of this study do not suffer nonresponse error.  
Furthermore, to avoid introducing biases in estimates of regression analysis, I conducted 
multiple imputation analysis to treat the missing values in my dataset.  Multiple 
imputation analysis has been developed by missing value theorists and statisticians as a 
superior method to other more common methods to treat missing values, such as listwise 
deletion (Little & Rubin, 2002; Little, 1988; Rubin, 1987, 1996; Schafer, 2010).  In sum, 
this dissertation implemented multiple methods to assure validity of data. 
 I am not intending to imply that my dissertation has contributed directly to a 
discipline of research methodology, but rather that it has carefully employed essential 
methods for validity of data, as it is vital to be able to analyze data by moderated multiple 
regressions for theory testing.  Yet it is also undisputable, from the recent survey research 
on social entrepreneurship, that most prior studies of social entrepreneurship have been of 
an exploratory nature and have fallen short of rigorous hypothesis testing for theory 
                                                
18 Examples of the responses of those studies include: 22 percent in Davis, Marino, Aaron, & Tolbert 
(2011); 26.3 percent in Helm & Andersson (2010); 20.7 percent in Miller & Wesley (2010); 21 percent in 
Morris, Coombes, Schindehutte, & Allen (2007);  and 19 percent in Shepherd (1999).  
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advancement.  Available data have also remained uneven and not suited to use for most 
statistical methods.  In this regard, my dissertation has made a meaningful contribution to 
social entrepreneurship.  
 
Contribution to the New Institutionalism and EO 
Analysis on Institutional Pressures and EO: Factors Affecting Strategic Practices and 
Performance of Organizations Embedded in the Institutional Duality 
 This dissertation makes several contributions to the new institutionalism.  
Drawing on theoretical implications of EO and the new institutionalism, I examined how 
organizations’ internal factors (EO) and external factors (regulative and normative 
pressures deviating from institutional environments) shaped behaviors of organizations 
embedded in the institutional duality.  
 First, my analyses on the main effects of these factors contribute to the new 
institutionalism, and entrepreneurship research as well, by investigating how competing 
pressures from two distinct institutional fields shape strategic behaviors and performance 
of organizations that have a mixed motif of social and economic ends.  As reviewed in 
Chapter 1, entrepreneurship scholars tend to utilize an institutional perspective to 
examine a group of organizations between different countries or economies at the field 
level (Bruton et al., 2010, 2008; Busenitz et al., 2000; Zacharakis et al., 2007).  However, 
there appears to be very limited effort in entrepreneurship research to analyze how 
competing institutional logics shape processes and behaviors of entrepreneurial 
organizations within the same institutional field.  My analysis has addressed this gap as 
the focal point. 
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 On the other hand, institutional scholars tend to analyze adaptation processes of 
organizations facing the institutional duality (e.g., pressures from host countries and 
parent multinational corporations upon foreign subsidiaries, Hillman & Wan, 2005; 
Kostova & Roth, 2002), but not organizations’ performance.  Thus, my dissertation 
makes an additional contribution to institutional theory by investigating how competing 
institutional pressures affect not only strategic practices, but also social and financial 
performance of organizations facing the institutional duality.     
 
Analysis on EO Moderating Effects on Institution-Strategic Practice Relationship: 
Agentic Responses to Institutional Pressures  
 As emphasized in Chapter 1, the ultimate objective of my dissertation is to 
respond to the “structure versus agency debate”—the most central quarrel dividing 
institutionalists (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997)—to determine whether organizational 
behavior is the product of macro social forces or of organizational agency.  My second 
research question exploring a moderating effect of EO on the relationship between 
institution pressures and venture philanthropy practices (Study 1), and institution 
pressures and performance (Study 2), served to answer this.  To develop hypotheses for 
moderating effects tests, I followed Oliver's view (1991) that increased 
institutionalization can actually become a source of deviation of entrepreneurial 
organizations.  That is, as Oliver (1991) advocated over two decades ago, organizations 
are capable of strategically responding to and shaping institutional forces, and thus I will 
assert that organizational behavior is not the product of macro social forces only, but of 
organizational agency, as well.   
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 This translates into my theory in this study postulating that SIFs with a higher 
level of EO are more likely to resist institutional constraints from traditional philanthropy 
or mainstream venture capitalism and still engage in venture philanthropy practices and 
enhance performance.  As discussed above, while I could not find a moderating effect of 
EO on the relationship between institutional pressures and performance variables, I could 
confirm a moderating effect of EO on the relationship between institutional regulative 
pressure (the nonprofit status) and SIFs’ strategic practices.  This finding of an EO 
moderating effect buttresses a position of the agency camp, arguing that if organizations 
are innovative, proactive, and willing to take a risk, they can reshape institutional 
pressures and achieve their goals.  
 It is noteworthy that EO was found to interact in particular with the nonprofit 
status, i.e., the source for regulative pressures (Scott, 2008b) from governmental (the 
IRS) mandate upon organizational goals and behaviors.  This finding reflects implications 
from prior literature and offers further interesting theoretical implications.  Institutional 
theorists (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) have suggested that governmental regulations and 
laws are the most coercive and forceful pressures on organizations.  Philanthropic 
scholars have pointed out that tax-exempt status makes philanthropic organizations 
extremely vulnerable to a loss of public legitimacy (Frumkin, 2008) because as 
subsidiary theory dictates, their very existence is made possible by public acceptance 
(Simon et al., 2006).  Entrepreneurship scholars (Kistruck & Beamish, 2010) have found 
nonprofits are less successful at adapting new entrepreneurship activities than for-profits 
due to the path dependencies created by their own individual actions.  All these 
theoretical perspectives thus indicate that constraints from the nonprofit status are 
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possibly the most negative pressure forcing SIFs to avoid engaging in a business-based 
model of venture philanthropy.  And, findings from this study indicate that in such an 
adverse condition, EO plays the most critical role in enabling organizations to enact 
strategic responses to institutional pressures.    
 
Analysis on EO as a New Enabling Condition of Institutional Entrepreneurship  
 In my study, EO was theorized to function as a factor in enabling organizations to 
create a strategic response to institutional environments.  As reviewed in Chapter 1, 
Oliver (1991) has proposed five institutional antecedents triggering organizations’ 
strategic responses to institutional environments: cause of institutional pressures, 
constituents exerting these institutional pressures, content of institutional pressures, 
control of how these institutional pressures are exerted, and context where institutional 
pressures occur.  A slim, yet growing, number of studies have examined and identified 
conditions enabling institutional entrepreneurship at the organization level, such as 
actors’ sensemaking strategies (Dorado, 2005), partial autonomy from the institution 
(Mutch, 2007; Seo & Creed, 2002), and empathy and social skills (Fligstein, 1997, 2001).  
However, no study appears to have examined organizations’ innovativeness, 
proactiveness and risk taking propensity as an enabling condition of institutional 
entrepreneurship.   
 Herein, this dissertation makes a meaningful contribution to advance theory of the 
new institutionalism by adding EO as a condition enabling institutional entrepreneurship 
when institutional pressures are coercive and regulative.  And, by investigating how the 
EO interacts with institutions’ coercive pressures at the organizational level and how EO 
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empowers each organization to engage in a strategic response to institutional pressures, 
my analysis is poised to fill another important gap identified by institutional 
entrepreneurship scholars—a need for analysis on institutional and entrepreneurial effects 
upon organizations at the micro level (Battilana et al., 2009; Mutch, 2007).  This in turn 
aims to answer the question of “the Paradox of Embedded Agency” (Battilana & 
D’aunno, 2009; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a; Hardy & Maguire, 2008), i.e., if actors are 
embedded in an institutional environment that shapes their cognition, how can they 
envision change and enact new practices in the contexts in which they are embedded?  
My empirical study has found EO, under a coercive pressure, to be a factor empowering 
SIFs to envisage and originate a novel model as a way to “revolutionize” (Moody, 2008) 
conventional practices in two institutional environments in which they are deeply 
embedded.   
 By identifying EO as a possible enabling condition of institutional 
entrepreneurship if institutional pressure is coercive, this study also makes a meaningful 
contribution to EO research.  As Covin and Lumpkin (2011) draw attention to it, many 
environmental variables have been identified and extensively tested as moderators for 
EO-performance relationships, so that there has not been much room left for making 
additional contribution.  Yet, Miller (2011) most recently proposed connecting 
institutional theory to EO as a new research agenda for theory advancement for EO 
research.  While institutional pressures are deemed as environmental factors (Scott, 
2008a), institutional perspectives still can add implications to discussions of 
organization-environment relations in EO research, because institutional theory assumes 
that environments shape not only organizational behaviors, but also their cognitive 
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abilities.  As such, EO perhaps needs to play an even more vital role in enabling 
organizations to resist environmental constraints.   
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 This study is not without limitations.  I will focus my discussions primarily on 
methodological issues as limitations of this study and also highlight needs and 
methodological considerations that future research should address.   
 
Missing Data and Common Method Biases  
As stressed above, this study employed multiple methods to enhance the validity 
of data and analysis.  Nevertheless, considerable limitations still exist.  First, the extent of 
missing data was significant and should be discussed as a major limitation of my study.  
Multiple imputation analysis must be used to avoid biased estimates if over 5 percent of 
data are missing (Allison, 2001; Fichman & Cummings, 2003; Graham, 2009), which is 
the case in my study.  To confirm the validity and usefulness of multiple imputation 
analysis for my empirical study, numerous regression models were run to determine the 
best-fit model.  Some regression models based on untreated data showed an extremely 
low or a negative value of R2 and adjusted R2, as opposed to R2 and adjusted R2 of the 
models based on multiple-imputed data (around .50 for the main effects models).  This 
underscores the usefulness of multiple imputation analysis.  Nevertheless, no other 
methods would give us the validity of data more than actual responses from survey 
participants.  Thus, researchers must make the greatest effort to minimize a threat of 
missing data in their survey datasets.  
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 Second, this study relied on self-reported data from single informants.  Their 
interpretation of internal and external factors of their organizations may not represent the 
views of other members in the organizations.  To reduce and evaluate this potential 
problem, I used multiple performance measures as well as other methods discussed above 
to reduce threats of biases.  Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter 3, reliance upon a single 
reporter has been pointed out as an issue for possible biased responses (Coombes, Morris, 
Allen, & Webb, 2011; Van Bruggen, Lilien, & Kacker, 2002).  The use of a single key 
informant approach in this study has been justified, because it follows main approaches 
by prior EO studies (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Miller & Friesen, 1982; Zahra & Covin, 
1995) and also because it can avoid a possible reduction of the sample size (Coombes et 
al., 2011).  However, if a reduction of the sample size is not a major concern, future 
research can consider utilizing a multiple-participant method, as well as other methods 
such as Harman’s one factor test and confirmatory factor analyses (Stam & Elfring, 2008; 
Wang, 2008).     
Given that prior studies on both foundations and venture capital funds suffered 
from a low response rate, SIFs, which stem from both these groups, can be among the 
most difficult types of organizations to use for effective survey collection.  Thus, it may 
also be advisable to use service-providing nonprofits (i.e., organizations referred to as 
“funded social ventures” in this study) because archival data containing their finance and 
other basic information are more readily available in IRS Form 990.  In fact, some 
nonprofit EO empirical studies (Coombes, Morris, Allen, & Webb, 2011; Morris et al., 
2007) targeted arts and culture nonprofits registered with the IRS and used their Form 
990 as a data source to construct nonprofit performance (e.g., total revenues, changes in 
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assets, fundraising expenses).  Applying the theories developed in this study to other 
types of nonprofit and social entrepreneurial organizations can also be useful to enhance 
generalizability of findings (Cohen et al., 2003).  Other possible organizations for future 
research include community development financial institutions and socially responsible 
publicly held corporations. 
 
Construct of “Performance” Variables and Qualitative and Longitudinal Studies 
Many efforts suggested above for future research, however, point us to another 
and more serious data problem deeply inherent in the very nature of nonprofits: the 
construct of “performance” variables.  The ability to improve data on nonprofits is 
hampered by the lack of standards.  The large scope and variety of nonprofit 
organizations complicates the task of collecting comprehensive, reliable, and valid data 
on nonprofits (Lampkin & Boris, 2002).  Performance, which my dissertation used as 
dependent variables for Study 2, is one of the most difficult concepts to measure in 
nonprofit and social entrepreneurship research.  Not only do they lack consensus about 
how to define and measure performance of philanthropic grantmaking (Forbes, 1998; 
Herman & Renz, 1999), but nonprofit scholars and foundation officers have not even 
agreed whether or not performance measurement itself is appropriate (Kanter & 
Summers, 1987; Ostrower, 2006).  While IRS Form 990 is one of the best sources 
available for research, as filing is legally required for most nonprofits19 (Lampkin & 
Boris, 2002), questions about the quality of the IRS data continue to be of concern.  
                                                
19 Lampkin and Boris (2002), however, remind us that nonprofits with less than $25,000 in gross receipts 
and religious congregations or related organizations are not included in IRS Form 990 data (All private 
foundations must file a Form 990-PF annually, regardless of size.).  
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Froelich, Knoepfle and Pollak (2000) investigate the adequacy, reliability, and 
appropriate interpretation of IRS 990 Return data through comparisons of selected entries 
with corresponding measures from each organization’s audited financial statements.  The 
study concludes that the IRS 990 Return can be an adequate and reliable source of 
information for basic income statement and balance sheet entries (total income, total 
expenses, total assets, and total liabilities), and to a lesser but still reasonable degree, for 
additional variables of traditional interest to nonprofits, including total contributions, 
program service revenue, program service expenses, and fund-raising expenses.  
However, market-based financial variables highly relevant to social entrepreneurship 
performance, such as gross profit from sales, were found to require caution to use and 
interpret.     
Single indicators have typically been used to operationalize social and financial 
performance of organizations whose chief motif is not profit-maximizing (Pearce, Fritz, 
& Davis, 2010).  However, a multidimensional approach to capturing performance should 
be used when investigating the effects of EO, as outcomes may be favorable in some 
dimensions but not in others (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005).  
Multidimensionality is especially important to measure social performance, due to the 
idiosyncratic nature of philanthropy (Frumkin, 2008) and a lack of standardized methods 
capturing social performance (Kanter & Summers, 1987).  Hence, I operationalized social 
performance as an index of eight performance measures.   
Multiplicity of social performance justifies the method taken in this study to 
construct performance variables in a way that these variables reflect expressive and 
instrumental aspects of philanthropy (Frumkin, 2008).  Nevertheless, a complexity of 
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constructs in my study may also have induced confusion among some survey 
respondents.  This assumption stems from the fact that most other EO studies on 
nonprofits used a single and/or more specific performance dimension and more 
hypotheses were supported for EO/performance relationship in their studies (Coombes et 
al., 2011; Pearce et al., 2010) than this study.  Given that measuring performance is of 
central importance to social entrepreneurship research, there is a need for more scholarly 
attention to the development of valid measures of different types of performance 
applicable to the nonprofit context. 
While most studies of EO and performance use cross-sectional designs (Wiklund 
& Shepherd, 2005), my cross-sectional data possibly fail to capture the dynamic interplay 
between EO and institutional forces, as it may take considerable time for the effects of 
EO to materialize (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).  As Venkatraman (1989) argues that 
longitudinal designs are needed in configurational studies, longitudinal studies should be 
conducted to accurately access moderating effects between EO and institutional forces.  
To empirically test whether an EO actually leads to better performance, longitudinal data 
are necessary where EO is measured at one point in time and performance outcomes are 
measured later.  Using qualitative data should be suggested to investigate how 
moderating effects between EO and institutional forces are materialized in social 
performance.   
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Issues in Detecting Moderating Effects and Future Methodological Consideration 
 The biggest challenge in this study is to detect moderating effects.  Since finding 
moderation effects of EO-institutional pressure lies at the heart of my central argument 
for theory advancement, an inability to detect strong moderating effects has imposed the 
greatest dilemma throughout my research.  However, this problem is not uncommon.  
Scholars have found the statistical power to detect interaction effects as a serious concern 
(Russell & Bobko, 1992) and how rare it was to obtain strong, unambiguous results in 
support of a moderator effect (Aguinis, 1995; Bobko, 1986; McClelland & Judd, 1993; 
Venkatraman, 1989).  For example, Terborg (1977) reviewed 14 articles containing 20 
tests of an interaction between motivation and ability—universally accepted models of 
work performance—and found only five results supportive of the interaction effect.  
 Some recommendations have been made by methodologists for improving the 
possibility of detecting a strong and accurate moderating effect.  First, a bigger sample 
size will be necessary to detect an interaction effect, in particular a larger interaction 
effect20 (Cohen et al., 2003).  Given that a higher power of a model is critical to detect a 
strong and accurate interaction effect, Aguinis (1995) has reported several artifacts 
influencing the power of moderated multiple regressions, including error variance 
heterogeneity resulting from unequal subgroup sample size conditions (Alexander & 
DeShon, 1994).  The sample I used in this dissertation has a much larger size of a 
nonprofit subgroup as opposed to a for-profit subgroup.  Thus, in future research, 
“commercial nonprofits” may be used because these nonprofits often coexist with and 
                                                
20 For instance, Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken (2003) suggest that when each predictor has reliability of 
0.88, the required sample size for power .80 to detect an interaction ranges from 100 to 150 or more, 
depending on the amount of variance accounted for by the main effects of X and Z.  And, for a small effect 
size interaction, the required sample size for 0.80 power to detect an interaction may exceed 1,000 cases 
when the reliabilities of the individual predictors are each 0.80.   
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compete against a large number of for-profit counterparts so that an unequal subgroup 
sample size should no longer be an issue.  “Scale coarseness”21 has also been identified as 
an artifact that adversely affects the statistical power of moderated multiple regression to 
detect moderating effects (Aguinis, 1995; Russell & Bobko, 1992; Russell, Pinto, & 
Bobko, 1991).  For instance, Russell and Bobko (1992) recommend that investigators not 
attempt to discover moderator effects unless the overt measurement scale contains at least 
as many response options as exist in the theoretical response domain, or consider other 
methods of providing subjects with continuous response scales.   
 Along this line of discussion, the potential of using other statistical methods has 
been explored among methodologists, while moderating multiple regressions have been 
the most widely used by EO scholars (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999; Becherer & Maurer, 
1997; Bhuian et al., 2005; Covin et al., 1994; Covin & Slevin, 1988, 1989; Dess et al., 
1997; Richard et al., 2004; Wiklund, 1999) and institutional scholars (Dickson & 
Weaver, 1997; Liao, Welsch, & Stoica, 2003; Oliver, 1997a, 1997b; Sherer & Lee, 2002) 
to detect an interaction effect.  For instance, Williams, Edwards and Vandenberg (2003) 
have discussed a use of moderated structural equation models.  Despite the potential of it, 
Cortina, Chen and Dunlap (2001) have cautioned that moderated structural equation 
models present several major challenges, including a challenge involving how to choose 
indicators to represent the latent product term.   
 
                                                
21 “Scale coarseness” generally refers to operationalizing a criterion variable in such a manner that it does 
not include sufficient scale points, incurs possible information loss, and thus prevents a hypothesized 
moderating effect from being detected (Russell & Bobko, 1992).  
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Conclusion 
 This dissertation research is motivated by responding to the “agency versus 
structure debate” of the new institutionalism—the central quarrel dividing institutional 
theorists.  Drawing upon Oliver’s (1991) proposition, my endeavor originates from an 
assumption that EO could provide a possible answer to this debate.  By linking the new 
institutionalism to EO, my dissertation simultaneously is poised to answer a call from 
Miller (2011) that we should explore how institutions’ regulative and normative pressures 
shape EO.  The most vital role I hope this study plays is supporting our collective efforts 
to advance scholarship of nonprofits, philanthropy and social entrepreneurship.  
Notwithstanding several noticeable limitations in my study, I hope to see findings of this 
dissertation “empower,” and not “constrain,” future research endeavors on investigating 
various roles that EO may play in enabling organizations to strategically respond to 
institutional environments.   
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Appendix A: Survey Instrument 
 
 
  
!
!
1 
 
 
Survey on Venture Philanthropy and Impact Investing: 
Factors Affecting Performance of Funding Social Enterprises  
 
 
Thank you for your participation in the study on venture philanthropy and impact investing by the 
Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University. The objective of this study is to investigate a variety 
of underlying factors that may affect return to/performance of the funding efforts and the social 
enterprises to which the funds were given. 
 
1. The survey will take approximately 5 – 10 minutes. For your convenience, most questions 
will require simply checking boxes.   
 
2. Your responses are strictly confidential and will never be released in association with your 
organization’s name. The survey will not ask you for your organization’s confidential 
performance data, either.  
 
3. Please note that while this study uses the term social enterprise, it does not intend to limit 
the term to organizations that engage only in commercial activities. Instead, the term 
refers broadly to both nonprofit and for-profit organizations, whose main purpose is to create 
social value. In this survey, social enterprises are the specific organizations your 
organization funds. 
 
4. The term funding refers to your organization’s provision of financial resources to social 
enterprises, including grantmaking, equity investment, and loans.   
 
5. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact:  
 
Tamaki Onishi 
The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University   
550 West North Street, Suite 301   
Indianapolis, IN 46202 
tonishi@iupui.edu 
(646) 322-0237 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this research project. 
A copy of the aggregated results from the survey will be sent to you  
once the study is completed. 
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2 
Part I: General Information 
  
1. What is the legal structure of your organization? If your organization is a local chapter of a larger 
national/international organization, please provide the information about the chapter. 
 Public charity 501(c)(3) 
 Limited liability company, limited partnership, or other business firm 
 Other structure (Please specify:                                                                                                                  ) 
 Unincorporated (Please describe:                                                                                                               ) 
 
2. In what year was your organization founded?     
 
3. Is your organization currently affiliated with any of the following professional associations? Formal 
affiliations are via formal membership. Informal affiliations are via any other ways including 
conference/seminar participations, informal networking, or affinity groups.  
 Formal 
affiliation 
Informal 
affiliation 
No 
affiliation 
Council on Foundations     
National Venture Capital Association    
Other grantmaker association(s) (Please specify:                               )    
Other venture capital association(s) (Please specify:                               )    
Association(s) for “impact investors” (Please specify:                               )    
 
4. Where are the social enterprises that have been funded by your organization located, and of what profit/non-
profit status are these enterprises? (Pick all that apply)   
 United States Foreign countries  
Nonprofit social enterprises    
For-profit social enterprises    
Other (Please specify:                                                )   
 
5. Please list the major social enterprises that your organization has funded in the last five years (or since its 
establishment), or provide the URL that lists those enterprises.  
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6. How often do you use each of the following funding instruments to fund social enterprises? 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
Grants      
Equity      
Equity through program-related investments (PRIs)      
Near-equity (e.g., convertible debt)      
Loans       
Loans through PRIs      
Other (Please specify:                                            )      
 
 
Part II: Staff and Leadership Team 
 
7. How do you rate the (1) work experience and (2) educational training of your leadership team 
collectively (e.g., board, CEO, COO, CIO, CFO) in each of the following fields?  
Leadership team’s work experience in: None Very little Some Strong Extremely 
strong 
Philanthropy, nonprofit management, or 
public administration  
     
Business administration      
Subject fields (e.g., environment, energy, 
health, arts, education, history) 
     
Other (Please specify:                                    )      
Leadership team’s educational training 
in: 
None Very little Some Strong Extremely 
strong 
Philanthropy, nonprofit management, or 
public administration 
     
Business administration      
Subject fields (e.g., environment, energy, 
health, arts, education, history) 
     
Other (Please specify:                                    )      
 
8. How many staff members and volunteers does your organization currently have? Please enter a number for 
each below. 
Full-time staff [                ] Internal board members (i.e., staff serving on board) [                ] 
Part-time staff  [                ] External board members [                ] 
Volunteers  
(excluding board) 
[                ] Other (Please specify:                                               ) [                ] 
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9. Please circle a number in the scale that best describes the orientation of your organization.    
• Circle number “1” if the statement on the left-hand side of the scale best describes your reaction to the item.   
• Circle number “7” if the statement on the right-hand side of the scale best describes your reaction to the item.   
• Circle numbers “2” through “6” depending upon your best estimate of an intermediate position. 
 
Statement on the left side  
more true  
    Equally true  
 
Statement on the right side  
 more true 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
 
In general, the leadership of my organization favors:  
 
A strong emphasis on maintaining 
tried-and-true funding programs or 
strategies  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7  A strong emphasis on developing new 
funding programs or strategies 
 
How many new funding programs and strategies has your organization developed in the last five years 
(or since its establishment)? 
 
No new funding programs or strategies 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  Many new funding programs or strategies 
   
Changes in our funding programs or 
strategies have been mostly of a minor 
nature 
  1    2    3    4    5    6    7  Changes in our funding programs or 
strategies have been quite dramatic 
 
 In dealing with other funding organizations, my organization: 
 
Typically responds to actions which 
other funding organizations initiate 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7  Typically initiates actions to which other 
funding organizations then respond 
   
Is very seldom the first organization to 
introduce new funding programs/ 
strategies, administrative techniques, 
operating technologies, etc. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7  Is very often the first organization to 
introduce new funding programs/ 
strategies, administrative techniques, 
operating technologies, etc. 
   
Rarely makes changes, due to 
perceived changes occurring in the 
community we serve 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7  Continuously makes changes, due to 
perceived changes occurring in the 
community we serve 
 
In general, the leadership of my organization has: 
 
A strong tendency to adopt low-risk 
projects (with expected normal and 
certain results) 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 A strong tendency to adopt high-risk 
projects (with chances of very dramatic 
results) 
 
In general, the leadership of my organization believes that: 
 
Owing to the nature of the 
environment, it is best to explore 
changes gradually via cautious, 
incremental behavior 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Owing to the nature of the environment, 
bold, wide-ranging acts are necessary to 
achieve the organization’s objectives 
 
 
When confronted with decision-making situations involving uncertainty, my organization: 
 
Typically adopts a cautious, “wait-and-
see” posture in order to minimize the 
probability of making costly decisions 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Typically adopts a bold, aggressive 
posture in order to maximize the 
probability of exploiting potential 
opportunities 
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Part III: Funding Performance 
 
This section asks about social and financial performance indicators you may use to assess your funding 
performance.   
• The term funding performance is related to various criteria on the status and outcomes of social 
enterprises and the return and other benefits to a funding organization (i.e., your organization).  
• The term target beneficiary refers to individuals or groups served by a social enterprise that your 
organization funds.  These individuals or groups include those who might not be able to obtain necessary goods 
and services from mainstream providers, such as children, women, low-income or hard-to-employ populations, 
and environmentally-conscious clients. 
 
10. Please indicate the degree of importance your organization attaches to each of the following funding 
performance criteria.  
 Not 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Very 
important 
Extremely 
important 
Not 
Applicable 
Meeting the needs of target beneficiaries 
(e.g., improved self-esteem of students)        
The number of target beneficiaries 
served (e.g., students in attendance, 
individuals housed)  
      
Concrete outputs for target beneficiaries 
(e.g., the number of jobs created, the 
number of meals provided) 
      
Scalability of funded programs to have 
social impact in other geographical areas       
Advancement of the social cause by 
influencing policymakers and the public        
Possibility of long-term social impact by 
changing social systems and behaviors        
Alignment with your organization’s social 
mission        
Donor/investor satisfaction        
Total revenue of social enterprises        
Earned income/sales revenue of social 
enterprises        
Philanthropic donation/grant revenue of 
social enterprises        
Growth in net assets of social enterprises        
Acquisition of another institutional funder 
besides your organization       
Probability of social enterprises’ initial 
public offering (IPO)       
Internal rates of return (IRRs)        
Direct financial benefits for your 
organization or donors/investors (e.g., 
return on investment, tax break)  
      
Other social performance indicator/s 
(Please specify:                                       )       
Other financial performance indicator/s 
(Please specify:                                       ) 
      
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11. Please indicate the extent to which your organization is currently satisfied with its funding performance 
on each of the following criteria. 
 Not at all 
satisfied 
Slightly 
satisfied 
Moderately 
satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
Extremely 
satisfied 
Not 
applicable 
Meeting the needs of target beneficiaries 
(e.g., improved self-esteem of students)        
The number of target beneficiaries 
served (e.g., students in attendance, 
individuals housed)  
      
Concrete outputs for target beneficiaries 
(e.g., the number of jobs created, the 
number of meals provided) 
      
Scalability of funded programs to have 
social impact in other geographical areas       
Advancement of the social cause by 
influencing policymakers and the public        
Possibility of long-term social impact by 
changing social systems and behaviors        
Alignment with your organization’s social 
mission        
Donor/investor satisfaction        
Total revenue of social enterprises        
Earned income/sales revenue of social 
enterprises        
Philanthropic donation/grant revenue of 
social enterprises        
Growth in net assets of social 
enterprises        
Acquisition of another institutional funder 
besides your organization       
Probability of social enterprises’ initial 
public offering (IPO)       
Internal rates of return (IRRs)        
Direct financial benefits for your 
organization or donors/investors (e.g., 
return on investment, tax break)  
      
Other social performance indicator/s 
(Please specify:                                       )       
Other financial performance indicator/s 
(Please specify:                                       )       
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In the following two questions, the term financial return is not limited to the conventional meaning, i.e., the 
return on investment to your organization/investors.  
Instead, the term refers to a variety of measurable financial consequences, such as an improved ability of 
the social enterprise to attract future funding (as an organizational capacity).  
 
12. In relation to the performance focus of your organization, please rate each statement on a 5-point 
scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” (1) to “Strongly agree” (5).  
 
 
Strongly 
disagree   
 Strongly  
agree 
Our organization is willing to give up some financial return if 
we have to, as social return is our primary concern 1 2 3 4 5 
Our organization is willing to give up some social return if we 
have to, as financial return is our primary concern 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. To what extent do your funders/investors expect social and financial returns?  
 Do not expect 
at all 
Slightly  
expect 
Moderately 
expect 
Strongly 
expect 
Very strongly 
expect 
Social return      
Financial return      
 
 
Part IV: Relationship with Social Enterprises 
 
14. How often does your organization retain the right to actively participate on the board of social enterprises?  
 Never  
 Rarely 
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 Always 
 
15. How often does your organization provide non-financial resources (e.g., strategic advice about 
management or programs, IT, recruiting new management members) to social enterprises?   
 Never  
 Rarely 
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 Always 
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Part V: Revenue and Other Financial Information  
 
16. To what extent does your organization rely on each of the following revenue sources to support its operation?  
 Does not 
rely at all 
Slightly 
relies 
Moderately 
relies 
Strongly 
relies 
Very 
strongly 
relies 
Internal revenue (e.g., endowment 
interest, earned income)           
Individual donors           
Individual investors (for loans, equity)           
Foundations           
Government           
Banks           
Venture capital firms           
Other  
(Please specify:                                    ) 
          
 
The following data will be published only as the aggregated results from the survey.  
Your organization’s name will never be disclosed. 
 
17. What were your organization’s total assets, on average (i.e., on a per year basis), over the last three years? 
 Less than $1 million      
 $1 million to less than $10 million     
 $10 million to $1 billion     
 Over $1 billion 
 
18. What was your organization’s operating budget, on average (i.e., on a per year basis), over the last three 
years?   
 Less than $1 million      
 $1 million to less than $5 million       
 $5 million to $10 million  
 Over $10 million 
 
19. What was the total amount of funding for your organization, on average (i.e., on a per year basis), over the 
last three years?  
 Less than $1 million      
 $1 million to less than $10 million     
 $10 million to $100 million   
 Over $100 million 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. 
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Appendix B: 
Results of Regression Analysis: Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices—Innovativeness Dimension 
 
  Unstandardized  Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 t-
statistics 
Sig. R2 Adjusted 
R2 
∆R2 F-
statistics  
 Variables B  S.E. Beta        
 (Constant) 1.64  .15  *** 10.803 .000    63.752*** 
Base 
Model 
Organization age .00  .00 .01  .138 .891 .19 .19   
Organization sizea .10  .02 .13 *** 4.828 .000     
The nonprofit status of funded social 
ventures 
-.49  .05 -.25 *** -9.196 .000     
 
Main 
Effects 
Model 
 
Innovativeness .10  .02 .13 *** 4.961 .000 .51 .51 .32 75.540*** 
The nonprofit status -.68  .10 -.23 *** -6.509 .000     
Donor/investor demand for social 
outcomes 
.05  .03 .05 † 1.660 .097     
Donor/investor demand for financial 
outcomes 
.20  .02 .29 *** 10.227 .000     
Affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations 
-.06  .02 -.09 ** -3.047 .002     
Affiliation with venture capital 
professional associations 
.20  .03 .25 *** 8.232 .000     
Management team’s training in nonprofits  .03  .02 .05 † 1.776 .076     
Management team’s training in business  .05  .02 .08 ** 3.178 .002     
Two-way 
Interaction 
Model 
Innovativeness x the nonprofit status .22  .07 .11 ** 3.329 .001 .54 .53 .03 60.407*** 
Innovativeness x donor/investor demand 
for social outcomes 
-.01  .02 -.02  -.501 .616     
Innovativeness x affiliation with 
grantmaker professional associations  
-.07  .01 -.14 *** -5.372 .000     
Innovativeness x management training in 
nonprofits 
-.01  .01 -.03  -.803 .422     
n = 146   † p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  a Log-transformed  
Dependent variable is venture philanthropy practices.  
Regression weights shown are coefficients obtained at the full model (Model 3). 
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Appendix C: 
Results of Regression Analysis: Effects on Venture Philanthropy Practices—Proactiveness Dimension 
 
  Unstandardized  Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 t-
statistics 
Sig. R2 Adjusted 
R2 
∆R2 F-
statistics  
 Variables B  S.E. Beta        
 (Constant) 1.53  .15  *** 9.957 .000     
Base 
Model 
Organization age .00  .00 -.01  -.256 .798 .19 .19  63.752*** 
Organization sizea .12  .02 .16 *** 5.651 .000     
The nonprofit status of funded social 
ventures 
-.49  .05 -.25 *** -9.046 .000     
 
Main 
Effects 
Model 
 
Proactiveness .09  .03 .09 ** 3.183 .002 .51 .50 .32 74.161*** 
The nonprofit status -.59  .11 -.20 *** -5.306 .000     
Donor/investor demand for social 
outcomes 
.06  .03 .06 † 1.846 .065     
Donor/investor demand for financial 
outcomes 
.21  .02 .30 *** 10.230 .000     
Affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations 
-.06  .02 -.10 ** -3.299 .001     
Affiliation with venture capital 
professional associations 
.21  .03 .26 *** 8.458 .000     
Management team’s training in nonprofits  .03  .02 .05  1.623 .105     
Management team’s training in business  .06  .02 .11 *** 4.266 .000     
Two-way 
Interaction 
Model 
Proactiveness x the nonprofit status .19  .10 .06 † 1.919 .055 .52 .51 .01 56.307*** 
Proactiveness x donor/investor demand for 
social outcomes 
-.04  .03 -.03  -1.156 .248     
Proactiveness x affiliation with grantmaker 
professional associations 
-.05  .02 -.08 ** -3.083 .002     
Proactiveness x management training in 
nonprofits 
-.03  .02 -.04  -1.649 .100     
n = 146   † p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  a Log-transformed  
Dependent variable is venture philanthropy practices.  
Regression weights shown are coefficients obtained at the full model (Model 3). 
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Appendix D: 
Results of Regression Analysis: Effects on Venture philanthropy practices—Risk Taking Dimension 
  
  Unstandardized  Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 t-
statistics 
Sig. R2 Adjusted 
R2 
∆R2 F-
statistics  
 Variables B  S.E. Beta        
 (Constant) 1.40  .16  *** 9.014 .000     
Base 
Model 
Organization age .00  .00 -.01  -.208 .835 .19 .19  63.752*** 
Organization sizea .13  .02 .17 *** 6.212 .000     
The nonprofit status of funded social 
ventures 
-.49  .06 -.25 *** -8.781 .000     
 
Main 
Effects 
Model 
 
Risk-taking -.001  .02 -.01  -.173 .863 .50 .50 .31 72.054*** 
The nonprofit status -.54  .11 -.18 *** -5.091 .000     
Donor/investor demand for social 
outcomes 
.06  .03 .06 † 1.860 .063     
Donor/investor demand for financial 
outcomes 
.21  .02 .30 *** 10.191 .000     
Affiliation with grantmaker professional 
associations 
-.08  .02 -.12 *** -4.032 .000     
Affiliation with venture capital 
professional associations 
.25  .03 .31 *** 10.022 .000     
Management team’s training in nonprofits  .04  .02 .07 * 2.325 .020     
Management team’s training in business  .06  .02 .11 *** 4.226 .000     
Two-way 
Interaction 
Model 
Risk-taking x the nonprofit status -.17  .09 -.06 † -1.822 .069 .51 .50 .01 53.724*** 
Risk-taking x donor/investor demand for 
social outcomes 
.05  .03 .06 * 2.024 .043     
Risk-taking x affiliations with grantmaker 
professional associations 
-.01  .02 -.01  -.469 .639     
Risk-taking x management training in 
nonprofits 
-.01  .02 -.01  -.411 .682     
n = 146   † p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  a Log-transformed  
Dependent variable is venture philanthropy practices.  
Regression weights shown are coefficients obtained at the full model (Model 3).
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2013–present Assistant Professor: Department of Political Science, Master of Public 
Affairs, University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
 
2012–2013 Visiting Lecturer (one-year appointment): Department of Political 
Science, Master of Public Affairs, University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro 
• Teaching the graduate courses for “Nonprofit Management and 
Leadership” (Fall), “Philanthropy & Resource Development” and 
“Social Entrepreneurship” (Spring) in both the classroom- and the 
online-formats 
• Coordinating the Nonprofit Management Certificate Program 
 
2012 Summer Associate Faculty: Philanthropic Studies, The Center on Philanthropy 
Indiana University  
• Taught the “Introduction to Philanthropy” (an undergraduate course 
via online) 
• The course and online format newly created with a grant of $4,000 
 
2010–2012  Associate Faculty: School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana 
University Purdue University Indianapolis  
• Taught the “Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector” (an undergraduate 
course at classroom/via online) 
• The online format newly created 
 
2007–present Lecturer: Aichi Prefectural University of Fine Arts and Music Graduate 
School, Japan  
• Teaching the “Fundraising for the Arts and Artists” (a graduate course 
at classroom/one-week intensive format)  
 
Management Experiences in Nonprofits and Business  
2006–2008 Project Director: “Youth Philanthropy in Japan and the United States” at 
the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University 
2004-2006 Visiting Researcher: “U.S.-Japan Comparative Study” at the Center on 
Philanthropy at Indiana University (an AFP funded international/diverse 
fundraising research project) 
1999–2004 Major Gifts Development Associate: Thirteen/WNET New York, Patron 
Program  
1998–1999 Corporate Funds and Sponsorship Intern: Carnegie Hall 
1998 Finance Assistant: Orpheus Chamber Orchestra  
1995–1997  Assistant Music Producer: Shirakawa Music Hall, Sumitomo Marine and 
Insurance Corporation, Japan  
1991–1993 Communications and Human Resource Development Coordinator: Toyota 
Motor Corporation Headquarters, Toyota, Japan  
  
PUBLICATIONS 
 
Research Article in Peer-Reviewed Journals  
Onishi, T. (2007). Japanese fundraising: A comparative study of the United States and 
Japan. International Journal of Educational Advancement, 7(3), 205–225.   
 
Other Selected Research Papers 
Onishi, T. (2011). Artists as entrepreneurs: A study on their fundraising and enterprise 
practices from a perspective of entrepreneurial orientation theory [in Japanese]. Next 
Muses (Aichi Prefectural University of Fine Arts and Music Research Journal) 
March 2011, 31-46.  
 
Onishi, T. (2008). Current conditions and development strategies of philanthropy and 
fundraising in Japan: A comparative study of the United States and Japan. 
Washington, DC: Association of Fundraising Professionals.  
 
Onishi, T. (2008). Fundraising vehicles and philanthropy: Charitable trusts in the United 
States [in Japanese]. Trust Studies in Japan, 29 (pp. 184–203). Tokyo: Trust 
Companies Association of Japan Research. 
 
Onishi, T. (2007). Fundraising for the arts [in Japanese]. Aichi Prefectural University of 
Fine Arts and Music Research Journal, 1(2), 1–24. 
 
Onishi, T. (2005). Research on the current condition of nonprofit and non-governmental 
fundraising in Japan and suggestions for their fundraising development strategies 
[in Japanese]. (Tokyo Foundation Rep. No. 2005–12). Tokyo: Tokyo Foundation.  
 
Onishi, T. (2005). Fundraising and planned giving vehicles in the United States [in 
Japanese]. In the Center on Public Resource Development (Ed.), Research on 
charitable vehicles developed through collaboration between NPOs and financial 
institutions (pp. 87-128). Tokyo: Trust 21 Foundation. 
 
Onishi, T. (2005). Volunteers’ roles in philanthropy and fundraising [in Japanese]. 
Japanese volunteer white paper 2005, 149–158. 
 
Chapters of Books and Encyclopedia 
Onishi, T. (2012). “Fundraising”. In N. Yamauchi, T. Tanaka & N. Okuyama (Eds.), The 
encyclopedia of contemporary civil society [in Japanese]. Center for Nonprofit 
Research & Information, Osaka, Japan: Osaka University. 
 
Onishi, T. (2010). “Media and philanthropy”. In H.K. Anheier & S. Toepler (Eds.), 
International encyclopedia of civil society. New York, NY: Springer.  
 
Onishi, T. (2008). “Giving by corporations”. Giving USA 2008 (pp. 77–88). Glenview, 
IL: Giving USA Foundation.  
 
  
Onishi, T. (2007). “Giving by corporations”. Giving USA 2007 (pp. 79–92). Glenview, 
IL: Giving USA Foundation.  
 
 
PRESENTATIONS 
 
Conference Papers and Presentations 
Onishi, T. (2013). Factors affecting venture philanthropy behavior: From the 
entrepreneurial orientation and institutional theory perspectives. 2013 Academy of 
Management Meeting. Lake Buena Vista (Orlando), FL. August 2013. 
 
Onishi, T., & Bielefeld, W. (2012). Venture philanthropy revisited. Association for 
Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action Conference. 
Indianapolis IN. November 2012. 
 
Onishi, T., & Bielefeld, W. (2011). Institutional influence on the manifestation of 
entrepreneurial orientation: The case of “impact investors.” Association for 
Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action Conference. Toronto, 
CANADA. November 2011. 
 
Onishi, T. (2010). A framework of strategic factors of venture philanthropy funds. 2010 
Academy of Management Meeting. Montreal, CANADA. August 2010. 
 
Onishi, T., & Bielefeld, W. (2009). The dynamics of capital markets for social 
enterprises: Social venture capital funds and factors affecting their funding 
decisions. Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary 
Action Conference. Cleveland, OH. November 2009. 
 
Onishi, T. (2009). Institutional influences on investment decision process of social 
venture capital funds. AIM Alliance Nonprofit Data Conference. Cleveland, OH. 
November 2009. 
 
Onishi, T. (2009). Risk and return factors affecting investment in social enterprises and 
the role of social capital. 2009 Academy of Management Meeting. Chicago, IL. 
August 2009. 
 
Goldfalb, N., Huehls, F., & Onishi, T. (2008). What counts? How does qualitative 
methodology affect research findings? 2008 Association for Research on Nonprofit 
Organizations and Voluntary Action Conference. Atlanta, GA. November 2008. 
 
Onishi, T. (2008). A comparative study on fundraising between the United States and 
Japan. The International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR) 8th International 
Conference. Barcelona, Spain. July 2008. 
 
Onishi, T. (2007). Toward typology of the capital market for social entrepreneurs: 
Overview of the state of research and theory implication. 2007 Association for 
  
Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action Conference. Atlanta, 
GA. November 2007. 
 
Onishi, T., Wagner, L., & Williams, C. (2007). Global fundraising: How does research 
affect practices?: A case study of fundraising in Japan. 2007 Association for 
Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action Conference. Atlanta, 
GA. November 2007. 
 
Onishi, T. (2005). U.S.–Japan cross-cultural examination on development strategies for 
philanthropy and fundraising. 2005 Association for Research on Nonprofit 
Organizations and Voluntary Action Conference. Washington D.C. November 2005. 
 
Onishi, T. (2004). Roles of professional and intermediary organizations in the 
development of U.S. fundraising. Japan NPO Research Association Annual 
Conference. Yokohama, Japan. March 2004. 
 
Onishi, T. (2001). Strategic management by Carnegie Hall: Analysis on its efforts of 
marketing, fundraising, and programming. Musicological Society of Japan 68th 
Conference. Nagoya, Japan. May 2001. 
 
Major International Conferences Organized 
Fundraising in the United States and its application to Japan. A series of forums and 
seminars on fundraising by Dwight F. Burlingame and Lilya Wagner, sponsored by 
the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, U.S. Consulate in Osaka, and the Toyota Foundation. 
Tokyo and Osaka, Japan. September 4–7, 2006. 
 
Fostering philanthropic mind. A series of forums and seminars by Dwight F. Burlingame 
and youth philanthropy workers from Learning to Give and Youth Philanthropy 
Initiative Indiana, sponsored by the Tokyo Foundation and United Way, Japan. 
Tokyo, Japan. February 11-15, 2005. 
 
Invited Presentations and Lectures at Academic Institutions  
Onishi, T. (2006). Fundraising practices in the United States. The Nonprofit & Public 
Management Program, Tokyo University, Japan. June 2006. 
 
Onishi, T. (2004). Educational programs for philanthropy and fundraising in the United 
States. Center for the 21st Century Social Design at Rikkyo University Graduate 
School, Tokyo, Japan. March 2004. 
 
 
RESEARCH GRANTS (SELECTED) 
2012  The Center on Philanthropy Graduate Student Research Grant, $2,000, for 
dissertation research  
 
  
2010–2012 William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, $10,000, for research entitled 
“Dynamics of the Social Capital Markets” (Co-Principal Investigator with 
Wolfgang Bielefeld)  
 
2009–2012 The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University Research Department, 
$5,000, for research entitled “Dynamics of the Social Capital Markets” (Co-
Principal Investigator with Wolfgang Bielefeld) 
 
2007–2008 Matsushita/Panasonic International Foundation Research Grant, JPY300,000 
($3,271), for research entitled Japanese fundraising: A comparative study of 
the United States and Japan. 
 
2007  Cosmo Oil Co. Grant, JPY500,000 ($5,451), for research project entitled 
“Youth Philanthropy in Japan and the United States” (Co-Principal 
Investigator with Dwight Burlingame) 
 
2006–2008 The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership Project Grant, 
$150,000, for research project entitled “Youth Philanthropy in Japan and the 
United States” (Co-Principal Investigator with Dwight Burlingame) 
 
2006  Trust Companies Association of Japan Research Award, JPY500,000 
($5,451), for research entitled “Fundraising vehicles and philanthropy: 
Charitable trusts in the United States” 
 
2006  Association of Fundraising Professionals (AFP) Research Grant (renewed), 
$5,000  
 
2005  Tokyo Foundation Research Grant, JPY1,500,000 ($16,353), for research 
entitled “Research on the current condition of nonprofit and non-
governmental fundraising in Japan and suggestions for their fundraising 
development strategies” 
 
2005  Association of Fundraising Professionals (AFP) Research Grant, $5,000, for 
research entitled “Current conditions and development strategies of 
philanthropy and fundraising in Japan: A comparative study of the United 
States and Japan” 
 
2005  Ruth Lilly Archives Research Grant of the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana 
University, $5,200, for research entitled “Japanese fundraising: A 
comparative study of the United States and Japan” 
 
  
  
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES 
 
Services 
Nonprofit Management Certificate Program coordinator, Master of Public Affairs, 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro (2012–present)  
Academic Program committee member, the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University 
Philanthropic Studies (2011–2012) 
 
Affiliations 
Member, Academy of Management 
Member, Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action 
(ARNOVA) 
Member, Japan NPO Research Association (Nihon NPO Gakkai) 
 
Referee  
Ad hoc reviewer for the Academy of Management Annual Meetings (2010, 2011, 2012) 
Ad hoc reviewer for The Foundation Review 
Ad hoc reviewer for Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly  
 
Consulting Services 
2012  “Program Related Investment and Mission-Based Investment by 
Foundations,” a research project at the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana 
University  
• Conduct research and provide strategic advice on key literature, 
research target and methodology.  
 
2007  “Corporate Social Responsibility for Cummins Engine,” consulting work for 
Cummins Engine and Cummins Foundation, with Suzanne Weber Lupton.  
• Conducted research on the principles, trends, and policies of CSR in 
the United States, EU, Africa, and Asia and made recommendations 
for Cummins’s new CSR programs; developed the Cummins 
Scorecards as the tools for the corporate managers to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Cummins’s CSR activities.  
 
 
DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH OUTSIDE THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 
(SELECTED) 
 
Press Interviews and Articles  
Wakisaka, N. (2007, June 2). Toward a philanthropy nation. Asahi Shimbun, p. A1. 
(Featured interview). 
Onishi, T. (2007, Summer). Youth philanthropy: U.S. model and development in Japan. 
NPO Journal 2007, 18, 33-36.  
Onishi, T. (2006). A comparative study on fundraising between the United States and 
Japan. Japan NPO Research Association Newsletter, 30(3).  
  
Onishi, T. (2006). Models and volunteer involvement of U.S. Fundraising. NPO Journal 
2006, 12, 15-20. 
Onishi, T. (2005, Fall). Competition and collaboration between the nonprofits and 
business in the United States. Kankyo Kaigi, 61–65. 
Yamahata, Y. (2004, December 8). Japanese fundraisers. Yomiuri Newspaper, p. A4. 
(Featured interview). 
Onishi, T. (2003, November). To introduce philosophy of fundraising to Japan’s civil 
society. Fujin Koron, 1141, 75. (Featured interview). 
Onishi, T. (2003). Fundraising practices by arts organizations in Japan. Japan Council of 
Performers' Organizations Journal, 13(1), 4–7. 
Onishi, T. (2003). About the American philanthropy. Japan Initiative News. No. 115. 
Onishi, T. (2002). A Report on international festival by MUSIC FROM JAPAN. Ongaku no 
Tomo, 60(4), 130–131. 
 
Columns in Media 
“Kaigai no Bunka (Cultural Events Overseas: Classical Music)” in Yomiuri Newspaper 
(October 1998–present). 
“Beikoku no Firansolopi (Philanthropy in the United States)” in Philanthropy, monthly 
magazine published for Japanese corporations by the Japan Philanthropic 
Association. (November 2004–November 2005). 
 
Invited Industry Presentations 
Onishi, T. (2007). Fundraising: New trends in Japan and the United States. A keynote 
speech at the Nippon Foundation, Tokyo, Japan. March 2007. 
Onishi, T. (2005). U.S. fundraising strategies and development suggestion for Japan’s 
nonprofit sector. Tokyo Foundation Conference. Tokyo, Japan. April 2005. 
Onishi, T. (2004). Fundraising practices and case studies in Japan. Non-Profit 
Organization Support Center for NPO Program Development Management Seminar. 
Tokyo, Japan. December 2004. 
Onishi, T. (2004). Fundraising and its roles in community development. Aomori NPO 
Support Center Fundraising Seminar. Aomori, Japan. September 2004. 
Onishi, T. (2004). The current condition and issues of U.S. fundraising. The Isshinjuku 
Public Policy and Nonprofit Management Seminar. Tokyo, Japan. August 2004. 
 
 
 
